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ABSTRACT
This study explores the connections between justice understood biblically, and restorative
justice.  Restorative justice theory has argued that its foundational principles and its forms of
practice draw directly from the taproot of biblical justice.  This study argues that biblical
justice as conceived by restorative justice is incomplete.  More, the primary theological and
biblical work in the field has not drawn the connections to the way restorative justice is
practiced.  This study argues that judgment and forgiveness are essential components of
biblical justice that are missing from discussions of restorative justice.  It concludes by
drawing some of the implications of incorporating judgment and forgiveness for restorative
justice practice by suggesting language that can be used by mediators.
Chapter 1 outlines the main principles of restorative justice and describes the ways in which
these principles were initially grounded on a description of biblical justice.  The ways in which
recent writing about restorative justice has identified an apparent loss of vision are explored, a
loss that flows from a theological grounding that has failed to adequately reflect the fulness of
biblical justice.
Chapter 2 explores the main themes of biblical justice.  Drawing connections between biblical
understandings of peace, covenant, and justice, it discusses the ways in which restitution,
vindication, vengeance, retribution, punishment, mercy, judgment, and forgiveness are all
constitutive of a full understanding of biblical justice.  Finally this understanding of justice is
described as central to repentance and reconciliation.
Chapter 3 draws the connections between biblical justice and restorative justice.  Arguing that
biblical justice is a justice for the nations, that it is what justice ought to be, the role that
judgment and forgiveness can play within restorative justice is described.
Chapter 4 connects the discussion to the work that mediators do in restorative justice. 
Offering potential language for restorative justice practitioners, it seeks to find ways for the
biblical and theological discussion to influence their work with victims and offenders.
Chapter 5 draws the argument together, and identifies the necessity of restorative justice
programmes remaining rooted in the church so as to retain the courage and creativity to
continually experiment with new forms of practice.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Framing the Task
The writing of the initial draft of this thesis began in the context of a public event and a
liturgical date: the Pennsylvania Amish response to the shootings at Nickel Mines, and the
Feast of St. Francis of Assisi. 
On Monday October 2, 2006, a 32 year old milk truck driver entered an Amish school
near Nickel Mines, PA, sent all except the female students outside, and barricaded the doors. 
He then shot each of the students, killing five and seriously injuring the other five, and then
turned the gun on himself.  On Wednesday, October 4, the Feast of St. Francis of Assisi, the
news broadcasts began to carry stories of various acts of forgiveness by the Amish community
toward the family of the shooter.  It was a moment of remarkable witness and surprising
connections. 
The week brought television scenes of grieving Amish families gathered in front of the
school, newspaper photographs of buggies on the way to funerals, the voices of leaders
indicating that forgiveness would come, questions from Amish people wondering what God
was telling them, the welcoming of financial assistance from the “English”, and the request
that any mutual aid fund set up for the injured and their families include the family of Charles
Roberts, the man who had shot the girls. 
I watched a group hurt beyond words reaching out in love, compassion, and forgiveness to
family members of the one who had caused the harm, and began to wonder: What might this
witness mean outside the Amish community?  What might this teach about the possibilities for
the criminal justice system?  I am grateful that the Amish community of Nickel Mines has
2
placed the question of forgiveness and reconciliation in the context of deep hurt on the public
agenda.
On that October 4, the Feast of St. Francis, I attended a Eucharist service where I was
reminded again of St. Francis’ sustained call to care for the weak, the vulnerable, the hurt.  I
reflected on what it means to participate in the Eucharist, to receive the body and blood of the
One of whom I claim to be a disciple, and who lived a life that embodied the vision of biblical
justice, on the day that recalls a disciple who sought to embody that same vision.  I began to
wonder how that vision is, and might better be, embodied in the practices of the work I have
been called to do.
2. Locating the Author
For a number of years I have been working at the edges of the problems I address in this thesis
as I have sought to find ways to think theologically about my own work as a conflict
practitioner.  I have not been actively engaged in a restorative justice mediation practice,
though I have been active in training mediators for doing this type of work.  Nevertheless my
practice in other areas, primarily in working with separating couples, and conflicted
congregations and workplaces, has raised a host of similar issues.
My first reflections on issues of restorative justice began in the context of my work in the
late 1980's as a lawyer in the professional discipline department of the Law Society of Upper
Canada.  A number of investigations with which I was involved that led to disbarment caused
me to wonder whether there might have been more restorative alternatives.  More recently I
have maintained an interest in restorative justice through training work and through close
 Marshall, Christopher, Beyond Retribution: A New Testament Vision for Justice, Crime, and1
Punishment (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 33.
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association with organizations working in the field.  I have observed a growing drift towards
instrumental practice, and believe that my experience in mediation practice points towards
some answers to the concerns I have with this drift.  There is a strong need for a model that
takes theological concerns seriously, frames a theologically grounded practice (even if
implicit), and assists mediators in developing a reflective practice.
I come to this project, and to all my conflict work, as a committed Christian in the
Mennonite tradition, who seeks to find ways to give expression in my work and my writing to
a core belief that my calling is to follow in the way of biblical justice lived by Jesus.
3. Identifying the Audience
Much of the writing on restorative justice that I will be surveying below operates within a
Christian theological framework.  Most of this theologically framed writing is less than clear
about its intended audience.  Documents such as the MCC Occasional Papers on criminal
justice could arguably be assumed to be written for practitioners, and other interested people,
rooted in Anabaptist theological commitments.  Howard Zehr’s Changing Lenses and
Christopher Marshall’s Beyond Retribution, both of which are published by Christian
publishing houses, frame a theological argument.  Marshall indicates that he is attempting to
lay a theological foundation for Christians engaged in critique and reform of the criminal
justice system.   Zehr begins his chapter on biblical justice with a statement that, for1
Christians, biblical justice is a more important model than that of community justice discussed
 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Punishment, 3rd ed. (Scottdale, PA2
and Waterloo, ON: Herald Press, 2005), 126.
 See Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 29-30 and Thomas Yoder Neufeld, ‘In the Middle’: Biblical3
Reflections on Restorative Justice (Unpublished Paper Presented to the MCC Restorative Justice
Network, 2003), 14 ff.  This does not mean that working out how to communicate this vitality is easy.
“The dilemma Christians face, then, is not only deciding how Christian values derived from the
eschatological experience of God’s redemptive love and saving justice recorded in Scripture can be
and should be applied in a mixed and fallen society, but also deciding how they are to be expressed in
terms that are intelligible in the marketplace, yet faithfully and explicitly anchored in the distinctive
claims of the Christian story.”  Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 30.
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in the previous chapter.   Other than that, Zehr offers no further discussion about his intended2
audience.
The theological work in the field is often not clear how the theological grounding of
restorative justice is actually relevant for a secular system.  Is the grounding meant as a
founding framework that is then to be ignored in practice?  Is the grounding meant to be the
basis on which Christian practitioners operate, or is the grounding meant also for practitioners
who claim no allegiance to Christian faith?  Is the grounding to be implicit or explicit in
practice?  Is it possible to speak of the foundational values of restorative justice without
having them framed theologically?  In other words, is restorative justice inherently and
necessarily a theologically grounded enterprise?
Restorative justice is an important expression of biblical justice, and as such represents
the way justice ought to be, whether or not one makes the case theologically.  However,
restorative justice that is not grounded in the biblical story loses the vitality of a specifically
biblical understanding of justice.   Beyond the immediate academic audience for which this3
thesis is being written, I am interested in making a contribution to my own community of
practice: those restorative justice practitioners who bring to their practice at least a nascent
 Marie M. Fortune, “The Conundrum of Sin, Sex, Violence, and Theodicy,” in The Other Side of 4
Sin: Woundedness from the Perspective of the Sinned-Against, ed. Andrew Sung Park and Susan L.
Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 135.
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sense that their work is somehow connected to their Christian faith and who wish to draw the
connections more clearly; and to those practitioners who, while not connecting their practice
to a faith stance, are theologically literate and interested in the ways in which theological
concepts might inform their practice.
4. A Note on Language
The language used to designate the parties to a criminal event is complex.  Most writers use
the customary language of “victim” and “offender”.  However, “victim” and “offender”
quickly become identities that shape people’s lives and locate them within the structures of the
criminal justice system.  People harmed by crime who see themselves as victims, and who are
seen by others as victims, easily become trapped in a sense of their own weakness.  People
who commit crimes become offenders, and this identity follows them for much of their lives. 
Both “victims” and “offenders” play officially established roles within the system and these
roles further contribute to the construction of identity.
Many who work with those harmed by crime prefer to speak of “survivors” rather than
“victims.”  Marie Fortune, who has written extensively on issues of sexual offending, argues
that the word “victim” needs to be retained as it identifies an important truth–victims have no
control over the harm that is done to them.4
There is some virtue in using language that is descriptive of the experiences of those
harmed by the crime and those who have acted in harmful ways, instead of using language of
 This question of identity is important in that identities such as “victim” and “offender” are in part 5
constructed by the narrative of the event as told by the participants, by those with relationships to the
participants, and by the CJS. Describing the events and the participants in different ways goes some
way toward constructing the identities in different ways.  It does not eliminate the harms caused by the
events.
 From this point “restorative justice” will usually be abbreviated as “RJ.”6
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identity.  This begins to address several dynamics.  First, the “harm” is an event that requires
response:  support and healing for those harmed, accountability and change on the part of
those who act harmfully.  Second, the identities shaped by crime are not fixed: those involved
in, and affected by, the harmful act need not be locked into identities shaped by the event. 
This form of language also keeps those outside of the event from falling into the trap of
identity creation.   Third, it recognizes that there are far more people and relationships affected5
than the single relationship between those directly involved in the event of harm.
I initially attempted to write using language that avoided the words “victim” and
“offender,” but the resulting text was cumbersome.  As a result I will continue, in most cases,
to use the language of “victim” and “offender,” with the hope that the reader will keep in mind
the issues of identity creation implicit in the language.
5. The Plan for the Project
Restorative justice  in its mainstream, North American, and non-Aboriginal origins can be6
traced to the work of two Mennonites, Mark Yantzi and Dave Worth, connected to Mennonite
Central Committee and to the Ontario parole/probation system.  While RJ was initially rooted
in the practicality of a Mennonite ethics-before-theology/theory style, there soon developed a
body of reflection about RJ that grew out of the particularity of Mennonite peace theology.  As
 From this point I will abbreviate “criminal justice system” as” CJS.”  This abbreviation will be a7
reference to the current system as it exists.
 Shalom is usually translated as “peace.”8
 Tsedeq is usually translated as “righteousness,” while mishpat is usually translated as “justice.”9
7
RJ has become accepted by the criminal justice system  it has largely become detached from7
its theological foundation, and even when it has not, there are significant gaps in the
theological foundation.  
This thesis will explore judgment and forgiveness, two theological themes that have been
largely missing (at least as explicitly articulated), or inadequately developed, in RJ.  Judgment
and forgiveness are central to understanding biblical justice, and are central to the movement
toward reconciliation, which lies at the heart of biblical justice.  RJ that is grounded in biblical
justice must therefore give central place to reconciliation, and thus to judgment and
forgiveness.  Using victim offender mediation as an example, connections between these
themes and practice will be explored.
The biblical and theological work regarding RJ has, to date, been largely grounded in an
understanding of biblical justice connected Old Testament understandings of peace (shalom )8
and justice (tsedeq and mishpat ).  As the theology of shalom and tsedeq has been developed9
in RJ, the discussion focuses around notions of wholeness, obligations created by crime,
making things right, and healing.  It is my argument that this is based on an inadequate
understanding of biblical justice, as it leaves out concepts such as retribution, vindication,
punishment, and judgment, all of which are part of a complete understanding of biblical
justice.  This truncation of the meaning of justice has been connected to a desire to describe RJ
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 286, notes that most programmes have shifted from calling themselves 10
Victim Offender Reconciliation Programmes, to calling themselves Victim Offender Mediation
Programmes.
 This is not to say that there is no literature on forgiveness.  The primary foci of the RJ forgiveness11
literature are two-fold: processes of intra-personal change, and post-conflict societies and issues of
transitional justice (of which South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the most
common referent).  The application of forgiveness as a relational process to situations of “ordinary”
crime is rare. See the database of articles at Centre for Justice and Reconciliation, Restorative Justice
Online [Website], Prison Fellowship International, 2007 [cited September 10, 2007], available from
http://www.restorativejustice.org/article_search_form.  See also the bibliography in Handbook of
Forgiveness, ed. Everett Worthington, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 507-556.  This bibliography lists
approximately 750 items of which only 63 address the political and legal issues.
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as an alternative to the mainstream justice system, a system which RJ characterizes as being
“retributive” and as having judgment as a central feature.  This rejection of so-called
“retributive justice” means that there has been little room for discussion of the retributive and
punitive in biblical justice, and judgment has thus disappeared from understandings of RJ.
The ongoing development of RJ has seen a shift from a focus on reconciliation as goal to
a focus on restitution as goal.   One of the consequences has been the disappearance of10
forgiveness as an explicitly articulated task in the process.  Forgiveness was marginal in RJ
theology from the beginning,  even though it is a crucial element in the process of11
reconciliation.  Its occlusion virtually necessitates the absence of reconciliation as a goal, yet
reconciliation is central to biblical justice.  With the absence/loss of forgiveness from the RJ
discussion, an important piece of biblical justice has gone missing. 
My goal is to recover the theological memory of judgment and forgiveness as themes in
biblical justice, with the aim of building the means to incorporate them into RJ practice. 
Chapter 1 will lay some of the foundation for this project by outlining the main themes of RJ,
reviewing the primary theological documents that grounded RJ from its early days, and
9
exploring the absences.  Chapter 2 will explore the meaning of biblical justice, while Chapter
3 will articulate some of the ways that RJ gives expression to biblical justice.  Chapter 4 will
then draw the various themes together and put some practice flesh on the theological bones. 
Keith Regehr
The Feast of St. Francis of Assisi, 2007
 The story of “the Elmira Case” has been told numerous times.  See, for example, Dean Peachey, 12
“The Kitchener Experiment,” in Mediation and Criminal Justice: Victims, Offenders and Community,
ed. Martin Wright and Burt Galaway (London: Sage Publications, 1989), 14-26; Satisfying Justice: A
Compendium of Initiatives, Programs, and Legislative Measures (Ottawa: Church Council on Justice
and Corrections, 1996); Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses.
 Mark Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation: An Essential Guide to Practice and 13
Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), xlv.  As of 1999, Umbreit identified a total of 1,319
victim offender mediation programmes worldwide in addition to New Zealand which offers RJ in all
jurisdictions.  Of these, there are 26 programmes in Canada and 302 in the United States.  There is a
methodological problem with Umbriet’s list.  He includes the New Zealand programme within the
category of Victim-Offender Mediation (hereafter “VOM”).  He is mixing categories, as New Zealand
offers Family Group Conferencing, a form of practice that includes support people for the primary
participants, with a focus on family members.  A review of Umbreit’s sources for these numbers, all of
which are his own previous work, do not reveal a definition of what he means by VOM.  It is not clear
whether he is using “VOM” as an alternative term that means the same as “RJ”, or whether he sees
VOM as a subset of RJ.  It remains unclear how many RJ programmes there are, how many VOM
programmes there are, or how many programmes there are that use other forms of practice.
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CHAPTER 1: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS
1. What is Restorative Justice? 
a. Key Principles
In the mid 1970's an experiment was launched in Kitchener, Ontario.  At the request of Mark
Yantzi, in a probation report submitted to Judge McConnell, two young men who had
vandalized a large number of properties in Elmira, Ontario, had the opportunity to meet with
those whom they had harmed.   For those outside the Aboriginal world, this story represents12
the beginning of RJ in North America.  This case gave birth to Community Justice Initiatives
of Waterloo Region, the first formal RJ organization in North America.  Since then the
movement has grown, so that the programmes in North America can be numbered in the
hundreds.13
RJ as a response to criminal wrongdoing has several hallmarks that are usually framed in
contrast to the mainstream justice system.  These hallmarks were initially outlined by Howard
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 181 ff.14
 The following outline of principles was developed from Zehr, Changing Lenses; Susan Sharpe,15
Restorative Justice: A Vision for Healing and Change (Edmonton: Edmonton Victim Offender
Mediation Society, 1998); Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice
(Cincinnati: Anderson, Publishing Company, 1997).
 There is a range of penalties available ranging from fines and incarceration to such alternative 16
penalties as community service orders, and restitution payments.  All of these can be seen as a
variation on the themes of loss of freedom or financial penalties.
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Zehr in Changing Lenses,  and since then have been referred to on so many occasions that14
they have achieved something of a consensus within the field.
i. Crime is a violation of people and relationships and creates obligations:  15
In contrast to the CJS, which defines crime in terms of law breaking, RJ sees crime as first and
foremost an act of harm against another person.  It destroys people, disrupts relationships, and
damages communities.  The CJS operates from the premise that the debt owed by the offender
is to the state, or to society more generally, a debt that is paid through the imposition of
punishment.   RJ, on the other hand, is built on the premise that people who cause harm to16
other people have an obligation to repair the harm, so that the offender’s primary obligation is
a personal one to the victim.
The damage caused by crime extends well beyond the direct victim, to involve damage to
extended networks of relationships and the broader community within which the participants
live.  One need only reflect on the cycles of damage to individuals, families, and congregations
in the context of clergy sexual abuse to begin to have a sense of the extent of the damage that
can be caused by crime.  This wider damage exists even if there is no prior relationship
between the victim and the offender, so that a series of break-ins within a community can
12
divide the community as it looks around for someone to blame.  This damage must also be
addressed.
ii. Justice meets the needs of those affected by crime
Restorative processes are focused on determining what needs and obligations have come into
existence as a result of the offence.  Once these have been identified, the task is to determine
how the needs will be met and the obligations fulfilled, how things will be made right.  RJ
does not consider only the needs of the victim and the obligation of the offender, but also
looks to the needs of the offender.  The discussion of needs and obligations may focus on just
the victim and the offender, or the process may address needs and obligations as they impact
the broader network of relationships and the community.
iii. Justice seeks restoration and reconciliation
RJ seeks to reunite what has been divided.  Victims and offenders are divided from each other,
victims and offenders are each separated from their families, their network of relationships and
their communities, and communities are divided against each other in the aftermath of crime. 
RJ seeks to undo these divisions by returning wholeness to the people involved, to their
relationships, and to their communities.  This focus on reuniting explains why many of the
early programmes included “reconciliation” in their programme name.  
b. The Genius of Restorative Justice
The CJS is in many ways a story of failure.  It is a story of punishment that cannot achieve its
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intended goal, of practices not in accord with the stated goals of the system, of offenders who
recycle through the system repeatedly, of victims confused and ignored, of inability to respond
to the mental health needs of many offenders, and of professionals who feel unable to respond
creatively to the needs of those caught up in the system.  RJ was a breath of fresh air that
provided an opportunity to do justice in new ways.  RJ recognizes the fundamental humanity
of all those involved in the system, whether victims, offenders, advocates, or decision makers. 
It continues to offer a way to do justice that many people, both within and outside the system,
immediately recognize intuitively as being somehow the right way.  
RJ’s focus on crime as violation of people, on making things right, and on reconciliation,
are central to more ancient systems of responding to the harms of crime.  The genius of RJ is
that it taps into these ancient needs and responses, and finds structures, techniques, and
methodologies that create opportunities to use these older practices inside the CJS.  It does this
by building connections between those one would expect would least want to have a
connection–the victim and the offender.  
2. Forms of Practice
It would be easy to describe a linear history beginning with the Elmira case, through the
numerous RJ programmes in North America, to the growth of practices elsewhere.  This
would, however, ignore the wide variety of other foundations for RJ, as well as the variety in
the forms of implementing RJ.  RJ in North America was first an Aboriginal practice that
predated the arrival of non-Aboriginal people.  RJ in Australia and New Zealand is similarly
rooted in Aboriginal and Maori practice.
 The inter connections between aboriginal practices and mainstream practices are complex.  17
Aboriginal RJ practices continued to operate to some extent after the coming of white people to North
America, often flying under the radar of the mainstream Canadian legal system.  This was similar to
the ways in which traditional forms of governance survived in the shadows of the imposed governance
structures of the Indian Act.  With the rising interest in RJ outside Aboriginal communities, there has
been increasing attention paid by non-Aboriginal people to these older Aboriginal methodologies. 
The complexity is that the justice systems in Aboriginal communities existed within a broader context
of a relational society, but that society was deeply damaged by its interactions with dominant white
society, the residential school system being one of the major sources of destruction.  
Aboriginal justice practices suffered corresponding damage, often operating on the memory of
the older relational social structures.  When Aboriginal practices are abstracted out of their original
context and used within the context of a dominant society without even the memory of the relational
context needed to support these practices, the practices soon lose any semblance of their original
significance.  Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tifft, Restorative Justice: Healing the Foundations of Our
Everyday Lives (Monsey, New York: Willow Tree Press, Inc, 2005), argue that RJ has to move out of
its place within criminal justice to play a role in shaping a more relational society. It is only when RJ
is rooted within this broader relational social context that it will fully be able to live out its promise.
 Umbreit, Handbook, xxxvii-xxxviii.18
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Victim Offender Mediation, the main form of practice that grew from the Elmira case, is
only one form among many.  A number of other practices are rooted in Aboriginal traditions,
though many of these have been transformed over the years by non-Aboriginal engagement
with the practices.   A large number of other practices have developed over the years. 17
Umbreit lists the following:
[...] community policing, family group conferencing, peacemaking circles, sentencing
circles, community reparative boards that meet with offenders to determine appropriate
sanctions, victim impact panels, restitution programs, offender competency development
programs, victim empathy classes for offenders, victim directed and citizen-involved
community service by the offender, community based support groups for crime victims,
victim advocacy programs, and community-based support groups for offenders.18
While one might quibble about how restorative some of these practices actually are, this list
makes clear that RJ is far more than VOM.  Nevertheless, VOM is the most common form of
RJ practice in mainstream urban Canadian society, and is often the first form of practice
developed by a new programme.
 A new RJ programme, for which I recently provided training services, is currently being 19
developed in Windsor, Ontario.  Despite grassroots efforts to establish a programme over the last
decade, actual programming started when the Crown’s office approached the local mediation centre
asking if it could begin working at establishing a programme.
 Kay Pranis, Barry Stuart, and Mark Wedge, Peacemaking Circles: From Crime to Community (St.20
Paul: Living Justice Press, 2003).
 Peachey, “Kitchener Experiment,” 15.21
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As Umbreit’s list illustrates, RJ has become a significant force in the CJS as it moves into
new jurisdictions, expands existing programming, and receives increasing support from
mainstream actors.   Increasingly, programmes are willing to experiment with different19
models of practice, rather than being tied to VOM.  Programmes in Boston and Minneapolis,
for example, have been leaders in applying Aboriginal originated circle models to the urban
context.20
3. Early Theological Reflections Regarding Restorative Justice
The restorative justice experiment had, at the beginning, no explicitly worked out theological
base, although early practitioners who were connected with Mennonite institutions saw their
work partly in theological terms.  The earliest development of a restorative model in Kitchener
was rooted in the peacemaking of Mark Yantzi’s Mennonite tradition.   For the early21
practitioners, RJ was connected to commitments to peace that were grounded in their
theology. They saw God at work in the world, healing broken relationships, and they viewed
RJ as one possible way in which this work of God could be extended.  As Howard Zehr
describes it, RJ became an “experimental plot” for testing the ideas about new conceptions of
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 158 ff. 22
 Wayne Northey, Justice Is Peacemaking: A Biblical Theology of Peacemaking in Response to 23
Criminal Conflict (Akron, PA: MCC US Office of Criminal Justice, 1992).
 Howard Zehr, The Christian as Victim (Akron, PA: MCC US Victim Offender Reconciliation 24
Program, 1981); Howard Zehr, Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice (Akron, PA: MCC US Office
of Criminal Justice, 1985); Howard Zehr, "Justice: Stumbling toward a Restorative Ideal," in Justice:
The Restorative Vision (Akron, PA: MCC US Office of Criminal Justice, 1989), 1-14.
 Vern Neufeld Redekop, Scapegoats, the Bible and Criminal Justice: Interacting with Rene 25
Girard (Akron, PA: MCC US Office of Criminal Justice, 1993).
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justice rooted in these theological affirmations.22
A series of monographs published by Mennonite Central Committee’s Office on Criminal
Justice opened up the earliest stages of theological reflection about RJ as a variety of
individuals, primarily practitioners, began to look for ways to understand the biblical and
theological premises for their work.  In Changing Lenses Howard Zehr synthesizes much of
the earlier work and articulates a biblical vision of covenant justice.
Several themes pervade the MCC monographs.  First, there are very few references to
New Testament theological strands in these writings.  Wayne Northey does considerable work
with New Testament materials in one of the monographs, picking up on themes such as Jesus’
acts of forgiving wrongdoers and his refusal of retribution in parables such as the prodigal and
the vineyard workers.  Northey also reflects on the cross as the model for dealing with power,
and on the atonement as a model for a non-retributive, non-retaliatory response to the
wrongdoer.   Zehr, in Changing Lenses, speaks only briefly to justice in the New Testament23
with a discussion of the atonement, while his earlier MCC monographs overwhelmingly use
the Old Testament to build an understanding of biblical justice.24
Vern Neufeld Redekop  uses Girard’s theory of the scapegoating mechanism in sacrifice,25
 Where appropriate, I will use the Hebrew terms “shalom,” “mishpat,” and “tsedeq” rather than the 26
English “peace,” “justice,” and “righteousness.” (“Tsedeq” is the masculine form of the noun, the
feminine form being “tsedaqah”.)  I am doing this as a way to emphasize the distinctively social and
relational significance of these words, as well as to hold up to attention the connections between these
concepts.  The monographs under discussion tend to use the Hebrew “shalom” quite extensively
(though not exclusively) as a general replacement for “peace” while repeatedly using “justice” instead
of “tsedeq” or “mishpat.”  This is surprising, given that these documents are struggling to shape a new
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and a reading of the New Testament through a Girardian lens that interprets the crucifixion as
an act against sacrifice, to understand the way the CJS works.  He uses Girard to describe the
CJS as an example of a sacred scapegoating sacrificial system.  This way of understanding the
CJS leads him to a series of questions and observations about the system and the way it works. 
He identifies the violence of the CJS, the purpose of the CJS, the inordinate presence of
minority groups caught up in the CJS, and the lack of support for victims, as issues that are
opened for reflection by seeing the CJS through a Girardian interpretation of the New
Testament.  He does not, however, specifically address RJ.
 Other than these examples, the biblical themes in these monographs are developed from
the Old Testament.  This may be because the supposed theological grounding for the
mainstream approach to justice is found in Old Testament themes of retribution and the lex
talionis.  As a consequence these writers seek to correct what they see as a misreading of the
Old Testament.  It may also be that the Old Testament, with its significant emphasis on law,
lends itself more easily to addressing the structures of justice systems.  It is surprising that so
few of these early writings would seek to frame the theological issues in specifically Christian,
Christological, or Trinitarian terms. 
The primary emphasis in the discussion of the Old Testament is on the linkage of shalom
and tsedeq.   Already in 1981, in the first of the monographs, The Christian as Victim,26
understanding of justice.  An exception is Herman Bianchi, Justice as Sanctuary: Toward a New
System of Crime Control (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), who uses “tsedeka [sic]”  or
“tsedeka[sic]-justice” to distinguish the model he is developing from the mainstream justice system.
 Zehr, Christian as Victim, 15.27
 Northey, Justice Is Peacemaking.28
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 133 ff.29
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Howard Zehr  argued that shalom is a much more important concept in the Old Testament27
than a justice structured around retribution.  He sees a direct connection between shalom and
tsedeq.  Tsedeq is not concerned with punishment, retribution, or separation of the offender
from the community; rather, it is aimed at the creation of shalom.  Tsedeq, and by implication,
criminal justice, must be oriented toward the repairing of relationships and the (re)building of
community.  The roots of some of the core principles of RJ can be seen in this connection
between shalom and tsedeq.
 Shalom and tsedeq cannot be thought about, described, or participated in, apart from the
fact that they are the form that God’s saving action takes.  Northey links the Old Testament
understanding of retribution, which is aimed at restoration and repentance, with the atonement
as an initiative grounded in the love of God for God’s enemies, and with justification as God’s
saving action that creates a new world.   All of these acts of God (retribution, restoration,28
justification, atonement) are grounded in God’s covenant love.  
Zehr treats covenant justice extensively in Changing Lenses.  Tsedeq, he argues, cannot
be separated from God’s unfailing love, God’s decisive action in saving Israel in the Exodus,
or the human response to this love in faithful imitation of God’s compassion through living
Torah.29
 See, for example Zehr Changing Lenses, 15-32, for descriptions of the many ways that victims 30
experience the harms of crime. 
 See, for example, Zehr Changing Lenses, 33-44, for a descriptions of the damage crime does to 31
offenders.
 See Zehr, Changing Lenses; Van Ness and Strong, Restoring Justice; John Pendleton, More 32
Justice, Less Law (Akron, PA: MCC US Office of Criminal Justice, 1987).
 Northey, Justice is Peacemaking, 1-3.33
 This discussion of paradigm shift is based on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 34
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) which deals with epistemology and patterns
in the development of scientific knowledge.  Kuhn argues that the dominant narrative of incremental
development and change does not reflect the reality of how science works.  His was in large part an
argument that personal commitments to existing theory played a significant role in the development of
knowledge, as well as that shifts develop from seeing the old data in completely new and unexpected
19
A second recurring theme is that crime represents a breach in community, a breakdown in
relationships, a damaging of shalom.  If shalom is a picture of a community at rest, a
community in which every member is able to live a full life contributing to the community,
then crime represents an obvious rupture.  There is a deep alienation of victims from their
community and from themselves through the fear, the unanswered questions, and the
wondering if they could have done anything to prevent the harm.   There is a parallel30
alienation of offenders from their communities as the communities seek to protect themselves
from further criminal wrongdoing.   This urge to self-protection alienates the community31
from itself as the impact of the crime ripples out.  In each case, the result is the death of
shalom.  
Third, RJ literature sees the current shifts toward RJ as a return to the older ways of
dealing with crime which had disappeared with the rise of absolute monarchy in England and
Europe.   Wayne Northey  speaks of a paradigm shift in Western notions of justice that32 33
produced the current system.  This shift is symbolized by a replacement of the original34
ways.  It is not entirely clear that the model applies to the development of justice practices.  However
the notion of paradigm shift has moved into the broader culture to mean something akin to simple
rejection of the old consensus for a new consensus built on different data.
 Wayne Northey, Restorative Justice: Rebirth of an Ancient Practice (Akron, PA: MCC US Office 35
of Criminal Justice, 1994), 1.
 Zehr, Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, p 9. See also Van Ness and Strong, Restoring 36
Justice, on the growth of royal power and the colonizing of criminal justice for royal ends.  Though
see also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995), who argues that the rise of the prison represents not a rise in state power but a shift
from inscribing the power of the monarch on the body of the condemned through torture, to inscribing
that power on the mind of the condemned through the disciplinary structures of a wide range of
carceral institutions, of which the prison is just one. Other such institutions include schools, hospitals,
and the military.
 See for example, Timothy Gorringe, God's Just Vengeance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 37
Press, 1996), who argues that 19  century modes of punishment are deeply rooted in particularth
readings of Old Testament sacrifice and expiation and a satisfaction theory of the atonement. He
suggests that these ways of understanding both the Old Testament and the atonement shaped the
“structures of affect” of European culture and were thus instrumental in the development of Western
punitive modes of justice.
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goddess of justice, a “smiling young maid with a friendly look,”  with the currently familiar35
image of the goddess, blindfolded, holding scale and sword.  While the shift in Roman law
and practice related to this new image of the goddess took place much earlier, the shift in
England and northern Europe commenced in the 12  century as the state took an increasinglyth
important role in the prosecution and regulation of criminal behaviour.   The increasingly36
important role of state power, the increase of punitive responses to crime, and the rise of the
prison, all functioned as part of a new way of seeing and addressing crime.
Zehr views the insertion of state power into the CJS as connected to a theology grounded
in a supposed Old Testament focus on retribution and punishing wrath.   This is seen as a37
misreading of the Old Testament.  Reading the Old Testament in a way that leaves retribution
in its proper place opens the way to a different approach to crime.  This removes the
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 130-132.38
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theological ground for retribution and suggests that the rise of retribution as the primary mode
of justice is itself an aberration.  This shift in understanding enables a return to the original
forms of practicing tsedeq.
This view of history is not without its problems.  Not least of these is that ancient forms
of tsedeq developed in a particular social and cultural context, one in which connections of
kinship, clan, and community functioned in ways that are virtually incomprehensible in the
current urban context of North America.  It is unlikely that the older forms of reparative tsedeq
could have survived the rise of the monarchies and the absolutist states of Europe, much as
these forms struggled to survive the monarchy in Israel.  It is thus an open question as to
whether a return to RJ on a broad basis is possible in the modern urbanized nation state.
Zehr does not just critique current ways of doing justice.  He articulates the foundational
principles of RJ, as well as giving a fuller expression to the theological foundations for a
Christian understanding of RJ.  Central to his vision is the interrelationship of shalom, tsedeq,
and covenant.
Shalom, understood as a condition of material and physical rightness, as right social
relationship including the economic and political, and as moral and ethical
straightforwardness, constitutes a unifying theme in the Biblical narrative and represents
God’s intentions for the world.   Shalom is rooted in covenant, a binding relationship that38
carries with it mutual responsibilities and creates the conditions for shalom.  God’s repeated
acts of deliverance throughout the Old Testament, as well as God’s action in Jesus, are rooted
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 133-135.39
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 136-139.40
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 140.41
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 142.42
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in God’s faithfulness to the covenant and are an expression of God’s desire for shalom.  39
Tsedeq is oriented toward shalom, and is itself rooted in covenant and is an expression of
God’s faithfulness.  Tsedeq is not an abstract moral order.  It operates, instead, to create the
possibility of shalom, and is thus oriented toward making things right, to responding to needs,
and to repairing the breach in shalom that is created by wrongdoing.   The adequacy of tsedeq40
is tested then, not by the right application of the right rules, but by outcomes.  Has shalom
been restored?  Have the oppressed been set free?41
Zehr does not reject punishment as inconsistent with tsedeq, though he does reorient
punishment.  There is a tendency to focus on punishment as an end in itself, or to assume that,
if properly applied, it is justice.  For Zehr, punishment must be understood in the context of
shalom and covenant tsedeq.  Punishment is oriented toward vindication for the one harmed,
and is a means of restoring the one who caused the breach of shalom.  42
This model of biblical tsedeq is closely related to Zehr’s model of RJ.  The restorative
focus on needs, on healing, on strengthening the community, on crime as violation of people
and relationships, are all rooted in this vision of biblical, covenantal, shalom/tsedeq.
The MCC monographs, together with Zehr’s book, began the process of building a vision
of RJ rooted in a reading of the Old Testament, with a particular focus on shalom and tsedeq. 
What has happened to that biblical/restorative vision?  In the intervening years has this been a
 In an appendix to Changing Lenses titled “The Subversion of Visions” Zehr expresses deep 43
concern that the reforming vision of RJ may be diverted or subverted from its original intent as it
becomes more fully integrated into the CJS. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 232-236.
 Umbreit, Handbook.44
 Mark Umbreit, “Violent Offenders and Their Victims,” in Mediation and Criminal Justice: 45
Victims, Offenders and Community, ed. Martin Wright and Burt Galaway (London: Sage Publications,
1989), 99-112.
 Mark Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert Coates, and Katherine Brown, Facing Violence: The Path of 46
Restorative Justice and Dialogue (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2003).
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guiding vision?  Has the founding vision of RJ survived the increased acceptance of RJ by the
CJS? 
4. What is Missing From Restorative Justice?
a. Loss of Vision
Much recent RJ literature leaves the reader with a sense that something is missing, in contrast
to the clarity of the vision inherent in the earlier writings.  Northey and Zehr inspire the reader
with a vision of a new way of responding to crime rooted in a clear biblical vision of shalom
and tsedeq, although Zehr also warns of the potential loss of vision as RJ becomes more
integrated into the CJS.   More recent writings carry, in part, a lament for a loss.  A few43
examples will illustrate this.
Over the years Mark Umbriet has made a significant contribution to the field.  He has
done a major study of the development of RJ programmes around the world,  developed an44
important model for addressing serious crime,  and conducted a major study of the45
effectiveness of RJ programmes.   In developing a model for working with people involved in46
and affected by violent crime, Umbreit identifies a number of points of dissonance between
 “VORP” is the acronym for “Victim Offender Reconciliation Program.”  It is used both as a 47
programme name, and as a noun that sometimes (as Umbreit is doing here) seems to be equivalent in
meaning to “restorative justice.”
 Umbreit, “Violent Offenders,” 102.48
 See, for example, Carsten Erbe, “What Is the Role of Professionals in Restorative Justice?”, in 49
Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal
Justice Press, 2004), 293-302, and Dave Dyck, “Are We -- Practitioners, Advocates -- Practicing What
We Preach?”, in Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey,
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the values and theory of RJ and the way RJ is being practiced:
If crime is viewed as conflict between people and the importance of addressing the
emotional needs of both victims and offenders is so central to the model, why does
VORP  focus so much on non-violent property offences in which the emotional trauma47
experienced by victims is probably not as great as in crimes of violence?
If the model operates from a restorative rather than a retributive paradigm of justice,
why is VORP so closely linked to the concept of restitution, which many regard as merely
another form of retribution and punishment?  (The Reagan administration, for example,
supports restitution as part of its commitment to get tough with criminals.)
Even with the nearly exclusive focus on non-violent property crimes, if the VORP
model is committed to viewing crime as conflict between people and reconciliation as the
primary goal of the process, why is only one meeting lasting an average of one hour, with
rare exceptions, conducted between the victim and offender, rather than scheduling
follow-up meetings?  Is it realistic to think that “reconciliation” will occur in such a brief
encounter?
To what extent is the very goal of the model, that of reconciliation, more an
ideological and symbolic value statement of its originators, rather than a grounded and
realistic goal that has a clear meaning to victims and offenders participating in VORP?48
Umbreit has here identified many of the themes found elsewhere in the literature that flow
from the loss of vision: focus on non-violent property crime, restitution as retribution, little
opportunity for actual reconciliation as a result of time constraints, and reconciliation as
symbol rather than programme goal.  Other writers identify increased professionalization of
the field of RJ, and a consequent de-emphasis on the necessity of seeing RJ as a way of life
deeply connected to the character of the people who give guidance to the process, as potential
dangers.   49
NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 277-92.
 Sullivan and Tifft, Restorative Justice, 55.50
 Sullivan and Tifft, Restorative Justice, 154 ff.51
 Sullivan and Tifft, Restorative Justice, 154 ff.  While this may seem to be overstated, this idea 52
that the practitioner is as wounded as the so called “clients” is common in some branches of the
literature.  See for example David Doerfler and Jon Wilson, Facilitating Victim-Centered Offender-
Sensitive Dialogues in Crimes of Severe Violence. (Austin, TX: Concentric Journeys/Just Alternatives,
2005).   Doerfler and Wilson describe the facilitator as “wounded healer.” They set aside a significant
portion of both pre-training preparation and training time for participants to reflect on their own
identities as victim and offender.
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Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tifft argue that growing state involvement of necessity shifts
the nature of RJ away from its founding values into something else altogether:
The qualities required for successful restorative programs are least likely to be found in
social arrangements that are hierarchical, punitive, and non-needs-based.  It is no surprise,
therefore, that as the state has begun to adopt the language and practices of restorative
justice, it has begun to redefine these practices and to vitiate the original intent of
restorative justice, which is to foster forgiveness and reconciliation in the most human
way possible for all involved; those harmed, those who have chosen to harm, and all of us
as the quality of our lives is affected by these harms and our responses to them.50
They argue that RJ practice, by its nature, requires a particular way of being for its
practitioners.  Faced as they are by the trauma of those harmed, and the complex needs this
engenders, as well as the complex and contradictory motivations of those who caused the
harm, practitioners must engage in “self confrontation” as well as struggling to transform the
“power based self.”   Working with the multiple identities, traumas, weaknesses, strengths,51
and denials of those involved in and affected by criminal offending cannot be done well from
a social location of power that sees the one providing assistance as inherently superior to the
parties to the event. Those assisting the parties need to recognize that they carry the same
strengths, weaknesses, identities, and denials as the parties do.   This is difficult for those who52
 Carolyn Boyes-Watson, “What Are the Implications of the Growing State Involvement in 53
Restorative Justice?” in Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews
(Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 221.
 Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto, “Restorative Justice: Steps on the Way toward a Good Idea,” 54
in Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation: International
Perspectives, ed. Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1992), 2.  The European and British RJ movements use the word reparation in a way that is parallel to
the North American use if the word restitution.
 Dean Peachey, “Restitution, Reconciliation, Retribution: Identifying the Forms of Justice People 55
Desire,” in Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation:
International Perspectives, ed. Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1992), 552.
 Peachey, “Restitution,” 553.56
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operate from a professional location, especially for those who function within the state
apparatus.  There is a deep incompatibility between technical expertise and emotional
detachment on the one hand, and on the other, valuing the emotional connectedness needed
between the person guiding the process and the participants in the process.  53
Writing in the European context, Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto identify the
“reparation agreement” as the major outcome of the RJ process.   This emphasis on restitution54
or reparation raises difficulties as many offenders experience restitution as punishment,  a55
perspective exacerbated by the fact that courts at times use community service orders and
restitutionary payments as sentences.  Similarly, victims often connect retribution and the
desire for revenge with their desire for compensation.   A system designed for healing focuses56
itself on restitution as the sign of healing and this sign of healing becomes caught up in the
punishment model of the mainstream system, and restoration becomes that which it opposed
from the beginning.
In a system that has shifted toward implementing some forms of restorative practice,
 Northey, Restorative Justice, p.16.  See also Boyes-Watson, “Implications,” 215, Guy Masters, 57
“What Happens When Restorative Justice Is Encouraged, Enabled, and/or Guided by Legislation?”, in
Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal
Justice Press, 2004), 230.
 Harry Mika, “Introduction” in Sullivan and Tifft, Restorative Justice, xxi.58
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situations that would formerly not have been dealt with through the criminal law are now
drawn into the system in a process that has come to be referred to as “net-widening.”   A57
situation that might formerly have been dealt with by a police lecture about the stupidity of the
behaviour and about what might happen next time may now be given life within the system:
notes are made, files are opened, and the parties are expected to participate in a more formal
restorative process.  RJ may have the effect of expanding the reach of the CJS, with a
consequent expansion of state power over the lives of more people.  This is in contrast to the
limiting of state power that is implicit in the notion of RJ returning responsibility for crime to
the community.  
One of the most eloquent statements on the shifts that have occurred in the RJ field comes
from Harry Mika:
There is a popular view of restorative justice, idyllic and soothing, full of synergy.  It will
not be betrayed by data.  There is lovely visioning, creative modeling, the angst of
implementing, and finally courageous evaluating.  The evolution of the great good thing. 
Another version of its appearance is less eloquent and reveals decidedly darker images. 
Here, restorative justice, disembodied and wrenched from its historical antecedents,
including the social forces that give it meaning and character ... justice as specter. 
Restorative justice becomes the grist of the new justice wars on all the continents, a deep
seated contesting of ownership between state, community and self interests, of marking
and defending territory ... justice as combat.  In the name of restorative justice, obscured
by the deafening regaling in its name, practice soon becomes alienated from immutable
values, diluted and fading away ... justice as entropy.  With numbing predictability,
instantly recognizable by the long suffering advocates of withered incarnations of
alternative justice schemes, restorative justice rolls headlong into retributive impulses,
appetites and concessions ... justice in harm’s way.58
 Mike Batley,”What Is the Appropriate Role of Spirituality in Restorative Justice?”, in Critical 59
Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press,
2004), 365-78.
 There is an important side bar connected to this title, given the way it brings together the religious 60
and the indigenous.  This suggests a particular white or mainstream construction of the Indigenous as
inherently religious.  The recent shifts from a grounding of RJ in the particularity of Christian
theology to a grounding in the particularity of indigenous traditions (especially by people who are not
indigenous and are working with clients who are not indigenous) raises questions of cultural
appropriation and the construction of what it means to be indigenous. 
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While this may be a disturbing vision, it captures the sense of anxiety at the edges of the RJ
community, an anxiety that wonders if the vision has been lost, if RJ has been co-opted so that
nothing is left of what was born in such hope.
b. The Demise of the Theological
As RJ has grown in respectability, the primary concerns in the literature have become
effectiveness, the role of the state in grass roots processes, and the appropriate roles of those
affected by the crime.  The discussion of these issues is divorced from the founding
theological vision articulated by Zehr and others.  A review of the table of contents of the
recent Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, edited by Howard Zehr and Barb Toews, shows
that of the thirty-one essays in the book, only three directly address issues related to religious
tradition and of these, two deal with indigenous traditions.  The third addresses, primarily, the
question of spirituality, while offering a few theological comments on shalom and covenant.59
An appendix to the book offers almost a hundred critical questions in six categories. 
Under the section on “Indigenous and Religious Traditions”  six issues are identified, four of60
which connect to the relationship between RJ and indigenous traditions, while the remaining
 The two issues are:61
• What roots or affinities does RJ have in various world religions?
• Is the spiritual dimension of RJ getting enough attention?  Can and should it when the state
sponsors it?
Howard Zehr and Barb Toews, “Appendix: Critical Issues in Restorative Justice,” in Critical Issues in
Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004),
412-413.
 See for example The Spiritual Roots of Restorative Justice, ed. Michael Hadley (Albany: 62
State University of New York Press, 2001) which includes essays on the religious roots of RJ in eight
different religious traditions.
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution.63
 Helen Bowen, Jim Boyack, and Christopher Marshall, “How Does Restorative Justice Ensure 64
Good Practice?”, in Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey,
NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 265-76.
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two raise more general questions of religious traditions.   Once again the emphasis is on the61
indigenous and the spiritual, rather than the theological.  In the context of secularization, it
makes a certain amount of sense to keep away from theological particularity.  It is telling that
for a movement with so much affinity to so many faith traditions,  a book on critical issues in62
the field pays so little attention to what any of the these traditions have to offer practitioners. 
It is as if these religious traditions, let alone the biblical tradition, have nothing to say to the
critical issues of RJ.
Christopher Marshall’s recent book, Beyond Retribution,  offers a sustained theological63
exploration of the meaning of retribution and reconciliation in the criminal justice context. 
Marshall is both a theologian and an RJ practitioner, yet it is not clear how his theological
reflections on retribution connect with the practice of RJ.  In an article on best practices,
Marshall, with others, offers a discussion of values underlying RJ and how those values are to
be lived in practice.   There is no hint of the theological.  It increasingly appears that the64
 Vern Neufeld Redekop, From Violence to Blessing: How an Understanding of Deep-Rooted 65
Conflict Can Open Paths to Reconciliation (Ottawa: Novalis, 2002).
 See footnote 25 and the discussion regarding Redekop’s use of Girard to analyze the CJS.66
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theologians and the practitioners operate in silos, even when the roles are to be found in the
same person.  This may be overstating the case, but it seems that the primary orientation for
practitioners is what works and the primary orientation of the theologians is getting the
theory/theology right without concern for what the theology means in practice.
Vern Neufeld Redekop, on the other hand, is careful to link theory and practice in his
recent book, From Violence to Blessing.   While not primarily focused on RJ, Redekop uses65
Girardian theory to develop a model for engaging in analysis and intervention in deep seated
conflict.  While having some relevance for developing a biblical and theological66
understanding of RJ and RJ practice there are two problems.  Redekop develops less a biblical
than a Girardian understanding of conflict.  While Girard came to his theory from a reading of
the New Testament, he employs it as a universal explanation for all human culture.  As a
consequence, the use of the theory to explain social phenomena too easily sets aside the
biblical text.  Second, Girard’s theory is built less on a biblical understanding of justice than
on a re-consideration of the sacrificial system in light of Jesus death, which is seen as
representing the end of the sacrificial system.  Girard is interested in using this new
understanding of the atonement to shape a theory for understanding violence within society,
rather than using the biblical text directly as a resource for thinking about the meaning of
justice.
 John Gehm, “The Function of Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System,” in Restorative Justice 67
on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation: International Perspectives, ed. Heinz
Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 548.
 Mary Achilles, “Will Restorative Justice Live up to Its Promise to Victims?”, in Critical Issues in 68
Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004),
65-74.
 Martin Wright, “Victim-Offender Mediation as a Step Towards a Restorative System,” in 69
Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation: International




5. Judgment and Restorative Justice
a. The Absence of Judgment
RJ literature pays virtually no attention to judgment, focusing instead on punishment while
making it clear that punishment is contrary to the principles of RJ.  If the goal of tsedeq is
healing, then imposing a parallel harm on the one who caused the original harm can hardly be
expected to achieve tsedeq.  John Gehm suggests that a dualism has recently developed that
divides justice into two approaches–a soft RJ approach and a hard retributive system.   If he is67
right, then RJ has separated itself from the hard system in order to preserve its distinctive
approach to criminal wrongdoing, resulting in the punitive being expunged from RJ for fear of
becoming a handmaid to the retributive.  This can be seen in the discussion in the literature
about whether there is room for victims who are vengeful,  about the dangers of reparation68
being used punitively,  and about the ways offenders experience reparations as punitive.  69 70
The absence of judgment from the RJ literature follows a pattern similar to the way
punishment is kept from playing a role in RJ.  The CJS (especially as construed by RJ
practitioners) is built on the notion of just deserts.  Given that RJ rejects just deserts, it is
 Thomas Neufeld (now Thomas Yoder Neufeld), Guilt and Humanness: The Significance of Guilt 71
for the Humanization of the Judicial-Correctional System (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s Theological
College, 1982), 22.
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understandable that the language of judgment would be largely absent from the RJ literature. 
What one sees instead is language of accountability for the harms caused, of healing what has
been broken, and of problem solving.  This is language that aims to stay away from the
hardness of a word like judgment.  Even a word with the hard potential of accountability is
softened in a way that defines it to mean the act of repairing the harms.
b. The Cost of the Absence
One of the most significant costs of the rejection of judgment connects to the harm/healing
discourse within RJ.  This discourse is important: victims have been harmed by crime, and
healing does need to occur.  Language of healing, however, becomes problematic when it is
used with regards to offenders.  Healing is an important part of addressing the needs of
offenders, given the history of victimization that many have themselves experienced.  There is,
however, a danger of forgetting the importance of moral culpability.  The guilt of offenders is
an important pointer towards their humanity, and it enables them to re-learn the roots of this
humanity.   Crime creates the obligation to undo, to the extent possible, the effects of the71
crime.   A focus on harm/healing, while turning away from judgment, will contribute to losing
sight of the offender as moral agent.
c. The Hidden Presence of Judgment
The absence of the language of judgment does not mean that judgment is not present.  One
 The primary text is John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge 72
University Press, 1989). See also Nathan Harris and Shadd Maruna “Shame, Shaming and Restorative
Justice: A Critical Appraisal,” in Handbook of Restorative Justice, ed. Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tifft
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 452-62; Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, “The Role of Shame,
Guilt, and Remorse in Restorative Justice Processes for Young People,” in Restorative Justice:
Theoretical Foundations, ed. Elmar G. M. Weitekamp and Hans-Jurgen Kerner (Portland, OR: Willan
Publishing, 2002), 267-84; Gabrielle Maxwell, and Allison Morris, “What Is the Place of Shame in
Restorative Justice?”, in Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb
Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 133-42
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way that the impulse to pass judgment has entered is through the theory of re-integrative
shame.   The theory of re-integrative shame argues that engaging people of significance to the72
offender contributes to the offender developing a desire to change behaviour in an effort to not
disappoint these people.  In an RJ meeting that uses re-integrative shaming, offenders are
forced to face the fact that people of significance to them view their behaviour negatively, an
experience that is similar to that of judgment.  Re-integrative shame theory seems to be an
attempt to rescue the idea of judgment, and it may be this character of the theory that
contributes to the controversy it has engendered.  However, the judgment that is implicit in re-
integrative shame may be more accurately described as disapproval or rejection, which must
be distinguished from a more robust definition of judgment that combines the ascription of
moral culpability with the refusal to reject the offender as human.
A second way in which judgment is present in RJ is through the opportunity for victims to
speak of their harm, to tell the offender the story of their experience of the crime.  Invariably
this process is one where offenders are forced to hear about the pain they have caused and to
face the ugliness of their behaviour.  This is a process of lament, where the victim is able to
speak in terms that are not foreign to the Bible’s imprecatory psalms.  Ruth Duck, in her
reflections on the ways that churches fail in their liturgical welcome of victims, offers helpful
 Ruth C. Duck, “Hospitality to Victims: A Challenge for Christian Worship,” in The Other Side of 73
Sin: Woundedness from the Perspective of the Sinned-Against, ed. Andrew Sung Park and Susan L.
Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 169-170.
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insights on this process of lament, arguing that in contrast to confession as the cry of the
sinner, lament is the cry of the victim.  There are at least three acts that she suggests are part of
lament: naming what has happened, expressing emotion, and condemning the actions of the
offender in the name of tsedeq.   In these terms lament can be seen as a process of judgment.73
A third way that RJ gives expression to judgment is in restitution, through which the
offender repays the victim for the actual costs associated with the crime.  For crimes where the
victim did not have any out of pocket costs, or where the offender cannot afford to pay the
financial losses, restitution frequently takes a symbolic form, such as community service or
work done by the offender for the victim.  Asking for, and receiving, restitution is a way of
affirming that the victim is not to blame, that the offender is responsible for the harms, and
that the offender has obligations to the victim.  The fact that many offenders experience
restitution as punitive and many victims experience it as vindication points to its character as
judgment.
6. Forgiveness and Restorative Justice
a. The Absence of Forgiveness
The connection between RJ and forgiveness is much more complex than the connection to
judgment.  Prison Fellowship International maintains a website that contains the abstracts of
 Centre for Justice and Reconciliation, Restorative Justice Online [Website], Prison Fellowship 74
International, 2007, [cited September 10, 2007], available from http://www.restorativejustice.org/
article_search_form.
 See also Howard Zehr, Transcending: Reflections of Crime Victims: Portraits and Interviews. 75
(Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2001) and J. A. Fourie, “The Psychology of Perpetrators of 'Political'
Violence in South Africa–a Personal Perspective,” Ethnicity and Health 5, no. 3/4 (2000): 283-89.
 This is a false dualism: forgiveness plays both these roles.  It is primarily oriented toward 76
reconciliation, and it achieves healing effects for both victim and offender through this orientation
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close to 8000 books and articles published since 1970 on issues related to RJ.   A recent74
search of the database for articles on forgiveness produced a list of about 290 items.  Of those
about 60 address forgiveness in the context of post-conflict societies such as South Africa,
Chile, and Rwanda.  Excluding words related to faith, religion, or national reconciliation
produces a list of about 180 items almost all of which have been published in the last 10 years. 
The majority of the material abstracted in the database is addressing issues of forgiveness from
a non-religious perspective.  One focus of this literature, as presented in the abstracts, is a
debate over the appropriateness of expecting or valuing forgiveness in the RJ process.  Many
of the writers who address RJ theory from a victim perspective argue that expectations of
forgiveness are oppressive to victims, and that these expectations have the effect of re-
victimizing.  On the other hand, autobiographical materials, in many cases written by victims
of serious violent crime (family members of murder victims, victims of sexual assault), speak
of the crucial importance of forgiveness to their own process of learning to live after the
crime.75
In addition there is a debate in the literature about the nature of forgiveness.  The primary
question is whether forgiveness is an act of victims for their own psychological health, or
whether forgiveness is an act of the victim for the benefit of the offender.   Opposition to76
toward reconciliation.
 Mark Umbreit, Victim Sensitive Victim Offender Mediation Training Manual (Minneapolis: 77
Center for Restorative Justice and Peacemaking, University of Minnesota, 1998).  See also Alva
Orlando,  June Maresca, Shadell Permanand, and Michele Sauve, Victim Offender Mediation
Training, Participant's Manual (Toronto: Conflict Mediation Services of Downsview, 2004) and Eric
Gilman, Christie Bowler, and Eric Stutzman, Inviting Dialogue: Restorative Justice and Victim
Offender Mediation Training Manual, Fifth Edition (Langley, BC: Fraser Region Community Justice
Initiatives Association, 2004).
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expecting forgiveness is assuaged somewhat when forgiveness is seen primarily in relation to
the victim.  In this view, victims forgive in order to relieve themselves of the damage of their
own hatreds, or to free themselves from the control that the offender and the offence have over
their lives.  
 This debate over both the nature and appropriateness of forgiveness has had practical
consequences.  A review of materials used for training mediators who will be working with
those affected by crime indicates that forgiveness is rarely addressed.  Umbreit speaks of the
need to avoid talk of forgiveness in order to prevent the imposition of expectations on the
victim.   At a practical level this means that mediators have not had the opportunity to reflect77
on the nature of forgiveness, its legitimate place in RJ practice, or on how to respond to parties
who express interest in forgiveness.  The result is that parties may be kept from the full
possibilities that RJ could offer them.  
There is one exception to this pattern.  David Doerfler and Jon Wilson have developed a
model for mediating dialogue between victims and offenders in crimes of severe violence. 
Their training manual includes extensive grief inventories for both victims and offenders, each
consisting of over 100 questions.  These inventories are to be completed early in the
preparation process and both specifically address the question of forgiveness.  For offenders,
 Doerfler and Wilson, Facilitating.78
 Umbreit, Training Manual, 63 ff.79
 Suzanne Freedman, Robert Enright, and Jeanette Knutson, “A Progress Report on the Process 80
Model of Forgiveness,” in Handbook of Forgiveness, ed. Everett Worthington (New York: Routledge,
2005), 392-406, and Messmer and Otto, “Restorative Justice.”
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the inventory inquires into their need for forgiveness and how they will respond if it is not
offered, while victims are asked to consider their ability to forgive.   The manual, however,78
does not explore the meaning of forgiveness, assuming that both victims and offenders
understand what it is.
b. Forgiveness and the Language of Healing
The closest cognate to forgiveness that can be found in RJ is the language of healing, as seen
in the core RJ principle of “healing what has been broken.”  Crime breaks the relationship
between the victim and the offender, and this relationship needs healing.  A focus on healing
can open the door to a discussion of forgiveness, reconciliation, and how former protagonists
can live together.  Umbreit, however, describes healing in terms of such benefits for victims as
expressing anger, getting new information, seeing remorse, gaining greater closure, and
gaining control of their lives.  The benefits for offenders include: learning the impact of their
actions, building self esteem by making things right, representing themselves, having input in
the plan, and gaining control of their life.   Healing is not framed in relational terms, nor is it79
connected with forgiveness.
When forgiveness does appear it is usually in the form of intra-personal, or psychological,
healing.  The primary meaning has to do with the victim abandoning resentment,  or releasing80
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the self from being bound by the aftermath of the offence.  When framed in this way,
forgiveness has little relational content.  Forgiveness becomes not a precursor to
reconciliation, but functions primarily to relieve the self from its pain.
There are significant losses that flow from a focus on healing.  First, victims lose the
possibility for full freedom from the burden of the harms they have experienced.  The harms
experienced by victims are more than psychological.  The anger, the pain, and the turning
inward fracture their networks of relationships.  Crime separates victims from their
communities.  While intra-personal healing may contribute to the possibility of rebuilding the
network of relationships, healing the full range of harms requires moving beyond the intra-
personal to empathy and reconciliation.
A second loss is that forgiveness in this intra-personal form has the effect of reducing
moral action to the realm of therapy.  Forgiveness is necessarily related to living the moral life
in the context of a network of relationships.  Forgiveness as an intra-personal process steps
back from reflection on the moral and relational to reflection on the self, so that the focus is on
developing the self as healthy rather than on developing the self-with-others.  Forgiveness as
precursor to reconciliation opens the possibility of strengthening the self-with-others in a way
that strengthens communities.
c. Hidden Forms of Forgiveness
RJ’s core activity is direct conversation, a dialogue between the victim and the offender.  The
simple fact that the dialogue takes place may be a symbolic act of forgiveness. The willingness
of the victim to meet with the offender frequently indicates a willingness to engage in
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understanding and to find a way to relate in new ways.  This cannot be assumed, as it may also
be that a victim wishes to meet with the offender for strictly vengeful and retributive reasons. 
Nevertheless, where the victim enters the process, engages meaningfully with the offender,
and pays attention to and takes seriously the offender’s remorse, forgiveness may happen even
if the word never crosses anyone’s lips.  Similarly, such acts as agreeing to accept a particular
form of restitution, agreement that the offender make restitution by performing services for the
victim, or agreement on how the victim and offender will treat each other if they meet on the
street, may be coded expressions of forgiveness.
Judgment and forgiveness continue to have a hidden presence within RJ.  If RJ is to fully
live up to its potential as a new way of doing justice, this presence needs to become public and
become a more explicit part of RJ practice.  In order to play this role, they require more careful
attention and require theological and biblical underpinning.  The next chapter will explore
biblical understandings of shalom and tsedeq in order to make clear the ways that judgment
and forgiveness function as essential components of peace and justice, understood biblically.
 Perry B. Yoder, Shalom: The Bible’s Word for Salvation, Justice and Peace (London: Spire, 81
1989).
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CHAPTER 2: DEFINING BIBLICAL JUSTICE
Understanding biblical justice, and setting the context for a consideration of judgment and
forgiveness within that understanding, requires an exploration of several words from both the
Old Testament and the New Testament.  Tsedeq is the Hebrew word most frequently
translated as “righteousness.”  Mishpat is usually translated as “justice,” while shalom comes
into English as “peace.”  In the New Testament, eirene is the Greek word for “peace,” while
dikaiosune is usually translated as “righteousness,” though it can also be translated as
“justice.” A cluster of words related to forgiveness must also be considered.  In Hebrew salach
is translated as “forgive,” while the primary Greek words are aphiemi (to forgive, especially a
debt), charis (gift, grace), and charizomai (to grace, to forgive).  In addition, hesed, best
understood as “covenant faithfulness,” though usually translated as “mercy,” provides a large
part of the context within which the other Hebrew words are to be understood, as well as
shaping New Testament understanding of the Greek words. 
Complicating the discussion is the fact that the Old Testament words, in particular, keep
shading into one another.  As Perry Yoder argues (and as is suggested in the title of his book)
the word shalom encompasses much more than peace.  His subtitle describes shalom as “The
Bible’s Word for Salvation, Justice and Peace.”   On the other hand the translation of mishpat81
and tsedeq as “justice” and/or “righteousness” collide with the modern tendency to correlate
“justice” with current notions of court administered justice.  Further, the translation of tsedeq
and dikaiosune as “righteousness” can also serve an ideological purpose that masks the social
 This equating of biblical justice with restorative justice, with both being distinguished from 82
retributive and “contemporary justice” can be seen in two charts outlining the models in Zehr,
Changing Lenses, 151-152 and 184-185.
 I am not a biblical scholar, and I have no facility in either Hebrew or Greek.  This means that the 83
discussion that follows will depend heavily on biblical scholars who have explored the meaning of
biblical justice, with a particular leaning on those with an understanding and sympathy for RJ.
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relational aspects of the Greek and Hebrew words.
Tsedeq and mishpat tend toward a much larger set of concepts than the English
“righteousness” and “justice,” including vindication of the oppressed, acting in accordance
with God’s order and in response to God’s acts of justice, saving action, deliverance,
vengeance, and the preservation of shalom.  More, a re-pointing of the Hebrew root sh-l-m to
produce shalam or shalem (transliterations vary) results in a word field that includes concepts
such as making amends, restitution, recompense, requital and restoration. 
In order to understand the biblical roots for what has developed as RJ, it is important to
move well beyond a description that unproblematically links RJ directly to tsedeq and
mishpat.  RJ has typically contended that shalom means well-being, that tsedeq requires
meeting the needs and responding to the harms caused by an absence of shalom so as to
restore well-being, that RJ is an approach to crime that seeks to give offenders the opportunity
to make good the harms that they have caused, and that the RJ process stands clearly in the
tradition of biblical tsedeq.  82
This chapter will explore each of these words so as to shape an understanding of biblical
justice.  This foundation will lead into a discussion of judgment and forgiveness as aspects of
justice.83
The words under discussion constantly shade into each other and support each other in
 All quotes from the Bible are New Revised Standard Version (Division of Christian Education of 84
the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1989)
 There is a debate in the literature that considerably nuances these definitions: Is shalom primarily 85
a state or condition, or is it a relationship?  Is shalom focused on intra-group or inter-group
relationships? Is the order of shalom a creation of the king or is the king judged by the vision of
shalom?  The discussion here is not significantly affected by the way that these questions are
answered.  See Willard M. Swartley, Covenant of Peace: The Missing Peace in New Testament
Theology and Ethics (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), 27 ff, and
Perry B. Yoder, “Introductory Essay to the Old Testament Chapter: Shalom Revisited,” in The
Meaning of Peace: Biblical Studies, 2nd ed., ed. Perry B. Yoder and Willard M. Swartley (Elkhart,
IN: Institute of Mennonite Studies, 2001), 3 ff.
 Swartley, Covenant of Peace, 28.86
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Contours of Justice: An Ancient Call,” in God and the Victim: 87
Theological Reflections on Evil, Victimization, Justice, and Forgiveness, ed. Lisa Barnes Lampman
and Michelle D. Shattuck (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 116.
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complex ways.  This can be seen in Psalm 85:10  which links mercy, truth, justice, and peace84
together in a relationship that warrants repeated exploration:
Steadfast love (hesed: mercy, covenant faithfulness, loving kindness) and faithfulness
(ehmet: truth, stability, truthfulness) will meet; righteousness (tsedeq: justice) and peace
(shalom: well-being, order) will kiss each other. 
This interplay will become clear in the following sections as a full orbed understanding of
biblical justice is developed.
1. Shalom
At its core, shalom describes the experience of wholeness or completeness, often in the
context of community.   Swartley defines shalom as everything that is needed for healthy85
living and for everything to be in order as it ought to be.   Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that86
the essence of shalom is the fundamental condition of human flourishing.  Where human life
in all its fullness flourishes there is shalom.   Claus Westermann mirrors this definition of87
 Claus Westermann, “Peace (Shalom) in the Old Testament,” in The Meaning of Peace: Biblical 88
Studies, 2nd ed., ed. Perry B. Yoder and Willard M. Swartley (Elkhart, IN: Institute of Mennonite
Studies, 2001), 54.
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shalom when he states that “Shalom as wellness, as being intact, to be in order, signifies the
well-being of the human in all imaginable aspects.”  88
As one example among many, Isa 32:14-20 offers a vision of shalom.  The passage builds
a series of images flowing from the current desolation to a future of shalom: 
[T]he palace will be forsaken, the populous city deserted; the hill and the watchtower will
become dens forever, the joy of wild asses, a pasture for flocks; [...] the wilderness
becomes a fruitful field, and the fruitful field is deemed a forest; [...] my people will abide
in a peaceful habitation, in secure dwelling places, and in quiet resting places; [...] happy
will you be who sow beside every stream, who let the ox and the donkey range freely.
This picture of security is a future oriented vision of a time of shalom that is coming after the
current time of desolation.  The city and the watchtower have become places of desolation, but
there is a time coming when the desolate places will flourish, when homes will be places of
security, and when the blessing of planting and of caring for livestock will not be affected by
that which would otherwise be disaster.  Desolation is symbolized by formerly productive
places becoming the haunt of wandering livestock, yet shalom is characterized by the freedom
to let one’s livestock roam freely.
Walter Brueggemann notes two ways in which shalom is explicated in the Bible.  It is
both a lived historical reality and a future vision.  This distinction reflects the difference in the
experience of shalom by the haves and the experience of shalom by the have-nots, the
difference between shalom that holds things together in the here-and-now, that celebrates the
stability and durability of the world, and shalom that disrupts things as they are and assures
those who suffer that things will not always be this way:
 Walter Brueggemann, Peace (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2001), 35.89
 William Klassen, “Peace (New Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol V, ed. David 90
Freedman (Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 208; Erich Dinkler, “Eirene -- the Early Christian Concept of
Peace,” in The Meaning of Peace: Biblical Studies,2nd ed., ed. Perry B. Yoder and Willard M.
Swartley (Elkhart, IN: Institute of Mennonite Studies, 2001), 72; Jacob Kremer, “Peace--God’s Gift:
Biblical-Theological Considerations,” in The Meaning of Peace: Biblical Studies, 2nd ed., ed. Perry
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For the precarious, shalom can be understood as the assurance that there is a hearer for our
cries, an intruder and intervener who comes to transform our lives.  For the well-off,
shalom can be understood as buoyant confidence that the world will hold together because
there is a maintainer and embracer who abides and certifies our existence in the face of all
its disintegration.  Shalom is not what we have to do; it is a gift from the intruding
transformer and the certifying maintainer.  Israel can say both “He comes,” and
“Underneath the everlasting arms.”89
Nevertheless, for both, shalom represents the possibility and the hope, if not the reality, of the
fullness of human life.
In the New Testament, eirene picks up and expands on this Old Testament
understanding.   Erich Dinkler argues that Paul uses the word in a variety of ways: as a virtue,90
as security, as the opposite to disorder, and as the saving element of the kingdom of God, but
that eirene is primarily to be understood as the abolition of enmity:
Peace as the abolition of enmity carries two dimensions of meaning, though with no clear
separation between them; the reconciliation affects the God-human relationship, giving
the reconciled person free access to God; and it leads to the unity in the church of those
separated, thus tearing down the walls of enmity.  This joining together of peace as gift of
God in Jesus Christ to believers, which grants them access to God, with peace as
humanity’s unity of racially separated peoples in the body of Christ, is constitutive, that is,
foundational to the understanding of eirene.91
Jacob Kremer argues that Jesus proclaimed the shalom promised by the prophets.   Thus,92
in the story of Jesus as given by Luke, Mary’s response to the Annunciation, in a song that has
 Matthew 11:5.93
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become known as the Magnificat (Luke 1:50ff), describes the humbling of the mighty and the
gift of good things to the hungry.  With these words, Mary links the promised child to the
shalom vision of a God who intervenes on behalf of those who suffer.  Similarly, in Luke
4:18-19, Jesus explicitly takes up the shalom vision of Isaiah 61, saying that he has been
anointed “to bring good news to the poor [...] to proclaim release to the captives and recovery
of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favor.” 
Jesus then announces the fulfillment of this scripture.
In Matthew 11, John the Baptist, who is in prison, sends his disciples to ask Jesus if he is
“the one who is to come.”  Jesus instructs them to report that “the blind receive their sight, the
lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor have good
news brought to them.”   In other words, John will know that Jesus is the expected one93
because he is producing shalom.
Shalom is virtually impossible to understand apart from tsedeq and mishpat.  Isaiah 32:17
gives assurance that “The effect of righteousness (tsedaqah) will be peace (shalom); the result
of righteousness (tsedaqah) will be quietness and trust forever.”  Psalm 72 presents a vision
which links shalom and tsedeq as the task of the king.  God is asked to give the king mishpat
and tsedeq so that he can dispense them to the people, particularly to those who suffer. 
Prosperity for the people comes when the king acts as dispenser of tsedeq and mishpat,
vindicating the needy, and crushing the oppressor, and from this role flows the king’s own
flourishing.  The king, who is tsaddiq, creates the conditions for a peaceful and prosperous
life, for the flourishing of the righteous.  Other kings and peoples will serve the king, and this
 Yoder, Shalom, 33-34.  Emphasis in the original.94
 Wolterstorff, “Contours,” 118.  Emphasis in the original.95
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too is shalom, since the bringing of tribute means that the people can continue to flourish
without fear.  Deliverance, compassion, and salvation from need, from death, from oppression,
and from violence all flow from the righteous king.  Prosperity and the flourishing of crops are
connected with the righteous king, yet all this is from the hand of God.  Shalom, tsedeq and
mishpat each produce the conditions for the other, each reinforces the other, and all are the
work of God done through the king who acts in accordance with mishpat and tsedeq.  
Perry Yoder makes this point through the use of the term “shalom-justice.”  Since justice
is primarily oriented toward the oppressed, its purpose is creating shalom where it is absent:
Since material want, oppression, and lack of moral integrity are the opposites of shalom,
God’s acts of justice reverse a non-shalom situation.  God’s justice makes things right by
transforming the status quo of need and oppression into a situation where things are as
they should be.  This transformation forms the basis of shalom.  Given this connection
between God’s justice and shalom, we shall call this shalom justice.  And where shalom
justice is missing, there shalom is missing.  Peacemaking means working for the
realization of shalom justice which is necessary for the realization of shalom.94
Nicholas Wolterstorff similarly argues that God’s love of tsedeq flows from God’s desire of
shalom for everyone:
God’s love for justice is grounded in God’s love for each and every one of God’s human
creatures.  God’s love for a human being consists of God desiring the good of that being –
the good for a human being in turn being understood as the shalom, the flourishing, of
that human being.  Justice consists of enjoying those goods – those components of one’s
shalom – to which one has a legitimate claim.  So of course God loves justice – and hates
injustice [...].  God’s love of justice is grounded in God’s longing for the shalom of God’s
creatures and in God’s sorrow over its absence.95
What follows from this understanding of the connection between shalom, mishpat and tsedeq
is that an exploration of the meaning of tsedeq and mishpat must take place in the context of a
 J. Scullion, “Righteousness (Old Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol V, ed. David 96
Freedman (Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 724-36.
 On covenant justice see Zehr, Changing Lenses, 126-157.97
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deepening of the meaning of shalom.
2. Tsedeq / Mishpat / Justice
Justice in the Old Testament, like shalom, is a “thick” concept.  It encompasses such a large
set of ideas that at times it seems impossible to fully describe its meaning.  Tsedeq is variously
understood as acquittal, deliverance, judgment, justice, saving help, vindication, order in
creation, and community loyalty, while mishpat is understood as vindication of the oppressed,
requital, vengeance, or the retributive justice of God.  If tsedeq is used in a possessive form
(i.e., David’s tsedeq or Israel’s tsedeq) the word can be described as the response to God’s
tsedeq, in the sense of acting according to God’s order in all areas of life.96
a. Justice in Covenant Relationship
Covenant frames the basic relational nature of tsedeq and shalom.   Tsedeq and shalom97
operate in a relational context, rather than being abstract principles governing society. 
Shalom, instead of being an interior feeling of peace, is a way of structuring a community so
that humans can flourish in the context of relationships structured by God’s commitment to
uphold and protect the community.  Similarly, tsedeq, rather than being a set of rules that
govern behaviour, is rooted in the commitment of God to ensure that human life can flourish
as shalom would have it.  God’s action in support of tsedeq, mishpat, and shalom is partial in
 John E. Toews, Romans: Believers Church Bible Commentary (Scottdale, PA and Kitchener, ON: 98
Herald Press, 2004), 401.
 Luke 10:25-37.99
 See Ched Myers, Binding the Strong Man: A Political Reading of Mark's Story of Jesus, 100
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988). The instances of Jesus calming storms in the crossing of the Sea
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opposed by cosmic powers, and that Jesus had the power to overcome them.
 Mark 5:1-20, Mark 6: 53-56.101
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the sense of being on behalf of the oppressed who, as God’s covenant partners, are the
beneficiaries of hesed.  More, tsedeq is not just rooted in hesed, tsedeq is hesed.  The one who
is tsaddiq is the one who acts to support relationships and the social order: “Generally, the
righteous person in Israel is the one who preserves the peace and wholeness of the community
by fulfilling the demands of communal living.”98
This covenantal framing of justice is not restricted to the Old Testament.  Jesus ministry
involved the constant expression of tsedeq combined with an expansion of the scope of the
covenant, such that God’s hesed extended well beyond the confines of Israel.  The parable of
the good Samaritan  would have been shocking to its hearers because those characters in the99
parable who would have been expected to be tsaddiq were not, and the Samaritan, one clearly
outside the covenant for the hearers, is the one person who is tsaddiq.  The parable thus opens
the way to reflection on who is tsaddiq and who is part of the covenant.
Mark’s Gospel is in part structured around Jesus’ movement between the Jewish and the
Gentile sides of the Sea of Galilee in a way that could be described as Jesus stitching the two
sides together.   The healing of the Gerasene demoniac, as well as other healings, take place100
on the Gentile side of the Sea.   Jesus feeds large crowds on both sides of the Sea, 5,000 on101
 Mark 6:30-44.102
 Mark 8:1-10.103
 Toews, Romans, 54 ff.104
 Shalem is the verb form and shillum is the noun form.105
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the Jewish side  and 4,000 on the Gentile side.   In each case these acts are signs that102 103
extend tsedeq as expressions of God’s hesed to those thought to be outside the covenant.
Paul, in writing to the Romans, describes the righteousness of God as rooted in covenant,
a covenant that is expanded to include the Gentiles.  John Toews argues that Romans 1:16-18
is the thesis statement for the letter.  For Paul salvation is available to all, Jew and Greek.  The
righteousness of God is revealed through the faithfulness of “the righteous one”, that is, Jesus
the messiah, which produces faithfulness of both Jew and Greek in response.   Paul makes a104
similar argument in Ephesians 2 about the stitching together of Jews and Gentiles in a new
humanity, though there he uses the language of “peace” rather than “righteousness.”  Given
the essential connection between tsedeq , the word behind Paul’s use of dikaiosune in
Romans, and shalom, the word behind his use of eirene in Ephesians, there is little difference
in the fundamental point.
b. Justice as Restitution/Reparation/Recompense/Repayment 
Repointing sh-l-m as shalem and shillum  produces a word field that encompasses concepts105
such as restitution, reparation and recompense.  Exodus 22: 1, 3-7, 9, 11-15 contains a series
of statements setting out a variety of ways in which an offender is to “make restitution” for a
theft of, or damage to, another’s property, or to “make good” the damage or loss, or to “make
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amends.”  In each case the word used is shalem.
Isaiah 59:17-18 offers a description of the linkage between tsedeq and shalem.  The
passage describes a situation where justice is absent.  In response God comes armed: “He put
on righteousness (tsedaqah) like a breastplate, and a helmet of salvation on his head; he put on
garments of vengeance (naqam) for clothing, and wrapped himself in fury as in a mantle.” 
Once he arrives God repays (shalem) “wrath to his adversaries, requital to his enemies.” 
Repayment is in the form of recompense for one’s behaviour.  Those who have undone
mishpat will receive shillum of wrath and retribution at the hands of the divine warrior who
comes wearing tsedeq, salvation, vengeance and fury.  Here shalem wears a punitive cloak
meant to inspire repentance.
This is distinguished from the use of shalem in Joel 2:23-25.  Following a description of a
return of prosperity, the passage quotes God as saying “I will repay (shalem) you for the years
that the swarming locust has eaten [...] my great army, which I sent against you.”  With the
return of prosperity and tsedeq that follows from repentance, God promises repayment for the
lost years, years that were lost because of God’s prior punishing action.  Shalem then, means
the undoing of the harm of punishment.  In an act of mercy for the offender, peace (shalom ) is
the repayment (shillum) that God offers.  
In Psalm 62:12 shalem implies repayment for behaviour whether good or evil: “For you
repay (shalem) to all according to their work.”  The broader context of the Psalm is
dependence on God for salvation, on God as a refuge.  Because of God’s strength and
covenant loyalty (hesed), people receive shillum for what they have done.  This repayment is
an expression of mercy, of God’s faithfulness to the covenant.  Contrast this with Jesus’
 Wayne Pitard, “Vengeance,” in Anchor Bible Dictionary Vol VI, ed. David Freedman, 106
(Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 786.
 George Mendenhall, “The ‘Vengeance’ of Yahweh,” in The Tenth Generation: The Origins of the107
Biblical Tradition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 90-91.
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statement at the end of the parable of the labourers in the vineyard in Matthew 20:14-15.  The
vineyard owner pays each of the workers the same whether they started work at dawn or near
the end of the day.  The owner’s response to those who complained is “I choose to give to this
last the same as I give to you.  Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to
me?” Jesus’ commentary is “So the last will be first, and the first will be last.”  Here the
payment is one of generosity, not premised on what was done but on the generosity of the
giver.
c. Justice as Vindication/Vengeance 
Addressing the ways that biblical justice incorporates themes of vengeance and vindication
requires attention to naqam, the Hebrew word for “revenge.”  Wayne Pitard argues that naqam
has a generally positive connotation when it is used in legal contexts,  where it often carries106
the sense of punishment.  Thus Exodus 21:20 says “When a slaveowner strikes a male or
female slave with a rod and the slave dies immediately, the owner shall be punished (naqam).” 
George Mendenhall notes that in the earlier sources naqam refers to the legitimate exercise of
sovereignty.  This use in Exodus is a case where the legal system would generally fail to
respond adequately, there being no one likely to speak for a dead slave, so the law provides for
community response as a legitimate exercise of sovereignty in the absence of any other source
of vindication.   107
 Mendenhall, “Vengeance,” 97.108
 Mendenhall, “Vengeance,” 98.109
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Sometimes naqam has the connotation of just recompense.  In Jeremiah 15:15 the writer
calls on God to “remember me and visit me, and bring down retribution (naqam) for me on my
persecutors.”  God’s messenger is threatened because of obedience, so naqam is the act of
God to punish those who would endanger him.   In Jeremiah 11:20, the writer calls on God108
to execute naqam against his enemies: “But you, O LORD of hosts, who judge (shophet)
righteously (tsedeq), who try the heart and the mind, let me see your retribution (naqamah)
upon them, for to you I have committed my cause.”  God’s retribution against the enemies of
the writer is an act of righteous judgment, a usage that is very similar to vindication.  Naqam is
here rooted in God’s sovereignty and in the covenant to ensure that God is not merely a
symbol and support of those with power and wealth.  109
Tsedeq is justice on the side of those who are oppressed.  One of the ways that tsedeq
plays itself out is as vindication, a form of saving action.  When God acted to redeem Israel
from Egypt this was an act of vindication, a turning of the tables.  This is especially important
as the oppression of Israel would normally have been seen as proof of their sinfulness, as the
oppressed often see themselves as oppressed for some wrong they have committed.  When
God acts to save, this signifies, among other things, that the suffering has been unwarranted.
Mishpat is built from the same root as shophet, which, in its verb form, carries such
connotations as decide, judge, rule, govern, vindicate, and deliver, though it is generally
 Temba Mafico, “Judge, Judging,” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol III, ed. David Freedman,110
(Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 1104.
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translated as “judge.”   Psalm 7:8 provides an example of the use of shophet as vindication:110
“The LORD judges the peoples; judge (shophet) me, O LORD, according to my righteousness
(tsedeq), according to the integrity that is in me.”  The verses that follow include images of
God being indignant every day, of whetting a sword and preparing deadly weapons for use
against the unrepentant, and of those who conceive evil falling into their own pit and having
their violence descending on their own heads.  God acts against the enemies of the writer in an
act of justice, and in doing so, God judges according to the righteousness of the writer. 
Judging in this sense, built as it is on God’s decree of justice, acts on behalf of the one calling
for God to act.  Further, judging carries here the connotation of vindication in the sense of
clearing of blame so that in the act of shophet the one who is judged is assured that he/she is in
fact tsaddiq.
Such a use of shophet leaves the impression of a simple dualism of those who are evil and
those who are tsaddiq.  Walter Brueggemann argues that the Old Testament does not
recognize this kind of dualism, using the Israel/Egypt story to disrupt this vision of simple
moral coherence.  In the early part of the story it would be easy to see that Egypt is the victor
by virtue of being right, while Israel is oppressed by virtue of having sinned.  This view,
however, fails to take into account God who says that Israel has been sinned against and who
vindicates Israel:
Everything depends, in this narrative, upon having three parties to the plot.  And
everything for Israel depends upon Yahweh demonstrating that he is stronger than
Pharaoh [...].  And when there are only two characters, it is simple enough to imagine,
with ideological deftness, that Pharaoh is in the right, and that Israel gets what it has
 Walter Brueggemann, “The Shrill Voice of the Wounded Party,” in The Other Side of Sin: 111
Woundedness from the Perspective of the Sinned-Against, ed. Andrew Sung Park and Susan L. Nelson
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 30.
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coming to it [...].  Everything depends upon the third character, in order for the Exodus
event to be dramatically visible.  The Exodus narrative exists in order to assure that
Yahweh will be a palpable and available third party in the life and imagination of Israel. 
It is this third party that makes it possible to see Israel not as sinner, but as sinned-against
by Pharaoh.  What Israel requires as sinned-against, is not guilt, punishment, and
repentance, but an intervening advocate who can and will work justice, and extricate
Israel from this unwarranted suffering.111
There are, however, two issues raised by mishpat as vindication: the reversal of the
pattern of moral coherence, and the question of vengeance.  God, having acted on behalf of
Israel, can be seen to be reversing the moral coherence implicit in the original arrangement of
oppressor and oppressed.  At the beginning of the story it seemed that Egypt was right, and
Israel had sinned, while at the end of the story it has become obvious that this is reversed:
Israel is in the right and Egypt has sinned.  God is on the side of Israel, and God can be
counted on to defend Israel from its enemies, yet it is this reversal of moral coherence that the
prophets railed against.
Jeremiah 29:15-19 illustrates the rejection of this reversal.  Chapter 29 reports the words
of the “prophet” Hananiah, who had prophesied the early return from exile in Babylon,
including the return of the items stolen from the temple, and the return of the king.  Hananiah
is predicting the return to things as they were before the exile, with the temple and monarchy
returned to their places in the life of Judah.  He is predicting that God will again vindicate. 
The response of God through Jeremiah is that Judah will not be vindicated; instead, the
scourging will continue.
Simple moral coherence in either direction does not determine God’s action; vindication
 See for example Matthew 5:38-48 and Luke 17:3-4 both of which call for repeated forgiveness.112
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cannot be counted on.  God’s people cannot just say: “We are oppressed, we are in need, and
we can count on God to show up and rescue us.”  On the other hand, there is a clear assertion
in the Bible that God will act in accord with covenant faithfulness, as God’s hesed can never
be counted out.   However, hesed comes from a God who decides to exercise mercy as God
chooses.  God’s act of vindication in freeing Israel from bondage in Egypt was also an act of
mercy and unwarranted favour flowing from God’s free choice to bestow that mercy.
Tsedeq as vindication is not the same as vengeance or vindictiveness.   If vindication is an
act of judgment that assures the victim that the oppressor is in the wrong, then revenge is a
form of justice that both assures the victim that the oppressor is in the wrong, and causes harm
to the offender.  This harm is for the sake of justice; it is an act of punishment that seeks to
create the possibility of change.  Vindictiveness, on the other hand, is the desire to cause harm
for the sake of harm, rather than for the sake of justice.  
Vindication and vengeance are also present in the New Testament.  In Romans 12:17-19
Paul tells his readers, “Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but take thought for what is noble in
the sight of all. [...]  Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of God;
for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord.’”  As this passage suggests
the New Testament pattern calls on God’s people to practice forgiveness,  and to leave112
vengeance/vindication/punishment to God.  2 Thessalonians 1:5-10 places this vindication in
the context of persecution endured and the coming day of glorification when trouble is payed
back to those who trouble the readers: “For it is indeed just of God to repay with affliction
those who afflict you, and to give relief to the afflicted as well as to us, when the Lord Jesus is
 2 Thessalonians 1:6-8.113
 Most translations read “everyone who has faith”, but see Toews, Romans, 54-57, who uses 114
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revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, inflicting vengeance on those
who do not know God [...].113
In Romans, Paul links the dikaiosune of God, the faithfulness of God, and the wrath of
God.  Paul’s description of the righteousness of God revealed through the faithfulness of the
righteous one is followed by a reference to the wrath of God revealed against ungodliness. 
Romans 1:16-18 places the description of the righteousness of God revealed through
faithfulness between a description of the gospel as “the power of God for salvation to
everyone who is faithful,”  and a description of the wrath of God “against all ungodliness114
and wickedness of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth.”  Both salvation and
judgment here are expressions of covenant faithfulness and of dikaiosune/tsedeq.
Revelation 18 and 19 recount a vision of the fall of Babylon.  An angel announces,
“Fallen, fallen is Babylon the great! It has become a dwelling place of demons, a haunt of
every foul spirit [...].”  God’s people are called to leave Babylon “so that you do not share in
her plagues; for her sins are heaped high as heaven [...].”  Then judgment is announced:
“Render to her as she herself has rendered, and repay her double for her deeds; mix a double
draught for her in the cup she mixed.”  The fall of Babylon is repayment for her evil deeds. 
While those who became wealthy trading with Babylon mourn her fall, there is rejoicing in
heaven, as a great multitude exults over Babylon’s fall:  “Hallelujah! Salvation and glory and
power to our God, for his judgments are true and just; he has judged the great whore who
 This is illustrated in the title of Susan Jacoby, Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge (New 115
York: Harper and Row, 1983).
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corrupted the earth with her fornication, and he has avenged on her the blood of his saints. [...]
Hallelujah!  The smoke goes up from her forever and ever.”  God’s just judgment vindicates
God’s saints and wreaks vengeance on Babylon.
d. Justice as Retribution/Punishment  
Vengeance is rooted in the desire that offenders experience their “just deserts,” to get what is
owed to them.  Frequently this takes the form of a simple reciprocation of harms.  This desire
for just deserts can be seen in the attraction of “eye for an eye” calculations, calculations that
are rooted in the lex talionis from which is derived “retaliation.”.  The lex talionis is given
expression in such texts as Exodus 21:23-25.  The context is a series of rules establishing
punishment for various offences.  Where a pregnant woman has been seriously injured by men
who are fighting, “you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot
for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.”  The law of retaliation establishes
the principle that the offender is to suffer the same injury as the victim.
This desire for just deserts can be seen as rooted in the need for moral balance as
offenders pay a moral debt.  Vengeance and justice are clearly related in the desire for the
world to be made right by achieving this balance.   There is an important connection between115
vengeance and punishment.  Vengeance is vulnerable to returning harm out of all proportion
to the harm suffered.  It is this at which the lex talionis is aimed, ensuring the balance of the
moral universe through reciprocal harms, but no more than reciprocity: only an eye for an eye,
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 162 ff. 116
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not two eyes for an eye.  Vengeance as the balancing of harms is one aspect of justice.  What
distinguishes retributive punishment in the CJS from vengeance is that it operates through
carefully structured institutions that separate the calculus of the balance from the raw emotion
of the victim.
It is this balancing of harms in order to balance the moral universe that is rejected by RJ
practitioners and theorists.  For that reason they also reject the punitive and retributive in the
Bible.  This is necessitated by the very construction of the paradigms: RJ is defined in
contradiction to retributive justice; RJ is defined as equivalent to biblical justice; therefore,
biblical justice cannot be retributive.  In most of the writing that links RJ to biblical justice the
retributive elements in the biblical text are ignored.  Christopher Marshall is the notable
exception.   In order to seriously connect RJ to biblical ground, this retributive material116
needs to be addressed, and allowed to shape RJ.
Recompense, requital, vengeance, and vindication point to this punitive and retributive
function of tsedeq.  Returning to Isaiah 59, it is significant that repayment to God’s enemies
comes with God wearing righteousness, salvation, vengeance, and fury.  As Yoder Neufeld
describes it, mishpat and tsedeq, as God’s messengers, had been abused, and now they return
as the armour of the divine warrior, as victims active in their own vindication.   The117
repayment described here is not an act of undoing harm by the offender.  Harm has been done,
and those causing the harm must receive their due.  Similarly, in Jeremiah 11:19-20 the writer
 Mendenhall (“Vengeance,” 103), connects this usage to the OT use of naqam as the legitimate118
exercise of God’s sovereignty.
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asks God to wreak vengeance on those who plotted against him.  This is a primal desire for
retribution that seeks a moral balancing.  Note also that in both these passages God’s
retributive acts are partial as God takes up the cause of the one who has suffered, and
rebalances the moral universe.
In Revelation 6:9-11 the martyrs call on God for this rebalancing: “Sovereign Lord, holy
and true, how long will it be before you judge and avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the
earth?”  The martyrs are promised that the retribution they have called for is coming.118
However, they must exercise patience, as the time is not yet ready.  This requirement of
patient waiting for God to bring judgment and retribution is reflected in 2 Thessalonians 1:5-
10, referred to previously.  The readers are told that the repayment that is coming has to wait
for the day “the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire.”  
In Romans 2 Paul speaks of the judgment of God on both Jew and Greek, referring to Psalm
62:12, where repayment according to deeds is a function of hesed, where each will receive
repayment according to their deeds.
e. Justice as Judgment
“Judgment” is one of the possible translations of mishpat, a word that is also often translated
as “justice.”  Justice and judgment are thus closely related.  Justice is partial to the oppressed
as it is an expression of the need of the oppressed for shalom.  Similarly judgment is an act of
God for the oppressed and against those who oppress.  God executes judgment in order to call
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Israel to return, so that mishpat as judgment is the precursor to repentance (shub).  In this
sense, judgment is also an act of hope.
Isaiah 19 illustrates this pattern.  The passage opens with judgment against Egypt.  In
response the idols of Egypt tremble, and the hearts of the Egyptians melt at the prospect of
God’s coming.  The plans of the Egyptians are confused, the Nile dries up, the crops fail, and
the economy collapses.  In a disturbing image Egypt is described as staggering “in all its
doings as a drunkard staggers around in vomit,” shuddering “with fear at the uplifted hand that
the LORD Almighty raises against them.”  In response Egypt will cry and God will rescue
them: “The Lord will make himself known to the Egyptians, and the Egyptians will know the
Lord on that day, and will worship with sacrifice and burnt offering, and they will make vows
to the Lord and perform them.  The Lord will strike Egypt, striking and healing; they will
return to the Lord, and he will listen to their supplications and heal them.” 
God both strikes and heals, and strikes in order to heal.  Note the pattern in the text:
judgment is for some past act; judgment creates the possibility for change; in the absence of
judgment, Egypt would have continued as before, not knowing it was confused; and, now that
judgment has come, Egypt has a choice.  In response Egypt, rather than staggering aimlessly,
turns and acknowledges God, and God turns, rescues, and heals.
Judgment presumes a prior act of wrongdoing to which the judgment is applied.  God’s
judgment of Israel is a response to the choices that Israel has made.  For example, in Isaiah
59:18, God is said to repay wrath and retribution to God’s enemies “according to their deeds.” 
In this act of repayment and recompense, as judgment for past action, God’s action is in
response to particular actions by those who are God’s enemies.
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The call to repentance, the call to turn, implies that both the original turning away and the
ability to turn back are choices.  In this sense then judgment and the subsequent call to
repentance imply a moral agency on the part of those who are judged.  Doing what is subject
to judgment, as well as the ability to choose to do what is right, are under the control of the
one being judged.  This does not mean that choices are completely unconstrained.  Choices are
subject to a wide variety of social, economic, and psychological constraints, as well as the
constraint of divine will.  This constraint on choice can be seen in the story of Israel’s
liberation from Egypt.  In the early part of the plague narratives Pharaoh’s heart becomes hard
after his magicians repeat Moses’ actions by “their secret arts” (Exodus 7:13, 22).  In Exodus
8:15, Pharaoh is said to harden his heart when there is relief from the plague of frogs.  By the
time the plague of locusts arrives Pharaoh is ready to let Israel leave, but God hardens
Pharaoh’s heart.  This is repeated in Exodus 11:10 after Moses warns Pharaoh of the final
plague, and again in Exodus 14 after Israel departs from Egypt.
This divine constraint on choice is not arbitrary.  In Romans 9:17 Paul uses this story as
part of an extended discussion of God’s freedom to show mercy as God chooses.  Paul is
arguing that God can be trusted to be merciful.  Mercy is the other side of the coin from
judgment, and God’s use of, and judgment of, Pharaoh show that God can be trusted to be
merciful to God’s covenant partner.  God’s desire to be merciful to Israel required judgment of
Pharaoh.
2 Samuel 24 provides another example. God provokes David to count the people and
David conducts a census.  God then offers him the choice of three punishments (one against
himself and two against the people) for the sin of conducting the census.  David, refusing to
 See the other telling of the story in 1 Chronicles 21 where Satan is said to provoke David to 119
conduct the census.  The alternative source to the provocation doesn’t change the consequences for
David or Israel. Neither does it change David’s choices about taking responsibility.
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choose, throws himself into the hand of God who is merciful, rather than into the hands of
humans. A pestilence strikes the people, killing 70,000, and David finally takes responsibility,
saying, “I alone have sinned and I alone have done wickedly; but these sheep, what have they
done?  Let your hand, I pray, be against me and against my father’s house.”  The passage
suggests that the punishment/judgment of God falls despite the fact that David’s act is said to
be done at God’s provocation.   David’s original decision to fall on the mercy of God is119
disingenuous, for he fails to acknowledge his sin in conducting the census.  It is as if he had
shrugged his shoulders, and in a failure of moral clarity about his own behaviour, said to God,
“You are merciful, you choose.”  It is finally the judgment causing the deaths of the innocent
that inspires David to acknowledge that he had sinned.
Responsibility in the context of constrained choice reappears in Romans 6:19, where Paul
highlights the interplay of choice and slavery: “For just as you once presented your members
as slaves to impurity and to greater and greater iniquity, so now present your members as
slaves to righteousness for sanctification.”  While acknowledging the reality of slavery–either
to sin or to righteousness (dikaiosune: justice)–Paul affirms that people have choice regarding
which master controls them, but having chosen the master, the way is constrained, leading to
either greater wickedness or to holiness. 
Judgment then, points to responsibility within the context of constrained choice.  Despite
the constraints that prevent a full living of shalom and tsedeq this life is a matter of choice
within the constraints.  The one who chooses a life of wickedness is subject to judgment and is
 The formula calling Israel to remember that they had been slaves in Egypt and that God had 120
redeemed them appears in Deuteronomy 5:15, 15:15, and 24:18.
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therefore faced with a new choice–to continue the old way of life or to enter a new life of
shalom and tsedeq.
Judgment is implicit in the love of tsedeq.  To love tsedeq is to hate injustice, and to
speak judgment is to speak a word of truth regarding sin and injustice.  Such tsedeq is on the
side of the weak, the harmed, the dispossessed, and the traumatized.  When God liberated
Israel from Egypt, God’s act of salvation for Israel was not experienced by the Egyptian army
at the Reed Sea as liberation.  It was experienced as judgment that led to death.  When God
freed Israel, God judged Egypt and found it wanting.  
The corollary of this act of judgment/liberation, however, is in the way the story was
remembered in Israel.  God uses the fact that Israel had been in bondage in Egypt, and that
God had freed them, to remind them that they are to treat the alien, the poor, the widow, and
the orphan with tsedeq.   In Deuteronomy 9 God reminds Israel that they are receiving the120
land not because they are righteous, but because the nations in the land are wicked.  There was
however, a further obligation that flowed from the command to remember God’s act of
judgment/liberation.  That was the obligation to struggle against injustice:
The memory of the Exodus contains two related lessons.  The first is that of deliverance:
Act in favor of the weak and oppressed just as God acted in your favor when you were
weak and oppressed.  The second is the lesson of unbending retributive justice: Oppose
oppressors and punish them as God opposed and punished those who have oppressed you. 
The two lessons are closely linked: the second is portrayed as the consequent obligation of
the first.  In an unjust and violent world, deliverance of the downtrodden requires
uncompromising struggle against their oppressors – or so the memory of the Exodus
 Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids: 121
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), 107.
 Volf, End of Memory, 111.122
 Volf, End of Memory, 111.123
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suggests.121
This suggests not only that Israel had the obligation to act justly, but that they also had the
obligation of acting in judgment.   The memory of the Passion affirms and modifies the122
memory of the Exodus, so that forgiveness stands “between the complete disregard of justice
and the relentless pursuit of justice.”123
The fact of judgment could have led Egypt to rightly remember its acts of injustice.  The
fact that the judgment of the plagues contributed to the hardening of the heart of Pharaoh, and
that the judgment of the final plague on the first born led not to repentance, but ultimately to
the Reed Sea, indicates that judgment may not always have that effect. 
 The Joseph narrative points to another way of understanding judgment.  When Joseph’s
brothers go to Egypt to buy food, Joseph engages in a series of acts that raise for them their
memories of what they had done to Joseph. The brother’s responses are recorded in Gen
42:21: this is happening because we killed Joseph.  The act of judgment enabled proper
remembrance.
In Matthew 25, Jesus tells three parables of judgment in the kingdom of God, the parable
of the ten virgins, the parable of the talents, and the parable of the sheep and the goats.  In each
of these parables there is a division between those who are prepared for the coming of the
kingdom and those who are not.  In the parable of the sheep and goats the issue that is subject
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to judgment is whether tsedeq, has been practiced and shalom created.  This judgment is
described as a final eschatological event in which those who are tsaddiq are welcomed into the
kingdom, while those who are not are cast out.
Understood biblically, judgment entails a constellation of characteristics.  Judgment is an
essential aspect of tsedeq and it is essential to building shalom.  Judgment responds to a past
act, but is oriented toward future change.  Judgment presumes that doing wrong is a choice,
but also recognizes that choice is constrained.  Judgment speaks truth regarding the past and is
to that extent partial to the one who is harmed.  Judgment enables the event to be remembered
rightly and calls the one judged to act against injustice.  Judgment distinguishes between those
who are tsaddiq, and those who are not.
f. Justice as Mercy 
If tsedeq is nothing more than retribution, vengeance, and recompense, even if in service of
covenant and shalom, then there is nothing particularly new in the description offered so far. 
However, Psalm 85:10 is an important signpost: “Steadfast love (mercy, covenant faithfulness,
loving kindness) and faithfulness (truth, stability, truthfulness) will meet; righteousness
(justice) and peace (well-being, order) will kiss each other.”   Hesed, understood as mercy, is
intimately connected to shalom and tsedeq.  Psalm 33:5 is another such signpost.  Tsedeq,
mishpat, and hesed are linked: “He loves righteousness (tsedaqah) and justice (mishpat); the
earth is full of the steadfast love (hesed) of the Lord.”
Katherine Sakenfeld suggests that hesed communicates that God is “[...] committed to the
community in covenant relationship as the One who provided for all needs, yet One also free
 Katherine Doob Sakenfeld, “Love (Old Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary Vol IV, edited 124
by David Freedman (Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 378.
 Note the difference from Exodus 20:5-6: “for I, the LORD your God, am a jealous God, 125
punishing the children for the sin of the fathers to the third and fourth generation of those who hate
me, but showing love to a thousand generations of those who love me and keep my commandments.” 
The promise of love to a thousand generations is here conditional on obedience, unlike Exodus 34.
 Donald E. Gowan, Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a Commentary, 126
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 237.
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and uncoercible.”   In Exodus 34:6-7 hesed and forgiveness are linked with God’s nature as124
God is self-described as “The LORD, the LORD, a God merciful and gracious, slow to anger,
and abounding in steadfast love (hesed) and faithfulness (emeth), keeping steadfast love
(hesed) for the thousandth generation, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, yet by no
means clearing the guilty, but visiting the iniquity of the parents upon children and the
children’s children to the third and the fourth generation.”  The context for this statement is
the worshiping of the golden calf at Sinai, the remaking of the stone tablets, and the making of
the covenant.  In this context, one that might have seemed right for retribution, God proclaims
God’s nature as compassionate, faithful, and forgiving.   Yet this mercy does not exclude125
punishment for the guilty.  As Donald Gowan frames it, this formula for describing God
defines the difference between mercy and indulgence or impunity: 
[...] God does not declare the guilty innocent or the innocent guilty, or say it really doesn’t
matter.  There is no such thing as mercy unless right is right and wrong is wrong.  This
brings us squarely up against the mystery of forgiveness [...].  As a God of justice,
Yahweh maintains standards that are never compromised.  Guilt is guilt, without apology,
and guilt of the kind we have encountered in this passage, rejection of the source of life
himself, leads to death.  That defines the nature of genuine mercy.  Mercy is not
indulgence, saying, well, you shouldn’t really do that but if you do I probably won’t do
anything about it.  Mercy is not something that can be claimed, as if the standards were
faulty or impossibly high, and God really owes us leniency.  Mercy finds us condemned,
and then for some reason we do not know, set free.126
 Sakenfeld, “Love,” 379.127
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This statement by God of the connection between guilt and mercy is made in the midst of a
process of remaking the covenant.  Hesed is central to the fact that guilt condemns and yet
mercy sets free.
The formula from Exodus 34 is repeated in Jonah 4:2 where Jonah uses the fact that God
is gracious and compassionate as his reason for fleeing from God’s instruction that he preach
repentance in Nineveh.  Here hesed as commitment, response to need, and freedom drives
God`s response to the people of Nineveh.  While Jonah claims that he headed the other way so
as to avoid giving an opportunity for God`s hesed, this passage also highlights that God`s
response is unexpected.  In the broader context of God’s loyalty to Israel this act of
compassion for Nineveh would be unexpected.  One aspect of hesed is that it encompasses
God’s freedom, since God is not bound by hesed to act in a way or at the time that God’s
covenant partner expects.127
The parable of the prodigal in Luke 15 offers a profound description of divine justice as
merciful.  The younger son’s request for his inheritance was a deep insult to the father, an
insult that can be described as a complete breach of tsedeq, a fundamental breakdown of the
relationships within the family.  Later the younger son in his distress decides to return to the
father, rehearses a speech that repudiates any right to be called “son,” and asks only to be
taken back as a hired servant.  While the son may be presuming on a certain level of
compassion that will at least take him in this role, he does not presume to be a son.  The
father’s response is extravagant.  Not only does he welcome his younger son as son, he holds a
celebration to honour his return.  The son, perhaps expecting a punitive justice, a justice of
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 93.128
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just deserts, receives instead a justice that is an expression of hesed, a justice that returns the
son to the covenant community of the family, an extravagant justice that comes as surprise,
and yet is completely in keeping with the character of the father who is clearly awaiting the
return of his son.  
Paul describes a similar justice.  For Paul dikaiosune is made manifest in the faithfulness
of Christ that incorporates gentiles into the covenant community.  This faithfulness is fully
expressed in Christ’s death as an act of justice making that brings near those who were once
far off:
 [U]nderlying Paul’s interpretation of the Christ-event and the Gospel writers’
presentation of the life and teaching of Jesus is an understanding of God’s justice as a
redemptive power that breaks into situations of oppression or need in order to put right
what is wrong and restore relationships to their proper condition.  Paul speaks of God’s
act of eschatological deliverance in the death and resurrection of Christ as a
comprehensive work of justice-making that liberates oppressed humanity from the power
of sin and death and from guilt of actual transgression, and brings peace with God and
reconciliation between former enemies.  Jesus speaks of the inbreaking of divine justice
as the coming of God’s kingdom, which starts to put right what is wrong on earth,
establishes a relationship of new intimacy between God and humanity, and calls into
being a new community to live a transformed way of life in the midst of the old order.128
Mercy does not function contra justice, as it is often seen to do in the western world.  In
western conceptions, justice functions primarily in terms of just deserts, while mercy
represents a subversion of justice.  Biblically, mercy is integral to justice in the same way that
judgment is.  Judgment serves to bring the sinner to a place of repentance, mercy, and full
return to the covenant community.
 John Kselman,. “Forgiveness (Old Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol. II, ed. 129
David Freedman (Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 832.
 See, for example, Leviticus 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18.130
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g. Justice as Forgiveness
There are two Hebrew verbs that are translated as “forgive,” and in only a few instances is
God not the subject of the verb.  In addition, the verb “forgive” is used in parallel with several
other verbs.  Nasa has the general meaning of “to lift,” in both a literal and figurative sense. 
In the figurative sense it is translated as “forgive” or “pardon.”  In this sense, to forgive would
have the sense of “bearing sin away,” though John Kselman suggests that in some cases it may
have the sense of “bearing iniquity” as a form of temporary forbearance.   In Genesis 50:17129
Joseph’s brothers report that Jacob had asked that Joseph forgive (nasa) the crime the brothers
committed against Joseph.  In Exodus 34:7, God is self described as forgiving (nasa) sin.
Psalm 85:2 has a parallelism, “You forgave (nasa) the iniquity of your people; you pardoned
(kasah, to cover) all their sin.”
The more common word for “forgive” is salach.  In Exodus 34:9, Moses responds to
God’s self description as one who bears sin away by asking that God forgive (salach) Israel’s
sin in worshiping the golden calf, and “take us for your inheritance.”  By implication, the act
of forgiveness by God returns Israel to its status as God’s inheritance, as God’s covenant
partner.  In a repeating pattern Leviticus  says “The priest shall make atonement (kaphar) for130
them and they shall be forgiven (salach).”  Kaphar, the word translated here as atonement,
means literally “to cover.”
Psalm 103:3 describes God as one “who forgives (salach) all your iniquities, who heals
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all your diseases,” linking forgiveness with healing.  Jeremiah 33:8 links forgiveness and
cleansing:  “I will cleanse them from all the guilt of their sin against me, and I will forgive all
the guilt of their sin and rebellion against me.”  In Jeremiah 31:33-34 forgiveness is linked
with not remembering sin.  In verse 33 is a description of the covenant God will make: “I will
put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts [...].  No longer shall they teach one
another, or say to each other, ‘Know the Lord,’ for they shall all know me [...] for I will
forgive their iniquity, and remember their sin no more.”  The new covenant will be one in
which God’s people will remember the law, for it will be written on their hearts, and God will
not remember their sin.
Isaiah 55:7 links forgiveness and mercy.  The wicked are urged to seek the Lord and
forsake their ways: “Let them return to the Lord, that he may have mercy on them, and to our
God, for he will abundantly pardon (salach).”
Forgiveness functions within the framework of God’s covenant loyalty.  Recall God’s self
description as merciful and forgiving in Exodus 34.  God’s willingness to forgive is connected
to God’s character:  God is gracious and compassionate, full of hesed, and as a consequence,
God forgives sin.  Yet this compassion does not exclude punishment.  If God’s self description
is reduced to its core, it might read, “God maintains covenant faithfulness and as a result God
forgives sin and God punishes sin.”  Both punishment and forgiveness are thus part of God’s
character and are expressions of hesed. 
Isaiah 33 presents a vision of shalom, describing the ways in which God is present in
Zion, and offering a variety of metaphors for the way shalom is present.  At the end of the
passage there is an assurance that illness is ended and the sins of all who live in Zion will be
 Gary Shogren, "Forgiveness (New Testament)," in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol II, ed. 131
David Freedman (Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 835.
 Shogren, "Forgiveness (New Testament)," 835.132
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forgiven. Through this assurance of the forgiveness of sin, within the context of a vision of
shalom, the passage points to forgiveness as an essential part of shalom.  Given the linkage
between shalom and tsedeq, it can also be said that forgiveness is an essential component of
tsedeq.  
In the New Testament there are two words translated as “forgive,” aphiemi and
charizomai.  Aphesis/aphiemi (the noun and verb forms respectively) are generally used in the
sense of the forgiving a debt.  Forgiveness in this sense represents a cancellation of the debt.  131
In Matthew 18:23-35 Jesus tells the parable of the ungrateful slave who, having had a huge
debt forgiven by the king, refuses to forgive the relatively minuscule debt of a fellow slave.  In
response, the first slave is sent to be tortured until he pays his original debt to the king.  The
parable connects forgiveness as the cancellation of financial obligation, divine forgiveness,
and the obligations of human forgiveness.  In doing so, Jesus reframes the Old Testament
understanding that God is the primary subject of forgiveness.  At the same time he builds a
structure that links divine forgiveness to the obligation of humans to forgive that parallels Old
Testament structures related to divine justice and the obligation of humans to justly.
The other New Testament word for “forgive” is charizomai, which generally has the
meaning of “giving freely.”  Charizomai comes from the root charis, meaning grace or gift. 
Grace is frequently associated with divine help and salvation.   Thus, in 2 Cor 8:1-2 the grace132
of God enabled the Macedonian churches to give generously, since, “during a severe ordeal of
 This passage is a single sentence in the NRSV, though in the Greek it is the conclusion of a 133
sentence that began in 2:1.
 Shogren, “Forgiveness (New Testament),”  835.134
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affliction, their abundant joy and their extreme poverty have overflowed in a wealth of
generosity on their part.”  
Eph 2:4-7 is a complex sentence  that in the middle asserts “by grace you have been133
saved.”  This assertion is framed by a description of God  “who is rich in mercy, [and who]
out of the great love with which he loved us even when we were dead through our trespasses,
made us alive together with Christ,” and who “raised us up with him and seated us with him in
the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.”  It is this extravagant gift that is the grace that saves.
Charizomai as a verb reflects this sense of gift or grace in its use as “forgive,” a use that is
unique to the New Testament, and that may have been a Pauline invention.   Luke 7:36-50 is134
a recounting of Jesus’ dinner with Simon, a Pharisee, during which a woman, described in the
passage as a sinner, washes Jesus feet with her tears, dries them with her hair, and anoints his
feet with ointment.  When Simon objects, Jesus tells a short parable about two debtors whose
debts are cancelled (charizomai).  This cancellation of debt (the KJV translates this as
“forgiven”) is presented here as a gift freely given, a grace, an undeserved favour. 
Cancellation of debt has this character since payment of a debt is an obligation, and there is no
compulsion on the one owed the debt to do other than require payment.  To cancel the debt is
to freely offer a gift that there was no obligation to offer.
Ephesians 4:31-32 ties together God’s forgiveness as freely given gift, and human




treatment of each other, such as bitterness, anger, and malice, Paul then encourages them to
“be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving (charizomai) one another other, just as God
in Christ has forgiven (charizomai) you.”  The use of charizomai clearly highlights the nature
of divine forgiveness as a gift that calls out a corresponding gifting or gracing as an act
flowing from gratitude for God’s prior grace.
If forgiveness is a grace, a gift, an insertion into daily life that arrives unannounced and
unexpected, the Gospels are also clear that forgiveness is commanded.  Whether it is in Jesus’
comment in the Sermon on the Mount following what has become known as the Lord’s
prayer: “For if you forgive others their trespasses, your heavenly father will also forgive you;
but if you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses,”  or Jesus’135
instruction in response to being questioned on the frequency of forgiveness: 70 times 7,  it is136
clear that for the Christian there is no choice in the matter of forgiveness.  If forgiveness is a
central part of reconciliation, then the command to forgive is connected to the central place of
reconciliation in the Bible.
Understood biblically forgiveness is an essential aspect of tsedeq, and is crucial to the
creation of shalom.  It can be described using a variety of metaphors such as carrying away the
wrongdoing, cancelling debt, covering the wrongdoing, non-remembrance, and healing. 
Forgiveness connects remembrance of the covenant with not remembering the wrongdoing. 
Forgiveness is an act of mercy rooted in covenant faithfulness.  It is a freely given divine gift
that inspires the giving of the gift of forgiveness in human relationships.
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h. Justice as Reconciliation
One cannot speak of the biblical story of God’s actions without speaking of reconciliation.  In
the Old Testament reconciliation appears as the ending of punishment and the restoration of
Israel to living in conditions of shalom, the restoration of the covenant.   Thus in Isaiah 58,
turning toward practicing tsedeq results in God once again being present and in a restoration
of shalom. “If you offer your food to the hungry and satisfy the needs of the afflicted” (v. 10),
“if you refrain from trampling the sabbath, from pursuing your own interests on my holy day”
(v. 13), then “the Lord will guide you continually, and satisfy your needs in parched places”
(v. 11), “then you shall take delight in the Lord, and I will make you ride upon the heights of
the earth” (v. 14).  This motif returns at the end of Isaiah 59.  Here God as the divine warrior
has come with retributive vengeance against God’s own people for their turning against tsedeq
and mishpat (vv. 17-18).  In response to “those in Jacob who turn from transgression,” God
offers a covenant: “my spirit that is upon you, and my words that I have put in your mouth,
shall not depart out of your mouth, or out of the mouths of your children [...] from now on and
forever” (v. 21).  Reconciliation appears here as renewed covenant.
Hosea presents a narrative of Israel’s sin, describing the announcement of judgment, calls
to repentance, punishment, and finally, assurance of a return to shalom.  The closing images of
Hosea present a picture of God`s people as a fragrant garden, a blossoming vine, living in the
shadow of God.  This picture is framed with an assurance that God “will heal their disloyalty
[and] will love them freely [...].” (11:4), and that Israel’s own faithfulness comes from God
(11:8).  Reconciliation comes as a flourishing that flows from God’s act of healing that which
had separated Israel from God and that had been the cause of judgment and punishment.
 2 Corinthians 5:19.137
 Ephesians 2:14.138
 John W. de Gruchy, Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), p 55.139
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Reconciliation is at the heart of Christian theology:  “[I]n Christ God was reconciling the
world to himself.”   It is at the heart of Christian thinking about human relationships: “[I]n137
his flesh he has made both groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the
hostility between us.”   The church then becomes both a reconciled and reconciling138
community.   Reconciliation is the sum total of God’s saving work and is equivalent to139
redemption, salvation and atonement.  Reconciliation restores tsedeq as signified in the140
renewal of interpersonal relations and the transformation of society.141
Ephesians 2 presents a compelling vision of reconciliation achieved through the peace of
God.  Yoder Neufeld notes the connection between Paul’s description of the Gentiles as those
who were far off and have now been brought near, and the use of this description in Isaiah 57
to describe the return of the exiles to Jerusalem.   The entry of the Gentiles into the covenant142
community is a return from exile, a homecoming, made possible by the cross.  This
homecoming is not just a reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles but is centrally a
reconciliation of both Jews and Gentiles to God.  The church is both a result, and an agent, of
this reconciliation.143
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 92.144
 Joseph Healey, “Repentance (Old Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol V, ed. David145
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Reconciliation is never an easy task.  It calls for a depth of transformation on the part of
both parties that invariably comes as a surprise, as grace, as a gift, whenever it arrives.  This is
most apparent when moments of reconciliation happen in the context of crimes of serious
violence.   As Marshall frames it, this is the only way that the power of evil can be defeated:
[...] the way in which Jesus places relationships and the restoration of relationships above
dictates of strict legal justice, and his recognition that evil can never be overcome by more
evil but can be defeated only by reversing the violent payback mechanism of evil, [...] are
a reminder that genuine justice, the justice that makes things better, is never satisfied
merely by following rules, however equitable they are, or by asserting legal rights,
however fair that may be.  It is satisfied only when relationships are restored and the
destructive power of evil is defeated, and this requires a freely chosen relinquishment of
the logic of -- and legal right to – an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.144
3. Repentance
The foundational way that repentance is presented in the Old Testament is as turning (shub).
Walking in the way of God is a common biblical metaphor, thus making the idea of “returning
to the way” a natural way of thinking about repentance.   This sense of returning is captured145
in Lawrence Boadt’s translation of Jeremiah 3:12 “Turn back (shub) O turned away
(meshubah) Israel.”146
Jeremiah 3:19-25 provides a picture of what the turning away and the return look like. 
The passage opens with a statement steeped in pathos as God speaks of being a father spurned
by his son, and of being a husband spurned by his wife:  “I thought you would call me, My
 Walter Brueggemann, A Commentary on Jeremiah: Exile and Homecoming, (Grand Rapids: 147
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 47.
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Father, and would not turn from following me.  Instead, as a faithless wife leaves her husband,
so you have been faithless to me [...].”  God faces the fact that God’s desire to give the
inheritance of the land broke on the fickleness of Israel,  that God’s desire to care for his147
wife disintegrated in her unfaithfulness.  Israel in its unfaithfulness spurned both God and the
inheritance.  It turned and walked away from its faithful husband:
The father wants to give the child this inheritance even more than the child wants to
receive it.  But the moment of gift never comes, because the child neither knows nor
cares.  The wounded father is left with the shambles of hard work and broken dreams and
knows the bitter combination of deep hurt and heavy resentment.148
But this fickleness results not in anger and rejection, but a “relentless yearning for restored
relationship.”149
In response to the yearning of God for restoration, Israel too cries out: “A voice on the
bare heights is heard, the plaintive weeping of Israel’s children [...].”  Israel weeps on the
heights, recognizing that it has forgotten God, that it has in fact been a faithless wife, that it
has turned away.  In response God again invites the faithless, the turned away ones, to return,
and to redirect themselves toward God.  Israel responds, and expresses a desire to return, but is
also deeply conscious of its own choice to turn away: “Let us lie down in our shame, and let
our dishonor cover us, for we have sinned against the LORD our God, we and our ancestors;
from our youth even to this day; and we have not obeyed the voice of the LORD our God.” 
The consequence of Israel’s unfaithfulness to God is its rejection by God and subsequent
 Boyd Luter, “Repentance (New Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol V, ed. David 150
Freedman (Toronto: Doubleday, 1992), 672.
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rejection by its other lovers.  This leaves Israel, after having turned away, with nowhere to
turn, so in the midst of its disgrace Israel recognizes that only in God can it find its salvation.
Implicit throughout this call for turning to God is the question of what Israel is turning
from and what it is turning to.  As has been made clear in the discussion of tsedeq, shalom,
and mishpat above, a significant aspect of God’s doing of justice is the bringing of punishment
on Israel for its failure to practice tsedeq, to live shalom.  By implication, the turning to God
would mean a new practice of living tsedeq and shalom. 
In the New Testament, “repentance” translates the Greek metanoia, which itself translates
what in Hebrew would have been shub.  It means literally “to change one’s mind,” though it is
a change of mind that carries an expectation of a change in behaviour.   The preaching of150
John in Luke 3 provides an example of this.  The crowds are coming to John for baptism, and
he announces judgment: the tree that does not produce good fruit, that is, fruit “in keeping
with repentance,” will be destroyed.  In light of the coming judgment, the people are called to
a repentance that will produce good fruit in lives that are consistent with repentance.  In
response to questions asked by his hearers, John articulates what behaviour would meet these
criteria: behaviour that is consistent with tsedeq and shalom.  
4. Summary
The following model summarizes the description of tsedeq to this point:
(  VINDICATION/VENGEANCE (  REPENTANCE
HARM Y (   JUDGMENT Y (  ATTEMPTED REPARATION Y RECONCILIATION 
(  RETRIBUTION/PUNISHMENT (  FORGIVENESS
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Once a harm has been done, tsedeq calls for movement between each of the steps identified in
the model.  Vindication/vengeance and retribution/punishment are set outside the linear
process as their function is to support the role of judgment in inviting repentance.  In that
sense they are not strictly necessary as repentance may be offered without the extra push
created by vindication/vengeance and retribution/punishment.  Some of these steps may be
truncated: judgment may play a minimal role if repentance is offered early.  Repentance and
forgiveness are placed above and below attempted reparation because they do not always
occur in a linear order.  One would expect a move from repentance to attempted reparation to
forgiveness.  However, forgiveness does not depend on prior repentance.  It can be, and has
been, offered in the absence of repentance.  Repentance may follow after an act of forgiveness,
in a reversal of the usual gift exchange.  Forgiveness/repentance as a paired step opens the
door to reconciliation.
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 172.151
 Yoder, John Howard, The Christian Witness to the State, 2nd ed. (Scottdale PA, and Waterloo 152
ON: Herald Press, 2002).
 Yoder, Christian Witness, 5.153
 Yoder, Christian Witness, 19.154
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CHAPTER 3: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND BIBLICAL JUSTICE
1. Offering Tsedeq to the World
 Zehr describes RJ as it first developed in Kitchener, Ontario and Elkhart, Indiana as an
experimental plot that was planted by the church, and as a catalyst through which the church
sought to effect a transformation of the way justice is done in the CJS.   Zehr’s151
characterization of RJ as experimental plot and as catalyst builds on John Howard Yoder’s
discussion of the role of the church in The Christian Witness to the State.   Yoder sought to152
describe the ways in which the church can speak to “the social order at large or to the state
criticisms and suggestions concerning the way in which the state fulfills its responsibility for
the maintenance of order.”   He goes on to describe how church engagement in education153
and health care ultimately led to the secular authorities taking responsibility for them and
offering them on a universal basis.  The church, he says, has been “the ‘pilot’ creating
experimentally new ways of meeting social needs which, once their utility has been proved,
can be institutionalized and generalized under the authority of the secular powers.”   In this154
way, the church, through the development of RJ, has given shape to a vision and has offered to
the wider community a new way of doing justice.  
A difficult question remains: should the founding theological strands that shaped the
experiment in its early stages continue to play a role once the crop has moved from experiment
 See Marshall, Beyond Retribution; Yoder Neufeld, In the Middle; Millard C. Lind, 155
Transformation of Justice: Moses to Jesus, (Unpublished Paper Presented to MCC Canada Victim
Offender Ministries Office Lawbreaking and Peacemaking Workshop, May 3, 1980).
 Batley,” Spirituality,” 371.  Batley confuses categories as he seems to slip between the 156
theological (RJ rooted in shalom) and the spiritual (RJ as focused on the emotional and spiritual




to widespread planting in a secular society?  Following are some preliminary reflections
connecting the biblical work above and RJ theory.  These are not the first reflections on this
issue in the context of RJ,  but they are central to the discussion in Chapter 4 on RJ practice.155
Batley explores the connection between spirituality and RJ practice, arguing that RJ is
inherently spiritual work.   He argues for “anchored expression,”  by which he means156 157
practice rooted in a framework of principles and values taken from the particular religious
tradition of the practitioner.  This does not mean that practitioners become overt
spokespersons for their tradition, nor do practitioners use ritual grounded in their tradition.
The tradition provides the basis to name, explore, and describe the values driving the practice. 
As an example of this kind of anchored expression, Batley suggests that Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, in his role as chair of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, rooted his
work in his Christian understanding of the role of repentance and forgiveness in creating the
possibility of transformation.158
This kind of “anchored expression” requires the preservation of the tradition within which
practice is anchored, a difficult task for a biblically rooted RJ operating within the CJS, a
 Foucault, Discipline and Punish.159
 Bianchi, Justice as Sanctuary; Daniel Van Ness, “Pursuing a Restorative Vision of Justice,” in 160
Justice: The Restorative Vision (Akron, PA: MCC US Office of Criminal Justice, 1989), 15-27. But
see also Zehr, Changing Lenses, especially Appendix 2, “The Subversion of Visions,” and M. Kay
Harris, “Alternative Visions in the Context of Contemporary Realities,” in Justice: The Restorative
Vision (Akron, PA: MCC US Office of Criminal Justice, 1989), 29-38 which is a response to Van
Ness’ model.
 Matt Hakiaha, “What Is the State's Role in Indigenous Justice Processes?”, in Critical Issues in 161
Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004),
358.
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system that is itself rooted in the need for control.   At the very least there is a mis-match159
between state needs related to social control and the biblical imperatives of shalom and tsedeq. 
While Bianchi and Daniel Van Ness are of the view that the creation of a CJS rooted in the
imperatives of tsedeq is possible, there is a very real danger that the creation of such a system
would subvert the vision of tsedeq and shalom.160
Care must be taken to protect the theological and value base of RJ.  Writing about the
recent implementation of Maori rooted processes in state mandated RJ in New Zealand, Matt
Hakiaha suggests that there is a risk that words, concepts, and processes may move into the
mainstream system without the worldview that grounded these within Maori culture.   A161
similar danger is present in North America, as RJ practices rooted in biblical conceptions of
shalom and tsedeq are implemented by the state, and thus lose their connections to a biblical
worldview.  
Tsedeq as described by Amos is normative for the nations: repeatedly in the first two
chapters of Amos the prophet announces that God will punish the surrounding nations for their
 Ted Grimsrud, “Healing Justice: The Prophet Amos and a ‘New’ Theology of Justice,” in Peace 162
and Justice Shall Embrace: Power and Theopolitics in the Bible, ed. Ted Grimsrud and Loren Johns
(Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 1999), 64-85.
 Grimsrud, “Healing Justice,” 76.163
 Lind, Transformation of Justice, 12.164
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failure to adhere to tsedeq.   For example, in Amos 1:11 the prophet reports that God’s wrath162
will be directed against Edom “[...] because he pursued his brother with a sword, and cast off
all pity; he maintained his anger perpetually, and kept his wrath forever.”  The punishment of
Edom parallels that of Israel described in Amos 2:6-8 which outlines Israel’s punishment for
its failure to be tsaddiq.  Israel’s failure is that it has ceased to be an example to the
surrounding nations.  As Grimsrud says, 
[...] Israel’s failure to practice justice destroys the hope of the nations.  Israel’s
faithfulness is for the sake of the nations, that they might see the light of God’s justice and
love.  When Israel is unfaithful, there is no light to be seen.163
If RJ is rooted in biblical tsedeq, then tsedeq is not something to be practiced in a corner, it is
to find its flowering in a general application.
Millard Lind also argues that the establishment of tsedeq in Israel was meant as a start to
the process of establishing tsedeq among the nations.  The suffering servant in Isaiah 53
(whom the church has identified with Jesus) suffers because he attempts to replace the justice
of the nations with the tsedeq and Torah of YHWH.   This means, then, that the church has164
an obligation to seek the establishment of biblical tsedeq and the replacement of justice as
normally done.  As Lind argues, 
The message of the Bible in regard to justice is not the established church point of view
that the church should accept Roman-English law as its justice, but that society as a whole
should receive blessing from the justice of God as revealed in Jesus of Nazareth and as
 Lind, Transformation of Justice, 23.165
 Stanley Hauerwas, "Punishing Christians," in Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice 166
of Nonviolence (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press, 2004), 200. Hauerwas insists that the church
must offer the world a way of punishing that is different, rather than a theory of punishment that is
different.  The practice of punishment within the church must be a practice that reconciles.  “To be
punished as a Christian is to be called home so that we may be reunited with the community of
forgiven sinners called church and, thus, reconciled with our own life” (199). Arguably the same can
be said more broadly about tsedeq.
 Peachey, “Kitchener Experiment,” 24.167
 I say part of the offering is RJ, since tsedeq is far more than a way of dealing with crime.  RJ is a 168
response to crime rooted in tsedeq. Tsedeq is not RJ, though RJ can be, and should be, an expression
of tsedeq.  Building a response to an economic system that leaves many without the necessities for
shalom is also a form of tsedeq.
84
mediated through the community of faith.165
That blessing comes neither in the form of new theories of punishment, nor in a carefully
worked out programme for implementing justice, but in a practice offered to the world by the
church.   This offering of a practice evokes Zehr’s description of RJ as an experimental plot. 166
As Peachey suggests, however, experiments are risky,  since the experimenter cannot be sure167
of the outcome.  Nevertheless, the experiment is conducted, in the hope of new information
that will be able to point towards further experiments.
If tsedeq is a tsedeq for the nations, then the church must be willing to offer the practice
of forms of RJ that are fully informed by tsedeq,  while at the same time being aware of the168
dangers of subversion.   This approach values the principles of RJ that have already been
developed by Zehr and others, while also welcoming the presence of judgment, repentance and
forgiveness.  As discussed in Chapter 1, judgment and forgiveness already play a hidden role
within RJ.  The task then is to make these hidden forms of judgment and forgiveness fully
present, while ensuring that their functioning is more fully formed by biblical understandings.
 Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 169
Company, 2005), 7.
 O’Donovan, Ways of Judgment, 8-10.170
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2. The Role of Judgment in Restorative Justice
Oliver O’Donovan provides a working definition of judgment that reflects many of the
characteristics described in the earlier biblical discussion: 
[Judgment is] an act of moral discrimination that pronounces upon a preceding act or
existing state of affairs to establish a new public context.169
There are three significant aspects to this definition: judgment is an act of moral
discrimination that divides right from wrong; judgment is reactive in that it speaks to a past act
or existing state of affairs, rather than taking initiative; and judgment creates a context for
future action.   This definition can be expanded to take into account the conclusion of the170
biblical study above.  As an act of moral discrimination, judgment presumes that doing wrong
is a choice, but also recognizes the constraints under which choice is exercised.  In
pronouncing on a preceding act or state of affairs, judgment speaks truth regarding those acts
in a way that is partial to the one harmed, and in so doing enables right remembrance of the
act.  In establishing a new public context judgment is oriented toward future change in a way
that calls on the one who is judged to act against injustice.  If RJ is to take judgment seriously,
all three of these aspects of the definition, as expanded, must be present.
Judgment as an act of moral discrimination makes it clear that what the offender has done
is wrong, that the offender has committed an offence.  In this sense, judgment contributes to
right remembrance of the offence by both the victim and the offender.  Volf identifies three
guiding characteristics of harm remembered rightly: remember truthfully, remember so as to
 Volf, End of Memory, 96.171
 Guilt is a word like judgment, in that it does not inspire great attraction in the current cultural 172
context.  In particular, guilt is often associated with a form of the shame of disgrace that may exist in
the absence of any morally culpable act.  I am using guilt in the sense of moral culpability for previous
acts.  In other words guilt is the moral location of an offender in the face of judgment as an act of
moral discrimination.  This is different from guilt awareness, which may accompany guilt.  Guilt
awareness may or may not be accompanied by feelings that look like the shame of disgrace. See
Neufeld (Guilt and Humanness, 6-8), who identifies the ways that guilt is understood by various
actors in the CJS.  Of particular note is his discussion of guilt feelings as feelings of “badness” and
“unworthiness.” Guilt feelings can be distinguished from guilt as “legal entity,” something that exists
apart from the feelings of the individual.
According to Neufeld (Guilt and Humanness, p 19), guilt belongs not only to the offender, but173
also to the rest of society which laid the foundation for the offence.
 Contrary to what happens in the CJS where guilt is ascertained outside of any network of 174
relationships.
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heal, and remember so as to learn from the past.   While Volf is clear about the ways in171
which memory is subject to loss over time, and to distortion so as to protect the innocence of
the one remembering, there is nevertheless an obligation to remember as truthfully as possible. 
A major blockage in the process of healing for victims is denial by offenders, either about
having committed the act, or about the extent of the harm.  Truthful memory of the offence as
offence circumvents this denial and so contributes to victim recovery.  Denial also keeps
offenders from learning from the offence, and cuts them off from the full import of their
action.  Truthful memory brings offenders face to face with the consequences of their
behaviour, and creates the opportunity to learn from the experience so as to change.
The offender is a moral agent.  While noting that guilt  is shared more broadly than just172
the offender,  Neufeld also notes that guilt is deeply personal and is known in the context of173
relationships.   Through this relational guilt criminals rediscover the roots of their humanity,174
 Neufeld, Guilt and Humanness, 22.175
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and in seeing the evil of their action, the way to repentance and forgiveness is opened.  175
Judgment plays a similar role, and is a step that comes before knowledge of guilt.  Judgment
opens the way to humanness and human connectedness by enabling offenders to see the
consequences of their behaviour in relationship and to consider what other options are open to
them in responding to those they have harmed.
The offender is, however, also embedded in a matrix of sin and social forces and this
embeddedness must be highlighted if judgment is to play its proper role in the RJ process.
Judgment has to be clear about what is judged and what is not, so that offenders take
responsibility for the choices they make, while not being held responsible for the social forces
that played a role in these choices.  Issues of social class, family of origin, education, mental
health, racist social structures, and much more play a role in the choices offenders make. 
Judgment must be clear about the constraints faced by offenders, while still ensuring that
offenders take responsibility for the choices they have made and the consequence that flow
from those choices.
Judgment is reactive in that it speaks to the past.  It describes what has happened and
describes it truthfully, noting who has done what, and where moral culpability lies.  In doing
this, judgment takes the victim’s experience seriously, and is to that extent partial to victims. 
The invasions of the self, the traumas, and the uncertainties created by criminal wrongdoing
are not easily dealt with, given that crime separates victims from their humanity and from the
fundamental connectedness of human life.  Judgment aids in the process of reconnecting
victims to their humanity by asserting that victims are not what the crime says they are. 
 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and 176
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 79 ff.
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Victims are not to blame for the harms they have experienced.  Judgment says that offenders
are responsible for the harms and for undoing the harms, and in doing so judgment vindicates
the victim.
Volf, however, speaks of the non-innocence of victims.   This is potentially true in four176
senses.  The roles of victim and offender are fluid, so that, in an ongoing relationship, the
members often take turns being offender and victim.  In some crimes the choice of whom to
charge is not always clear.  For example, where two people engage in a physical confrontation,
only one may be charged, even though the assault may be a response to repeated bullying that
falls short of being criminal.  To the extent that the person who is in law the victim of an
offence has offended against the offender, that victim cannot be said to be innocent.  Volf,
though, has in mind a more complex, and counter-intuitive idea.  He argues that even where
victims are legally innocent there are two ways in which they are not finally innocent.  He
speaks of the hatreds, desires for revenge, and the rage that victims experience after an
offence, and the ways these taint the memory of the offence, and damage any possibility of
reconciliation.  However, in a deeper sense, no one is innocent and this non-innocence
corrupts every attempt at judgment:
[I]n the name of the one truly innocent victim and what he stood for, the crucified
Messiah of God, we should demask as inescapably sinful the world constructed around
exclusive moral polarities--here, on our side, ‘the just,’ ‘the pure,’ ‘the innocent,’ ‘the
true,’ ‘the good,’ and there, the other side, ‘the unjust,’ ‘the corrupt,’ ‘the guilty,’ ‘the
liars,’ ‘the evil’ --and then seek to transform the worlds in which justice and injustice,
goodness and evil, innocence and guilt, purity and corruption, truth and deception
crisscross and intersect, guided by the recognition that the economy of undeserved grace
has primacy over the economy of moral deserts.  Under the conditions of pervasive
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 84.177
 Volf is writing out of his experience with the multiple hatreds of the former Yugoslavia which 178
erupted into the horrors of ethnic cleansing and the Balkan wars at the end of the 20  century, anth
experience that makes claims to innocence particularly specious.  While I think Volf is ultimately
correct on this point of non-innocence, I make the point with great trepidation.  As one who has never
been victimized in any traumatic way, I hear and see in my mind a person who has been, looking at me
with rage, saying, “How dare you?!” All my qualifications around this point mean nothing to one who
has suffered great harm.  What comfort I take comes from reading reflections from survivors who
speak of their own struggles to move beyond the rage and hatred to forgiveness, but even this is cold
comfort.  See Howard Zehr, Transcending.  See also Doerfler and Wilson, Facilitating, who invite
victims to reflect on what guilt and responsibility they have for their losses and what role that plays in
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noninnocence [sic], the work of reconciliation should proceed under the assumption that,
though the behavior of a person may be judged as deplorable, even demonic, no one
should ever be excluded from the will to embrace, because, at the deepest level, the
relationship to others does not rest on their moral performance and therefore cannot be
undone by the lack of it.177
Volf is correct to assert both the non-innocence of the reaction of many victims after the
offence and the ultimate non-innocence associated with the human condition, as well as the
ways that this non-innocence prevents reconciliation.  However, the way this is read into the
original criminal event has consequences for both victims and offenders, and the ways in
which they recover from the incident.  Too strong an emphasis on the non-innocence of
victims can contribute to offender denial and victim rejection of RJ, while no such reflection
can leave victims convinced of a strong victim/offender dualism, in which victims are nothing
but good and offenders are nothing but evil.  These questions of non-innocence, at least
initially, need to be explored by victims apart from offenders, while at the same time being
framed in terms of judgment of the offenders’ actions.  Discussing the non-innocence of
victims in this way helps to preserve the partiality and vindicating function of judgment, while
at the same time preserving the insight that any human judgment is itself tainted by non-
innocence.178
their recovery and healing.
 Fortune, “Conundrum,” 138.179
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Judgment is a preliminary step to repentance:  “Rebuking (calling to account) the one who
causes harm to the vulnerable is necessary in order for repentance to be possible.  And
repentance, meaning real change [...] is much more than the tears of remorse.”   This is not to179
say that tears of remorse are unnecessary or inappropriate.  It is to say that in the absence of
change, tears of remorse are inadequate.  This is especially so in crimes such as domestic
violence, where tears of remorse are often a step in the repetition of the cycle of violence. 
Judgment provides the foundation for change, for repentance as a turning away from what was
before, and for the doing of tsedeq in the form of repair or undoing of harms.  But judgment
also creates the possibility for the offender to learn to act against injustice.  The experience of
judgment that produces change in the offender enables the offender to participate in the task of
helping others to make the same change, to assist in the undoing of harms caused by others in
similar circumstances.
Shame, it was suggested earlier in Chapter 1, sometimes operates as a stand in for
judgment.  What has become known as “re-integrative shame” is focused around behaviour
rather than character, and can provide a powerful incentive for personal change as offenders
seek to ensure that they do not re-experience shame.  On its surface this sounds like judgment,
with its focus on moral discrimination and creation of a new public context.  The language of
shame has been controversial, with much debate about whether shame can be anything other
than debilitating and harmful.
Andrew Sung Park argues that shame is ordinarily the response of a victim, whereas the
 Andrew Sung Park, From Hurt to Healing: A Theology of the Wounded, (Nashville: Abingdon 180
Press, 2004), 35.
 Sung Park, From Hurt to Healing, 43.181
 Susan L Nelson, “For Shame, for Shame, the Shame of It All: Postures of Refusal and the Broken 182
Heart,” in The Other Side of Sin: Woundedness from the Perspective of the Sinned-Against, ed.
Andrew Sung Park and Susan L. Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 77.
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appropriate response of an offender is guilt,  though he seems to mean by this “guilt-180
consciousness.”  Shame is the emotional response to the vulnerability that flows from having
one’s boundaries transgressed.  The experience of guilt on the other hand is a function of
transgressing internalized moral values.  Shame is not the experience of an offender, though
Park does identify the shame of disgrace as an offender experience that is tied to guilt:
The shame of disgrace springs from losing one’s self-esteem and sense of self-value.  Its
foundation is the fear of ruining one’s reputation, relationships, status, and positions.  The
fear of losing the respect of others is connected with the potential promise of life.  With a
bad or ruined reputation, one cannot play a normal role in the family and community, and
accordingly cannot succeed in one’s business and career.  Thus, the offender develops the
fear that their shameful shadow–be it sin, error, misconduct, or crime–might become
evident in the light of day. [...] When their secret comes to light, their guilt-consciousness
turns into disgrace shame.181
Susan Nelson frames the dynamic of victims reproducing victimization in terms of this kind of
shame: the experience of being shamed leads to a defensive and protective posture that
contributes to a shaming of others so as to prevent the possibility of re-experiencing shame:
To know shame is to experience ourselves as deficient and ultimately rejectable.  The
posture of alienation that is toxic shame is the process of internalizing that shame and
developing protective strategies to defend ourselves from ever being shamed again.  In
this process, what was an experience of shame becomes core to our experience of who we
are.  If sin is to refuse our human condition and to seek to secure ourselves and protect our
future, then shame is born of being refused and is reflected in the sense of being
‘defective,’ in the corresponding dread that there is no future for ‘me’ (at least as ‘I’ am)
and in strategies and postures that seek to defend the self against further shaming
incidents.182
 Shame may operate differently in so-called “shame based cultures.”  In Japan (a society often 183
described as “shame based”) the CJS operates in large part through acknowledgment of guilt,
expression of remorse, and victim-offender negotiation of restitution.  John Haley (“Confession,
Repentance and Absolution,” in Mediation and Criminal Justice: Victims, Offenders and Community,
ed. Martin Wright and Burt Galaway (London: Sage Publications, 1989), 195-211), argues that this,
rather than culture, explains the relatively low prison population and lenient sentences.  It may be,
however, that this approach to criminal justice is rooted in the relative cultural importance of broader
social networks that reinforce socially acceptable behaviour.
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Shame, on this basis, cannot play a re-integrative role.  Rather, it drives the offender farther
from the possibility of rebuilding a healthy connection with the community or a repaired
relationship to the victim.  It is also clear that shame is not the same as judgment.  Judgment
creates the possibility of a new future, while shame reinforces defensive structures of
relationship.183
Restitution, reparation and repayment are a central part of RJ.  However, the uses of this
constellation of concepts in RJ are significantly different from the way the Bible understands
them.  In RJ, restitution, reparation and repayment are seen as ways for offenders to undo the
harms caused by their crimes.  They are products of the RJ process, products shaped through
the conversation between victim and offender.  There are two places of tension between the
biblical concept of shalem/shillum and the way restitution and repayment are used in RJ. 
First, the idea of recompense is missing in RJ.  More importantly, other than the way it is used
in Exodus, shalem operates in a much different way than restitution in RJ.  As discussed above
(48 ff) shalem is generally conceived as the repayment of evil to those who do evil.  There is
no correlative in RJ for the statement in Isaiah 59:18: “According to what they have done, so
will he repay (shalem) wrath to his enemies and retribution to his foes [...].”  Repayment is
conceived in RJ as undoing harm.  In Isaiah and elsewhere in the Bible repayment is
 Many works on RJ address the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the way the CJS 184
punishes, in part to note the difficulties in achieving the goals set by the various theories of
punishment.  My point here is not to identify the theory that best explains what it is that the CJS does,
but to note that the moral rebalancing that drives punishment and vengeance is integral to tsedeq, and
that this impulse must find expression.  On theories of punishment see, for example, Marshall, Beyond
Retribution; Hauerwas, “Punishing Christians;” Gorringe, God's Just Vengeance; Conrad Brunk,
"Restorative Justice and the Philosophical Theories of Criminal Punishment," in The Spiritual Roots
of Restorative Justice, ed. Michael Hadley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 31-
56.
 Bianchi, Justice as Sanctuary.185
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conceived in terms of “just deserts,” a concept that RJ seeks to expunge from the structures
and systems of justice.
RJ has specifically framed itself in a way that excludes vindication, vengeance, retribution
and punishment.  As a result it becomes difficult for RJ to take into account the ways in which
tsedeq incorporates these concepts.  It does not follow from this however, that the mainstream
CJS gives expression to these impulses in unproblematic ways,  nor does it mean that the184
CJS has found a way to rebalance the moral universe in a way that is not loaded with internal
contradictions.  The seemingly simple act of determining the right number of years in prison
that balances the harm caused by armed robbery, or sexual assault or sexual assault with a
weapon, or manslaughter, a calculus that happens every week in a court somewhere in Canada,
is in reality remarkably complex and subject to no precise gradation or tabulation.
It is not surprising that many scholars in the field of RJ are at great pains to sever biblical
tsedeq from retributive impulses.  Herman Bianchi,  for example, is concerned to build an185
approach to criminal justice rooted in tsedeq and abstracted from any retributive structures. 
To that end he argues that tsedeq has no space for the retributive.  Rather, tsedeq can be seen
in the process of the offender turning around, repenting and doing penance, all ultimately
 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 148.  See also Northey (Justice is Peacemaking), who, while 186
acknowledging more strongly the role of retribution and punishment in the Old Testament, still argues
against any role for punishment in RJ. 
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 43 - 45.187
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 52.188
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leading to reconciliation.  Zehr similarly builds a notion of tsedeq structured around healing
for victims and offenders meeting their obligations to victims, in a way that severely limits any
role for punishment and is contrasted with a system labeled as retributive.  As do other writers,
he makes reference to notions that God both punishes and is faithful, while punishment
remains subordinate to faithfulness and to shalom.  Despite this acknowledgment, there is no
room in his restorative paradigm for punishment/retribution as he argues, on the basis of
Romans 12:19, that punishment is “God’s business, not ours.”186
Marshall is more nuanced on this point.  He argues that Latin concepts of justice are based
on an abstract notion of moral order built on maintaining a balance and receiving what is due. 
This splits justice into two sets of practices--social justice and criminal justice framed
retributively.  This in turn leads to the idea that justice and mercy are in tension and that a
choice must be made between just deserts and setting justice aside.  In this reading, God’s
tsedeq is focused on punishing transgressions and upholding the moral order, and is identified
with vindictiveness in the CJS.   Yet, when Marshall turns to the question of punishment, he187
acknowledges that there is a punitive dimension to biblical tsedeq.  This punitive element is
not central, however.  Its orientation is restorative: “Yahweh’s justice is saving justice where
punishment of the sinner is an integral part of restoration. [...] God’s justice is a restorative or
reconstructive justice before it is a punitive or destructive justice.”   He acknowledges that188
 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, 137.189
 Northey, Justice is Peacemaking, 13.190
 Stephen Travis, Christ and the Judgment of God: Divine Retribution in the New Testament, 191
(Hants: Marshall Pickering, 1986).
 Hauerwas, “Punishing Christians,” 189.192
 The history of the penitentiary is instructive.  As originally conceived by its Quaker inventors, the 193
penitentiary was an “exhortative” institution, a place where those incarcerated might find the
opportunity to reflect on their sinful ways and repent.  Once the penitentiary became a core method of
punishment in the CJS, it became little more than punitive warehousing, or, worse, a potent means for
the creation of a criminal underclass. See Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
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there are retributive elements in the biblical texts, though he argues that there is not a fully
developed retributive theory of punishment.
Marshall insists that the connection between punishment and tsedeq cannot be ignored. 
He pursues the possibility of restorative punishment, arguing that particularly in cases where
restoration/restitution is not possible, punishment can play an important role, primarily
symbolizing the corrupting effect of the crime on the offender and the possibility of reversing
the wrongdoing.   189
The retributive aspect of tsedeq (rooted in sh-l-m), then, is a means of effecting
repentance and restoration.   Rightly conceived, punishment is exhortation,  and the telos of190 191
punishment is forgiveness and reconciliation.   It is important that RJ take account of the192
punitive and retributive aspects of tsedeq, but in doing this, the task of exhortation and the
goal of forgiveness and reconciliation must be kept constantly in mind if punishment is not to
exist only for its own sake.193
 Jacoby, Wild Justice, 333.194
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3. The Role of Forgiveness in Restorative Justice
If facing the pain of judgment is the task of the offender, then facing the pain of forgiveness is
the task of the victim.  RJ practitioners have, with good reason, been loath to impose a
“forgiveness agenda” on victims, since a strong emphasis on forgiveness can be experienced
by victims as judgment, if they do not forgive.  Further, such an emphasis can be experienced
by victims as a way of minimizing the significance of the offence.  In a culture that values the
rights of the individual as much as North America does, forgiveness sounds too much like self
denial:
To forgive a real injury requires a conscious suppression of the instinct to make others
suffer as we have suffered; to accept such forgiveness is to incur the guilt of having, in the
most obvious sense, escaped our ‘just deserts.’  The pain incurred on both sides means
that true forgiveness is rare.  In the course of long and intimate association, in which
injuries are inevitably inflicted and sustained, men and women are repeatedly asked to
forgive; in the absence of forgiveness, the only alternatives are vindictive hatred and
indifference.  The fact that many people prefer the latter alternative confirms the difficulty
of attaining true forgiveness.194
Part of the counter cultural character of forgiveness is rooted in the reality that it is
frequently seen as a sign of weakness: only those without the courage to confront evil with
power, force, and violence, as it ought to be confronted, are the ones who forgive.  In this
telling, forgiveness is the last resort of the weak, the refuge of those who have no resources to
do anything else.  Forgiveness, in the popular mind, comes from a place of weakness, or from
people, like the Amish, who are strange.  At the same time, there is little patience for those
who remain caught in the pain that they have experienced through crime or other trauma. 
Whether it is the oft expressed desire for “closure,” or the disdain expressed for those unable
 Gehm, “Function of Forgiveness,” 541.195
 In those cases where the offender is unknown, where the offender refuses participation in a 196
reconciliatory process, or the victim would not feel safe meeting with the offender (as in a sexual
assault), a subjectivist forgiveness may be the only kind available for the victim, and can be a
powerful force for personal healing.  There are RJ models, such as victims meeting with representative
offenders, for addressing these situations.  
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to “move on,” there is an expectation that the traumatized will get up and carry on as if
nothing has happened.  Even those who express a willingness to forgive are not always clear
what it means. 
There is a tendency to think of forgiveness in subjectivist terms, as the decision of the
forgiver to attempt a change in attitude.  Thus John Gehm suggests that forgiveness is the act
of the victim to cease to feel resentment.   This form of forgiveness is inadequate in biblical195
terms. While ceasing to feel resentment can be an important step in the healing of a victim,
and may have an impact on the victim’s treatment of the offender, it does not adequately
support reconciliation in that a relational process is not necessary to subjectivist forgiveness.  196
In response to this subjectivist account, Suzanne Freedman, Robert Enright, and Jeanette
Knutson define forgiveness in a way that moves beyond release from resentment to the
ascription of worth to the offender:
People, upon rationally determining that they have been unfairly treated, forgive when
they willfully abandon resentment and related responses (to which they have a right) and
endeavor to respond to the wrongdoer based on the moral principle of beneficence, which
may include compassion, unconditional worth, generosity, and moral love (to which the
wrongdoer, by nature of the hurtful act or acts, has no right).
This definition begins to move beyond the subjectivist trap, by asserting that the focus is on
unfair treatment, the determination of which rests not on subjectivity but on a “rational
determination,” and moves from abandoning negative views of the offender to a more positive
 Donald W. Shriver, “Is There Forgiveness in Politics?: Germany, Vietnam, and America,” in 197
Exploring Forgiveness, ed. Robert Enright and Joanna North (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1998), 133-134.
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view.  The definition, however, remains individualistic.  It is possible for the victim to engage
in the ascription of positive characteristics to the offender without moving toward the
(re)building of a positive relationship with the offender.
Donald Shriver highlights the relational aspect of forgiveness, seeing forgiveness as tied
to repentance and leading to new relational patterns:
Forgiveness simultaneously presupposes the commission of an evil act by one agent
against another and the effort of the victim to repair the relationship fractured by the evil.
[...] Forgiveness has as its match the willingness of offenders to acknowledge their
offences and to receive the offer of forgiveness.  This is the repentance side of the
transaction.  Forgiveness without repentance hangs, abstract and unconsummated, in
limbo.  Repentance without forgiveness cuts the nerve of the parties for moving on toward
a reconciliation, which is the fulfillment of a process in which forgiveness is the
beginning.  Forgiveness itself begins not with a forgetting but with a remembering, a
refusal to buy the repair of the relation at the cost of not mentioning the cause of the
fracture.  Moral forgiveness begins with the memory of immorality, with moral judgment. 
To forgive [...] is to value the hope of relation repair above the bare moral claim that one
has inflicted evil and another has suffered it.  Forgiveness is a future-oriented social
transaction.  It aims at a new bond for a relation now broken.  As such, forgiveness always
involves a certain forbearance, a step back from revenge.  The refusal of vengeance does
not mean refusal of all punishment for evildoing, but forgiveness does refuse punishment-
in-kind.  It aims at breaking the cycle of evil and counterevil in endless repetition.  It
likewise involves some degree of empathy with the one who has committed the wrong. 
Forgiveness is a kind of stooping, an acknowledgment of the humanity of another and the
salvageability of the victims’ relation to that other.197
As noted at the end of the biblical material above, forgiveness in the Bible is described in
a variety of metaphors: carrying away the wrongdoing, cancelling debt, covering the
wrongdoing, non-remembrance, gift, and healing.  Forgiveness functions covenantally, and
therefore includes both mercy and punishment.  Foundational to this description is that
forgiveness is an essential aspect of tsedeq, and is crucial to the creation of shalom.  Shriver’s
 Fortune, “Conundrum,” 138.  This is not to imply that forgiveness without prior repentance is 198
impossible or improper, if freely offered by the victim.  It is important that victims who have not seen
repentance from the offender not be pressured to forgive in these circumstances.
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description captures this relational character of forgiveness, orients it toward reconciliation as
the goal of tsedeq, and provides important clues to the ways in which it can function in RJ. 
What follows will use both the biblical metaphors and Shriver’s expansion on the biblical
themes to build an understanding of how forgiveness can operate in RJ. 
For repentance to occur there must be something from which to repent, as repentance is a
response to wrong doing.  In order for a person to repent there must be knowledge of the
offence.  To the extent that judgment is an act of moral discrimination it is a prior condition
for repentance, and judgment and repentance are prior conditions for forgiveness.  To expect
forgiveness without repentance is to expect that the victim take responsibility for undoing the
harm.  198
Forgiveness steps back from the cycle of vengeance where each act of harm triggers the
need for reciprocal harm.  The Bible affirms that forgiveness sets aside the demand for
punishment, while at the same time asserting that God’s forgiving nature does not preclude
punishment.  The forgiveness metaphors of debt cancellation, carrying away or covering the
wrongdoing, non-remembrance, gifting, and healing point to the setting aside of punishment. 
Biblically, punishment plays its role prior to repentance, and once the turn of repentance has
been made, punishment can be set aside. 
There are situations where forgiveness and punishment can sit next to each other in the RJ
context.  RJ processes that address serious crimes usually begin after sentencing, and the
outcome of RJ does not generally have an impact on the length of the sentence or the success
 Volf, End of Memory, 121.199
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of a parole application.  In those cases any forgiveness that occurs during RJ does not change
the progress of the punishment.  Forgiveness, however, sets aside the expectation that
offenders must completely undo the harms, given that many of the harms are irreparable. 
Forgiveness and mercy are not impunity.  Forgiveness does not say that nothing has
happened, as Volf’s comments make clear:
But the extension of unconditional grace does not disregard the demands of justice; rather,
grace recognizes those demands as valid and precisely as such sets them aside.  This
tension-filled verdict, which both honors and transcends the claims of justice, is only
possible because the Lamb of God took on himself the sin of the world.  In doing so, he
sanctioned both the affirmation of justice and the extension of unconditional grace.199
Volf’s use of the word justice to describe what is set aside obscures the point, given the
argument to this point that forgiveness and unconditional grace are the fulfillment of justice
understood biblically.  Volf appears to have in mind a punitive form of justice, and to that
extent his use of the word points to the way that forgiveness sets punishment aside. 
Forgiveness, or unconditional grace, acknowledges the validity of punishment, sets it aside,
and in so doing fulfills the demands of justice understood biblically.
Harms create burdens and debts.  Repairing the relationship requires that the burdens and
debts be addressed.  For offenders, the burdens and debts include guilt and obligations to undo
the damage.  For victims, the burdens and debts include the fear, anger and other emotional
responses, the actual financial and physical costs incurred, the damage to physical and mental
health, the damage to other relationships, and the obligations created by the harm they do in
response to the harm suffered.  Victims of harm caused by others frequently feel trapped in a
world of suffering not of their choosing.
 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 35 ff.200
 Bianchi, Justice as Sanctuary, 47.201
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At one level forgiveness is an act that releases victims from their own world of suffering. 
But caution is required on this point.  Jones argues that forgiveness that focuses only on the
release of victims from their own pain is a truncated forgiveness that exchanges reconciliation
for a therapeutic stance disconnected from the reality of relationship.  Forgiveness does not200
function only as the release of victims from their hurts, though it does do this.  Forgiveness
also functions through victims releasing their need for vengeance and committing to the
restoration of relationship.
Forgiveness as a discipline leading to the restoration of relationship releases offenders
from their burdens and obligations.  If harm creates debts, then forgiveness releases from the
debt.  The language of financial obligations is instructive: to cancel an obligation to repay
money is to forgive the debt.  It is precisely this dynamic that is at work in forgiveness of
harms.  As Herman Bianchi puts it, “Forgiveness means the victim “gives away,” remits, those
parts of the debts which the culprit, in spite of willingness, is unable to achieve.”   Bianchi,201
however, is also clear that this remitting of debts takes place when the offender, having
repented and having attempted to repair the damage, has found the burden of repair too great
to bear.  Again, in the context of financial obligations, the forgiveness of the debt does not
come immediately after the granting of the loan; it comes after the debtor has attempted to
repay, but was unable to.
In the act of releasing the perpetrator of the obligation to repay the debt, the one forgiving
is actually assuming part of the burden.  To use the financial analogy, the one who forgives the
 Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies, 9.202
 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 48-49.203
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debt sustains a financial loss.  When offenders are relieved of part of their burden through
forgiveness, that burden is transferred to the victim.  Victims who forgive sustain a loss as
some of the harms they have experienced go unaddressed by the offender, but this loss
parallels a release from the trap of resentment and anger against the offender.  
There is another transfer that is at work here, as being relieved of the obligation to pay the
debt produces mixed emotions in the offender. Once judgment and repentance have taken
place, remorse induces a desire to undo the harm.  The inability to undo the harm can be
experienced as a deep regret.  Being told, through forgiveness, that the debt has been cancelled
involves both a relief that the struggle to repay is over, combined with the regret that the harm
cannot be undone.  Forgiveness results in a process of cancelling, recreating, and redistributing
debts and obligations so that victims and offenders become dependent on each other in ways
that can contribute to the repair of the relationship.
Empathy for the offender and the commitment to repair a fractured human relationship are
central to forgiveness.   Forgiveness cannot flow where the victim views the offender as202
other than human, yet forgiveness is a step in the process of re-humanizing the offender.  For
this re-humanizing to be fully present requires a step further: to commit to repairing the
relationship despite the fractures and the pain.  
A therapeutic approach to forgiveness tends to speak of forgiving those who cause hurt,
despite their best intentions.   Many times hurts are not in spite of, but because of, the203
intentions of the other.  This is particularly the case in RJ where the criminal offence, by
 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 48-49.204
 Volf, End of Memory, 121.205
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definition, involves some level of intent.  When hurt is rooted in the conscious decision of the
other, repair of the relationship becomes much more difficult.  Hurts in spite of best intentions
do not actually call for forgiveness.  It is intended hurts that call for forgiveness.   The204
intentional nature of hurts makes it more difficult to empathize with the offender, and can be a
significant barrier to repair of the relationship. 
For forgiveness to be effective in repairing the relationship, the offender must also act. 
An offer of forgiveness that is rejected or forgiveness offered in the absence of repentance
cannot move the relationship to the point of repair.  A relationship is not one sided, but
requires some level of reciprocity.  Forgiveness requires the active engagement of both victim
and offender to be effective in the (re)building of the relationship:
Forgivers forgo the punishment of persons who deserve it and release them from the
bonds of their guilt.  Of course, to obtain this release wrongdoers must receive forgiveness
of their misdeeds as just that – forgiveness – just as any person must accept a gift for the
gift to be given, not simply offered.  Wrongdoers must acknowledge their actions as
wrongdoing, distance themselves from their misdeeds, and where possible restore to their
victims what the original violation took away.  Failure to do so would not result in the
withdrawal of forgiveness; that gift is unconditional.  But it would result in the suspension
of forgiveness between its generous giver and the intended but untaking recipient.205
The offer of forgiveness has a future orientation and is thus an act of hope.  There are no
guarantees that forgiveness will repair the relationship, and there is no way to know what will
come from the act of forgiveness.  Victims who forgive do so knowing this unpredictability,
yet are willing to take the risk in hope of the possibility of such (re)building.  
The biblical images for forgiveness, especially the carrying away or covering of
 Dan B. Allender, “‘Forgive and Forget’ and Other Myths of Forgiveness,” in God and the Victim:206
Theological Reflections on Evil, Victimization, Justice, and Forgiveness, ed. Lisa Barnes Lampman
and Michelle D. Shattuck (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 202.
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wrongdoing, non-remembrance, and debt cancellation, all raise the complexity of the
relationship between memory and forgiveness.  One of the most common exhortations heard
by those who have been harmed by another person is that they are to “forgive and forget.”  Yet
as Dan Allender notes, that cannot be done, except at great cost.  Referring to a conversation
with a man who claimed to have forgiven his very dysfunctional parents by moving forward
and not looking back he comments that 
forgiveness meant cutting his losses, ignoring the pain of the past, and keeping busy
enough to outpace the sadness.  Yet this kind of detachment dulls the senses and distorts
perspective.  His zeal to forget blinded him to the baggage he carried from the past and
strengthened his determination to remain emotionally distant, rigid, and dogmatic.  His
family paid a terrible price for his ‘forgetting.’206
Forgetting prevents healing, for in forgetting a deep wound is produced that will continue to
haunt, and the wound is more painful the deeper it is.   However, ongoing remembrance that207
continually replicates the pre-forgiveness memory only serves to erase reconciliation, and
memory that continues unchanged reproduces judgment as if no forgiveness had taken place. 
The choice then is not between remembrance and forgetting, but between different kinds of
remembering.
Rather than forgetting, forgiveness involves a new way of remembering.  As Hauerwas
points out, memory is redeemed by forgiveness.   Jones speaks of coming to a place where208
 L. Gregory Jones, “Behold I Make All Things New,” in God and the Victim: Theological 209
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the harm is no longer remembered as sin.   It is important, though, that the memory is209
retained.  If forgiveness means the end of the memory of harm, then the one forgiving remains
open to repetition of the harm.  Memory must remain, but be made new.
This transformed memory is intimately connected to the recognition by those forgiving
that they are also in need of forgiveness.  Jones argues that the ability to practice forgiveness
comes from the status of being forgiven.   Ultimately, this process of remembering is a210
process of (re)membering.  It is a process in which victims relearn that the enemy, the
offender, shares humanity with them.
Volf also argues for a redemption of memory, a remembering in a new way, which he
describes as a non-remembering that is not quite a forgetting:
If the victims remember rightly, the memories of inhumanities past will shield both them
and all of us against future inhumanities; if the perpetrators remember rightly, the memory
of their wrongdoing will help restore their guilty past and transform it into the soil on
which a more hopeful future can grow.  Yet if we must remember wrongdoings in order to
be safe in an unsafe world, we must also let go of their memory in order to be finally
redeemed [...].  [O]nly those who are willing ultimately to forget will be able to remember
rightly.211
He goes on to speak of dropping the shield of memory in order to embrace.  But as Volf notes,
this step of forgetting is the final step in reconciliation, and it assumes that truth of the harm
has been spoken, that tsedeq governs the relationship, that the perpetrators have been named,
judged, and transformed, and that the victims rage and wounds have been healed.  Only then
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 131.212
 Volf, End of Memory, p 179.  Volf uses this term to designate the cultural side (as opposed to the 213
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can forgetting be a part of making all things new.212
4. Judgment of Grace
The significance of the judgment/repentance/forgiveness nexus is captured by Gregory Jones’
phrase, “judgment of grace,” a term also used by Marshall and Volf.  Both Marshall and Volf
speak of God’s judgment of grace in the context of what he calls the final reconciliation.  213
For Marshall, the judgment of grace is part of a final eschatological judgment that is already
present.  But even this judgment is a judgment of grace, “a judgment in that it confronts and
condemns, rather than ignores or excuses, the destructiveness of present human conduct, and a
work of grace in that it aims at repentance, transformation and restored communion.”   For214
Volf, the Last Judgment is judgment of grace, 
[...] for it is a judgment executed by the same Christ who died for the world’s salvation. 
For grace to be enacted in judgment, two elements are essential: people’s sins against God
and neighbor must be brought to light in their full magnitude, and sinners must be freed
from their guilt and transformed. [...] The Last Judgment will reach its goal when all the
wronged standing at the threshold of the world to come receive their rightful vindication,
and when wrongdoers eschew attempts at misplaced self-justification, acknowledge their
wrongdoing, and are freed from the hold of evil on their lives.215
While Jones also speaks of God’s judgment of grace as eschatological, he is ultimately
interested in how this judgment of grace is embodied in the practices of repentance and
 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 147.216
 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 15.217
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forgiveness in the particularity of human life,  asserting that “Through God’s eschatological216
judgment of grace, human brokenness is overcome and communion restored.”  217
Making possible the intersection of judgment, repentance, and forgiveness within RJ
enables both victims and offenders to experience this judgment of grace that overcomes
human brokenness and restores communion.  Ultimately judgment and forgiveness, operating
together as a judgment of grace, make possible the reconciliatory goal that lay at the heart of
the early formulations of RJ.  The question that remains is that of practice.  The following
chapter explores how it is that RJ can give expression to judgment and forgiveness in the
process of working with offenders and victims.
 Achilles, “Promise,” 69.218
 Heather Strang, “Is Restorative Justice Imposing Its Agenda on Victims?”, in Critical Issues in 219
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CHAPTER 4: RESHAPING PRACTICE
1. The Risks
A practice rooted more deeply in a fuller understanding of tsedeq is not without risks, although
these are also risks that apply generally to RJ: the problem of vengeful and judgmental
victims, imposing an obligation to forgive, placing responsibility for offender rehabilitation on
victims, and the avoidance of structural issues that contribute to crime.  These risks can have
an increased negative impact when the door is opened to a practice built more intentionally on
reconciliation rooted in judgment, repentance, and forgiveness.
a. Vengeful Victims
Mary Achilles asks with some pointedness whether RJ can fulfill its promise when dealing
with victims who say things that practitioners do not want to hear,  or who enter RJ with the218
desire to cause as much pain as possible for the offender.  Moving RJ in a more committed
way to the values of judgment, forgiveness and reconciliation may make it more difficult to
make space for victims who carry a strong desire for revenge.  It is easy for practitioners to fall
into the trap of seeing vengeful victims as “bad” victims, and focus their work on “good”
victims.  But “good” victims may be the unusual victims who have suffered less harm,  or219
have a weaker sense of moral outrage.   To focus RJ on those victims who are willing to act220
the opposite, morally strong people seeking to honour the deaths of their forebears.
 Zehr, Transcending, 195-196.221
 Umbreit, Training Manual.222
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politely may be to cut out those victims most in need of what RJ has to offer.  
Zehr’s earliest work tended to be more offender focused and he has sought to shift toward
an approach that more adequately responds to victim needs.   In his training materials,221
Umbreit describes his approach as “victim sensitive victim-offender mediation,”  whereas222
Doerfler and Wilson describe their approach as “victim-centered offender sensitive
dialogue.”   These authors are responding appropriately to concerns that RJ has tended to an223
excessively strong focus on offenders and their needs.  This focus is understandable given that
RJ functions in the context of a system that is primarily oriented to the offender.  There is a
danger that the approach being proposed may return RJ to an offender orientation, with
victims only being present so as to contribute to the healing of the offender.
b. Forgiveness
Forgiveness opens a space of vulnerability for victims: are they able to take the risks of
forgiveness?  Can they find the strength with which to offer forgiveness?  Can they consider
offering forgiveness without feeling coerced?  Despite its essential role in RJ, care must be
taken not to impose a requirement of forgiveness on victims.  Particularly where the harm has
been great and where there was a pre-existing relationship with the offender, being pressured
to forgive can mean the end of the RJ process.  In such cases helping victims build trust in RJ
 Doerfler and Wilson invite both victim and offender reflection on forgiveness as 224
well as for them both to consider how the dialogue may assist the other in recovery from the crime.
 Achilles, “Promise,” 71.225
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needs to focus on what the victim can gain from engagement.  Too strong a focus on the
possibilities for reconciliation and forgiveness can drive victims away from a willingness to be
involved.224
c. Responsibility and Accountability
There is a risk that the RJ process will confuse who is responsible for what (in the sense of
having it under their control), and who is accountable for what (in the sense of having to
account for what they did).  Achilles has identified the importance of not expecting the victim
to assume responsibility for the rehabilitation of the offender.   This is crucial, for if the225
victim takes on responsibility for the offender’s rehabilitation, and the offender fails, there is
the potential of deepening the victimization.  It must be clear that offenders are responsible for
their own rehabilitation. Nevertheless, in a reconciliatory process, the offender and the victim
have a mutual interdependence as they have been tied together by the reality of the criminal
event.  While offenders have primary responsibility for their own transformation, such
transformation cannot happen without a community of support.  The victim can be part of that
community of support, and to that extent does play a role in supporting the offender’s
transformation.  Victims need to be prepared for this role.
The victim’s healing is primarily the responsibility of the victim, while also being
dependent on offender responses.  Through remorse, restitution and providing information, the
 Gilman, Bowler, and Stutzman, Inviting Dialogue, 66.226
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offender plays a significant role in undoing the harm of the crime and thus contributing to the
healing of the victim.  If the offender declines involvement in RJ, is insufficiently remorseful,
offers insufficient explanation, or offers insufficient restitution, this may negatively impact the
victim’s healing.  Training materials emphasize the importance of preparing the victim for the
possibility that the offender will not be as remorseful as the victim may wish.   This is an226
expression of the fact that victims are not completely in control of their own healing and that
they require engagement from the offender to continue the process of healing.  Reconciliation
requires engagement from both parties in a setting of mutual interdependence.  Healing also
requires a community of care, and offenders can be part of that community to the extent that
they are willing to engage in their own transformation and give victims what assistance they
can.  Just as there must be care that both victim and offender are prepared for the victim’s role
in assisting the offender, they must be prepared for the offender’s role in assisting the victim.
The world of offenders is one of numerous people telling them what to do: defence
lawyers tell them how to behave; if they are incarcerated, the system inside controls all aspects
of their lives; if they are not incarcerated, then parole and probation officers tell them what
they need to do to stay out of trouble; judges tell them what their future holds, often
accompanied by a lecture about what is wrong with them; and finally, in victim impact
statements, victims tell them what horrible people they are.  RJ has the potential to shape
different ways for the system to function so as to empower offenders to make the choices they
need to make in order to change their ways.  The risk, however, is that RJ becomes just
another way of stripping the offender of their dignity and their humanity as victim centred
 Harris, “Alternative Visions.”227
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processes add more opportunities for victims to tell offenders about their failings in a setting
of personal intimacy.
Harris addresses this question in a response to a comprehensive RJ system model
developed by Van Ness.   In creating formal roles for community and victim, the model has227
added to the burden faced by the offender by adding more participants to the system.  Adding
to the complexity of the system has the potential to further strip offenders of their ability to
make choices for themselves.
Even in a process specifically structured for offenders to respond to the harms they have
caused victims, there will be some needs that the offender cannot meet.  There is always the
risk that the victim will have exaggerated expectations of what the process can do.  This may
be at the level of needs that cannot be met, or it may be at the level of an expectation that once
RJ has been completed the victim’s life will return to what it was before the crime.  Even if
reconciliation takes place, even if the opportunities to express judgment, hear remorse, receive
restitution, and to offer forgiveness are all present and taken, the fact remains that the victim
will still be less than whole.  This is especially so if the harm has been significant, such as a
death, a sexual assault, or an assault with long term physical effects.  There must be care that
expectations are kept realistic while at the same time ensuring that the parties have the
opportunity to move toward reconciliation.
d. Judgment
Judgment opens a space of vulnerability for offenders: Can they hear the judgment without
 Nelson, “For Shame,” 73.228
 Cynthia Crysdale, Embracing Travail: Retrieving the Cross Today (New York: The Continuum 229
Publishing Company, 1999), 7.
 Peachey, (“Restitution,” 553), identifies the current usage of “reparative sanctions.”230
 Peachey, “Restitution,” 554.231
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loss of self-esteem?  Can they find the strength to respond with repentance?  If, as Nelson has
argued, sin can be a product of “broken-heartedness,”  or, as Cynthia Crysdale puts it, a228
product of a “beleaguered sense of self,”  then judgment has the potential to add to that229
broken-heartedness.  Judgment can drive the offender deeper into defensiveness, denial, and
more of the behaviour that occasioned the judgment.  Judgment in RJ may be more difficult
for offenders to face than judgment in the CJS, given that it comes directly from victims in an
intense face-to-face interaction.  The judgment in this face-to-face context cannot be deflected
in the same way as that experienced in a court room or from a police officer.
In the same way that too much emphasis on forgiveness too early in the process can drive
the victim away from RJ, so too, an emphasis on judgment can push the offender away from
RJ.  This prevents the offender from fully engaging in a process that offers potential for
healing.  If judgment is a judgment of grace, a judgment that opens the door for the offender to
repent, then this would indeed be a great loss.  
RJ processes that are built around developing restitution agreements may exacerbate the
potentially negative role of judgment.  Restitution is often experienced by offenders as a form
of punishment,  while victims have a tendency to merge restitution and retribution.   This230 231
suggests that RJ that is structured primarily around restitution may be experienced by
offenders as punitive.  Offenders may then end up experiencing judgment as the absence of
 Harry Mika, “Mediation Interventions and Restorative Justice: Responding to the Astructural 232
Bias,” in Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation:
International Perspectives, ed. Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
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grace.
Punishment functions, biblically, to move the offender toward repentance, since turning
around involves recognition of moral culpability.  As such, punishment plays a role in
encouraging accountability.  It can play a role in drawing the offender home as in the parable
of the lost son in Luke 15.  While the parable does not explicitly use the word punishment, the
son’s experience of famine would fit with the structures of punishment seen in the Old
Testament:
 When he came to his senses, he said, “how many of my father’s hired men have food to17
spare, and here I am starving to death!  I will set out and go back to my father and 18
say to him: Father I have sinned against heaven and against you.   I am no longer19
worthy to be called your son; make me like one of your hired men.”   So he got up20
and went to his father.
The son’s response to the punishment was to return home after “he came to his senses.”  This
coming to his senses illustrates the function of punishment, enabling the one who is punished
to see in a new way.  From this new vision comes the ability to turn around and return home. 
RJ, then, should not reject restitution because it may be punitive, but recognize that it may
play an important role in the ongoing transformation of both victim and offender.  At the same
time the potential for seeing restitution as punitive calls for care in building an RJ process so
that offenders have a clear sense of its goal and purpose.
e. Astructural Bias
RJ has an “astructural bias,”  though its grounding in biblical conceptions of shalom and232
Publishers, 1992), 559-68.
 Bonnie Price Lofton, "Does Restorative Justice Challenge Systemic Injustices?", in Critical 233
Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press,
2004), 385.
 Mika, “Mediation Interventions,” 559.234
 Mika, “Mediation Interventions,” 561.235
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tsedeq suggest that this is not inevitable.  Shalom and tsedeq as covenantal concepts are
oriented to the maintenance and/or rebuilding of community, and as such are concerned with
both individual life and life within social structures.  Nevertheless, RJ practice as it has
developed is almost exclusively concerned with the meeting of the victim and the offender in
the context of undoing the individual harm and responding to the moral failings of the
offender as an individual.  The broader community is involved only as an entity harmed by the
crime.  One of the principles of RJ asserts that crime damages the community.  RJ does not
question the definition of crime as an act between individuals, and it forgets that crime is often
the product of damaged communities.   To this extent, then, RJ fails to challenge mainstream233
notions of crime and the causes of crime, focusing instead on the individuals, and forgetting
the “rootedness of [...] conflict in human relationships expressed in social organization and
structure.”   RJ expects that the individuals involved have the tools to transcend these social234
structural sources of the conflict.   This is to expect too much of the parties.  The fact that RJ235
processes are successful suggests significant effort on their part.  The risk in the direction
being proposed is the possible continuation and strengthening of this astructural bias.  To
focus RJ on judgment, forgiveness and reconciliation may exacerbate the avoidance of the
structural embeddedness of crime and prevent the directing of resources to addressing these
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causes.  In other words, accepting the dominant understanding of crime, and individualizing a
social problem, may prevent meeting one of the goals of RJ: strengthening the community in
order to prevent future harms.
Any practice that focuses so closely on the interpersonal relationship between victim and
offender that the structural aspects of the crime are ignored is inadequate.  This does not mean
that the structural context of the crime needs to be specifically addressed in the meeting
between the parties, or that mediation needs to be avoided because of its astructural nature.  It
does mean that practitioners and programmes need to be prepared to work at the structural
issues knowing that crime is also a deeply personal and painful event.
f. An Ethic of Risk
Any conflict resolution process is fraught with unexpected changes in direction as participants
engage in an ongoing process of interaction with the mediator and the other party.  That
interaction involves reflecting on and speaking from the party’s own experience, and
responding to what the other party adds to the conversation.  This radical contingency can be
frightening for the mediator, who ultimately influences, but has no control over, the process. 
But it is this very contingency that makes possible the turning of the parties toward
reconciliation.  As a consequence, the mediator in an RJ process must cultivate a willingness
to take risks.  
Sharon Welch contrasts an ethic of responsible action and an ethic of risk.  The former is
rooted in a belief that contingency can be contained and controlled, that it is possible to view a
situation, determine what needs to be done to solve the problem, complete the task and have
 Sharon Welch, A Feminist Ethic of Risk (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).236
 It is this courage that the offenders, the victims, Mark Yantzi, and Dave Worth displayed in 1974 237
in the Elmira case.
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the solution work.  Rejecting the possibility of such control in a world of contingency, she
argues that an ethic of risk involves experimentation, imagining possible futures, never
knowing what will work, and making choices in the context of a supportive community.   236
As argued above, both judgment and forgiveness are essential to a biblically rooted RJ,
yet both entail risk.  They contribute to an atmosphere of vulnerability for both victims and
offenders, and thus have the potential to drive both offenders and victims from the process.  If
judgment and forgiveness are to be present and play their proper role as judgment of grace,
this courage to risk in the midst of radical contingency needs to be embraced by RJ
practitioner.237
2. Creating Space in the Process
As noted in Chapter 1, there is a wide diversity in forms of RJ practice.  Victim offender
mediation, however, remains the dominant model, and it is the model with which I am most
familiar through my own work.  As a consequence it will be the primary focus in the following
discussion on practice implications. 
Mediators are necessarily a part of the conflict interaction and have an impact on the way
the parties to the conflict relate to each other.  This may be relatively benign, since the parties
want mediators to be present for their influence on what happens.  There is a danger, however,
that the mediator will have a more profound impact on the interaction.  The way mediators
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define the issues in a conflict has significant impact.  The way the mediators describe the
process influences what happens and what outcomes are possible.  A mediator can frame the
same conflict as being about relational matters or about financial issues and this framing can
affect whether the parties talk about their relationship or about how to deal with finances.  
Mediators will also affect the way judgment, repentance, and forgiveness are present in
the RJ process.  By avoiding any discussion of judgment, repentance, and forgiveness,
mediators can influence parties away from engaging in them.  Likewise, by directly inquiring
about their importance to the parties, mediators invite their presence in the mediation.
In what follows I will explore what needs to be considered if judgment and forgiveness
are to play the role envisioned, all within a style of practice that seeks to ensure maximum
participant control.
a. Preparing for Judgment and Forgiveness
The engagement of a mediator in an RJ process usually begins with meeting the parties
individually.  In the language of practice, this is case preparation.  It has several purposes, the
main ones being: meeting and building a relationship of trust between the mediator(s) and the
participants, gaining a clear understanding of the process, gaining an understanding of the
costs and benefits of engagement in the process, asking questions, and being invited to
participate in the process.  As this is the first contact of significance between the parties and
the mediators, apart from a more formal contact to invite participation in this case preparation
meeting, it plays a significant role.  It is in these meetings that the tone of interaction is set,
and the parties gain a sense of what RJ is and what it can do. 
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The way the mediators frame the process is crucial to what can happen.  For example,
framing the process as being aimed at restitution will have the effect of directing the
conversation toward restitution, how it is to be calculated, and how it is to be paid.  Framing
the process as being aimed at reconciliation or transformed relationships will have the effect of
focusing the conversation in that direction.  The question thus becomes how the mediators
should frame the mediation and its purpose. 
What follows is a review of a number of issues that arise during case preparation.  In each
case, there will be some discussion of the issue as it connects to supporting judgment and
forgiveness, as well as ideas for how the mediator might encourage the victim or offender to
operate within the framework of judgment/repentance/forgiveness.  The questions and
responses suggested are starting places.  The questions will inspire responses, to which the
mediator will have to consider a response that supports movements toward judgment,
repentance, and forgiveness. 
The reader will no doubt notice that the suggested questions and responses presume a
particular social location of the mediator as educated and articulate.  These suggestions will
not work with all RJ participants exactly as presented, depending on their own social location. 
In addition, the participants may have a religious or theological orientation different from that
of the mediator.  In either case, the suggestions that follow will require translation.
b. Inviting Offender Reflection 
While granting that crime is not abstracted from social causation or social consequences, it
was argued above that the offender is a moral agent.  Offenders made choices when
 This does not mean that they may not need help, support, or advice to enable their choices and238
their ability to live out these choices.
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committing the offence, and they are capable of making choices about how they respond to the
crime.   It is important that, from the beginning, mediators frame the mediation in terms of238
the offender’s ability to engage this task:
One purpose of the mediation is to help you think about the effect of the crime and what
choices you have available to you.  It might be helpful to think in advance about what
outcomes you would like to see and what you can do to help reach those outcomes.  I
would invite you to think about this more later, but what initial thoughts do you have
now?
It is also important to frame the initial interaction between the parties in the criminal event
in terms of moral agency.  In other words, the offender is not just a moral agent in terms of
future options and choices, but the offender was also a moral agent in the previous interaction
with the victim; offenders are themselves sinners.  At the same time, offenders act within a
larger set of constraints that shape the choices available, constraints that in the language of the
New Testament may be thought of as principalities and powers.   In other words, offenders are
fallen, and live within a fallen world.   It would thus be important to invite reflection on both
their freedom to act and the constraints that they experienced: 
Mediation offers an opportunity to talk about what happened during the crime, and what
choices you made during that event.  It will also offer you a chance to talk about why
committed the offence.  As you think about that now, what strikes you as important about
what you did and why you did it?
For offenders this will give space for a discussion of their reasons for committing the
offence, of the choices they made about their behaviour during the commission of the offence,
what other choices might have been available to them, and what constraints they experienced. 
This discussion of the reasons for the offence can also open up discussion of the social
 Umbreit, Training Manual, 112.239
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structural issues face by the offender, though great care will be needed to ensure that this does
not become an opportunity for denial or making excuses.
Judgment presumes moral agency.  Offender reflection on moral agency can begin to open
the offender to engagement with moral discrimination.  Recognition of past choices made and
future choices that are available begin to open the offender to the possibility that other choices
were available, and that future choices may create the possibility of a different relationship
with the victim.  This reflection can also begin to open the offender to thinking about
repentance, though this may require the offender to hear more about the harms.  Reflection on
constraints can begin to open the offender to consider what larger life changes are required to
prevent future offences.  
Offenders often play down the importance of the harm experienced by victims.   This is239
particularly true in nonviolent crimes.  For example, the anxieties created for a victim who
comes home to find the aftermath of a break-in may be incomprehensible to an offender:  “It
was just stuff, no one was there, and no one was hurt, and besides, insurance will pay the
loss.”  It is important for an offender to begin reflection on the harms and how a victim might
have experienced them.  This reflection helps the offender be ready to understand the emotion
of the victim during the joint meeting, as well as preparing the offender to hear expressions of
judgment.  This requires some care as beginning this conversation may give the offender
another opportunity for denial.
One approach involves inviting the offender to give a detailed account of the criminal
event.  This detail may open the offender to seeing the consequences of the actions taken. 
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Inviting the offender to reflect on how he/she might have responded to being on the receiving
end of these actions may also aid in achieving some clarity about the nature of the harms
experienced by the victim.
Again, some caution is appropriate.  If the offender has been victimized in the past this
reflection may re-open the wounds of that previous victimization.  If this is the case the
offender will need significant support.  This conversation may also create the opportunity for
real empathy on the part of the offender for the victim, an empathy that may open the door for
repentance.
Issues of guilt and forgiveness cannot be ignored.  The offender needs to be prepared for
discussions around these concepts:
In what ways has guilt played a role in your response to the crime?  How might you want
to communicate about this with the victim?
In what ways is forgiveness important to you?  What do you want to do to request it? 
What will be your response if the victim refuses forgiveness?
These questions will help offenders think about their own sense of responsibility as well
as considering their own needs around recovering from the offence.
Judgment will appear in the RJ process, whether in the form of shame, of naming the truth
of the criminal event, of expectations of restitution, or of expectations that RJ be on the side of
the victim.  Offenders may experience the presence of judgment, especially if it is
accompanied by strong emotions, as rejection of their humanity.  There may also explicit
expressions that victim views the offender as a bad human.  The offender needs to be prepared
for this:
During the RJ meeting there will likely be discussion of your actions as being wrong. 
How will you experience that?  What would you want to say about that?
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The victim will likely express strong feelings about what you did during the commission of
the crime.  How do you think that will affect you?  What might you want to say to the
victim in response?
The victim may have some negative things to say about you.  How do you think that will
affect you?  What might you want to say to the victim in response?  What would you like
me to do to assist you if this happens?  What can you do now to prepare for this
possibility?
If the crime did flow from a “beleaguered sense of self” the offender may need significant
support in hearing what the victim has to say.  This may also require significant intervention
during the mediation, so that the victim’s expressions can be focused toward judgment
regarding the actions of the offender.
If judgment is to operate as judgment of grace, the offender will also need support for that
to happen.  Starting with case preparation the mediator will need to focus on assisting the
offender in thinking about how judgment can enable movement toward repentance and a new
way of living.
The offence binds offenders to an identity as “offender” from which they need to be
released so that identity can be restructured.  Paradoxically, judgment is the first step.  In
judgment as judgment of grace the offender is enabled to step away from “offender” as
identity.  In stepping away from this identity, the offender is freed to take the step of
repentance.  Offenders who can only see themselves as offenders cannot make the move to
repentance, for this step would require that they see themselves as capable of change.  During
case preparation the mediator can begin to help the offender with this shift in identity.  This
can be done through affirmation of the offender’s humanity.  The mediator can refuse to see
the offender only as an offender, choosing instead to see the offender as a person with
complex story, who is trapped by sin and whose choices may have made sense at the time. 
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 250-253.240
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Through practices of respect and honouring the dignity of the offender, the mediator can give
the offender an experience that is different from what often happens in the CJS.  Through such
practices as careful listening, use of the offender’s name when addressing the offender,
postures that communicate attentiveness and care, and respecting meeting times, the mediator
acknowledges that the offender is a person worthy of such respect, and that the offender is
much more than the offence.
The ability to engage in what Volf refers to as double vision,  to see from one’s own240
perspective as well as the perspective of the other, is difficult to achieve in the best of
circumstances.  For the offender, the ability to see from the victim’s side is crucial to the
ability to enter into repentance.  In the absence of such perspective taking offenders remain
trapped in a view of the crime that serves only their perception of their own interests. 
Enabling such double vision for the offender is difficult, and cannot be fully achieved until the
victim and the offender meet and speak to each other.  Some steps in this direction can be
taken during case preparation.  Destabilizing the offender’s view of the crime is one part of
this:
During the joint meeting you will have an opportunity to describe the events from your
perspective.  The victim will also describe the events from his/her perspective.  It is my
experience that these two descriptions can be quite different.  What do you think some of
the differences might be?  What do you think the victim might have to say about your
description of the event?
Care must be taken not to invite the offender to evaluate the possible alternate views of events,
since the goal here is to help the offender to begin to see the possibility of multiple
perspectives.  This discussion has the potential to open the way to a new public context.  By
125
helping the offender recognize that there are multiple viewpoints, the offender may be able
accept the validity of the victim’s perspective, a perspective that includes judgment of the
offender’s actions, thus opening the way to repentance.
The disciplines of confession and repentance are not widely practiced, nor do they have
wide acceptance.  In the absence of such acceptance, few have the skills needed for repenting. 
It may be necessary for the mediator to assist the offender in giving expression to repentance,
though this should not be done unless the mediator is sure that the offender wishes to do so. 
With careful attention to what the offender is saying, the mediator can provide opportunities to
help the offender think about how to communicate repentance:
You seem to be clear that you regret what you did to the victim, and you regret that the
victim experienced harm at your hands.  Are you interested in saying that to the victim? 
How might you express that so that the victim hears and understands?  
(Offender makes an attempt at expressing repentance.)  
As I listened to you I was a little confused when you said: “x”.  What were you trying to
communicate?  What might be a better way to say this?
By inviting the offender to practice, and by communicating confusion without putting words
in the offender’s mouth, the mediator has helped the offender clarify the message, and has
ensured that it is communicated in the offender’s words.
Sitting behind each of the suggestions above is the possibility that the offence is rooted in
an offender’s previous experience of being harmed.  There is a significant risk that taking up
this approach with the offender may cause further harm.  The mediator will need to be very
conscious of supporting the offender in the conversation so that the offender can begin to act
on the basis of strength, so that the past is acknowledged, but no longer defines the self.  The
central protection is the importance of the offender only taking those steps he/she is capable of
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taking.  The mediator may also need to take an active role in supporting the offender in
making the courageous steps that are called for.  The offender has to be able to make carefully
thought out decisions about how to function in the mediation, and how to respond to the
victim.
The gains for the offender who begins the process of hearing and accepting judgment, and
who is able to move to repentance, are significant.  By entering into the change called for by
judgment, offenders make possible both their own healing and the healing of the victim.
c. Inviting Victim Reflection
The task of the mediator with regard to the offender is creating an opening for hearing
judgment, and moving to repentance, so as to create the possibility for reconciliation.  With
the victim the mediator’s task is helping clarify what is to be communicated in judgment, what
response is to be made in the event of repentance, and whether forgiveness is one of the
possible responses.
The conversation about moral agency will lead in different directions depending on the
nature of the offence.  The most significant difference will depend on whether the victim was
present or absent during the offence.  Discovering a break in after the fact is different from a
direct and violent, or potentially violent, confrontation.  In a direct confrontation the victim
was engaged in interaction and made responses to the offender that may have had an impact
on the course of the criminal event.  If there was interaction the victim will need to reflect on
the nature of the choices and deal with possible feelings of guilt if the responses contributed in
a negative way to the course of events.  The victim will need to reflect on the nature of moral
 Victims often see crime and their responses to it as experiences of disempowerment.  It can be 241
difficult for them to see that they had choices, that they made choices that prevented the crime from
being worse, and that they are capable of recovering from the experience.  For many victims this is
framed as moving from seeing themselves as “victims” to seeing themselves as “survivors.”  It is the
potential strength of self identification as survivors that I am seeking to identify.
127
agency in situations of significant stress.  Great care will be needed so that the victim is not re-
victimized by an interaction that implies that they are at fault for what happened to them.  The
focus of this conversation will need to be around what choices the victim had available, given
that in moments of violent confrontation, the victim operates in a climate of constrained
choice.  The victim will reflect on what choices were made, what choices were available after
the event and how the victim responded, and what ongoing choices the victim is making in
responding to the harm, including the choice to engage in an RJ process.  The focus here is on
both the constraints within which the victim operates, and previous choices that are signs of
strength.241
Questions such as the following may be helpful:
When you chose to keep silent when the offender first threatened you, what other choices
might you have made?
What were the consequences of this choice?
What might have been the consequences of those other choices?
In what ways was your choice based on careful thought and in what ways was it an
instinctual response?
In what ways was your choice rooted in a sense of your own strength?
What choices do you see that you have now, in responding to the crime and the offender?
What choices have you made about dealing with the experience since the crime?
In what ways are these choices rooted in a sense of your strength?
128
Where are you finding support that enables you to make choices based in your strength?
Care in the use of these questions must be taken, particularly if the mediator senses that the
victim remains locked in their own sense of weakness.
Given the wide range of emotional responses to victimization, there are some victims
whose primary desire will be for retribution, to see the offender suffer harm that is at least
equivalent to the harm suffered by the victim.  While retribution is one aspect of tsedeq, it is a
retribution aimed at repentance, and it carries the hope that through the imposition of
punishment, the offender will turn and seek reconciliation.  Rather than focus on vengeful
victims as a problem for RJ, it would be better to see the opportunity the desire for retribution
represents.  Retribution as a motivation is grounded in a moral clarity about the offender and
the offence.  This presents the mediator with the opportunity to help the victim use this moral
clarity in a new way, to frame it in terms of judgment.  The challenge is that the victim may
not be able to do this in a way that focuses on the offence while continuing to respect the
offender as a human being.
The mediator may need to be intentional about creating opportunities for the victim to
reframe their desire for retribution as judgment:
You have expressed a great deal of anger about the offender, as well as expressing a
desire that the offender also experience a similar kind of pain to what you have
experienced.
I am wondering how you want to express that anger when we have the joint meeting.
How might you want to communicate to the offender the wrongness of what he/she did?
What do you want the offender to know about your experience during the crime?
What do you want the offender to know about how the crime affected you?
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In asking these questions it would be important to focus on the behaviour of the offender and
how that behaviour affected the victim.  The goal with these questions is to focus the victim
on what the offender has done, and not on the character of the offender.
When meeting with the victim, the mediator may not know whether the offender is feeling
remorseful or desires to make the turning away from a previous way of life that is a product of
repentance.  This may be because the mediator has not yet met with the offender, or it may be
because the offender still needs more time to think, or because remorse and repentance may be
dependent on the offender meeting the victim.  In any event, it is important that the mediator
assist the victim in thinking through responses to the absence of, clear expressions of, or
ambivalence about remorse and repentance.  The way the offender expresses remorse and a
desire for repentance can play a significant role in victim expressions of forgiveness.
Offenders frequently take the opportunity of an RJ meeting to express remorse to the
victim.  I am wondering how you would feel about a clear expression of sincere remorse
from the offender for what he/she did to you.
What might you want to say to the offender in response?
What might you want to say to the offender that would encourage him/her to express
remorse?
While many offenders take the opportunity of an RJ meeting to express remorse, there are
a few times when offenders, for a variety of reasons are unwilling or unable to express
remorse.  
I am wondering how you would feel about that.
If the offender does not express remorse, what might you want to say?
Offenders sometimes are quite confused about their own feelings about the crime and may
give mixed messages about whether they are remorseful, shifting between expressions of
remorse and not caring.
I am wondering how you would feel about this.
How might you want to respond?
Some offenders see RJ as an opportunity for repentance and to make significant life
changes 
How might you respond if this happens?
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Are there any ways that you might want to support the offender in doing this, either
with words or in actions?
How might you feel/respond if the offender doesn’t speak about this?
In each case these questions are framed so as to assist the victim in thinking about
remorse and repentance and what would be an appropriate response. 
The victimization experience binds the victim to the offence and to the offender in
powerful ways.  Victims speak of the offender and the offence as a constant presence well
after the offence, and in many cases the victims have a variety of factual questions related to
the crime itself.  These questions speak of an underlying need to have an accurate description
of the offence, combined with a need to hear about the offender’s state of mind at the time of
the offence.  This is often described in terms of curiosity, and in terms of assuaging fear.  A
common question that victims bring to RJ is whether they were random victims, whether they
were specifically stalked and targeted, and whether they need to fear further victimization.  
Victims need accurate information in order to properly engage in judgment.  They need to
know what it is that is they are judging.  If they decide to move past judgment toward
forgiveness they need to know what it is that they are forgiving.  The questions that victims
bring to the RJ process lay important groundwork for the later tasks of judgment and
forgiveness.
Just as offenders need to see the offence from both their own perspective and from the
perspective of the victim, so do victims need to see from their perspective and from that of the
offender.  One of the challenges of supporting victims in the step of seeing from the offenders’
perspective is that the experience of harm can make it very hard for victims to want to see in
any way other than their own.  Encouraging perspective-taking calls for great care.  Some of
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the following questions might be helpful:
What would you like to know about the offender?
The offender will likely tell you something about his/her background in response to
questions about why he/she committed the offence.  It is my experience that offenders
often have their own story of having been victimized.  How might you feel about such a
story from the offender?
It is my experience that offenders frequently experience the offence in the context of
various social pressures, ranging from their own poverty to the reality of racial prejudice. 
What would you like to know about these factors in the offender’s actions?  How might
you respond?
What would you like to know about the why the offender made certain choices regarding
the offence?
The ability to see both from their own perspective, as well as beginning to see from the
perspective of the other is central to forgiveness as the penultimate act of reconciliation.  The
ability of victims to move from a strictly inward focus on their own pain to recognition of the
humanity of the other is crucial to the desire to forgive and to the release of offenders from the
debt that is owed to victims.  In addition these questions help the victim begin to see the
offender within a larger world of pressures that contributed to the choices that the offender
made.
Victims may bring exaggerated views of a dualism between themselves and offenders. 
While maintaining respect for victims and the harms they have experienced, it may be
necessary to disrupt this dualism.  This may take two forms–helping victims to see the
humanity of the offender, or helping victims to reflect on the moral complexity of their
responses to the crime.  The latter response is risky.  There is the danger of backlash against
the mediator for suggesting that the victim is in any way other than innocent.  There is the
possibility that the offender is caught in the backlash and experiences significant harm. 
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Nevertheless, it is important that the mediator encourage reflection on the quality of victim
responses, whether they represent the victim as they want to be seen by others, and how they
want the offender to see them.  The goal with these questions is to encourage victims to reflect
on the affinity between themselves and the offender.
As discussed above in Chapter 3, Volf identifies a deeper non-innocence of victims, the
non-innocence of the human condition that taints any human judgment, and relativizes any
supposed victim/offender dualism.  Entry into this discussion is particularly risky, and not all
victims will be capable of engaging this issue. 
Describing RJ to victims in terms of the opportunity to forgive has the effect of limiting
victim interest in participation.  However, taking the opportunity to forgive is a significant part
of victim satisfaction with RJ.  This encapsulates the risk and the gain.  Mediators need to be
careful not to oversell RJ in terms of forgiveness, while still engaging victims in case
preparation in such a way as to prepare them for the possibility of the move from judgment to
forgiveness.  The corresponding gain is the possibility of reconciliation. Asking about
forgiveness directly may be helpful.
In what ways have you thought about forgiveness?
How might forgiveness be helpful for you?
How might forgiveness be helpful for the offender?
In addition it is important to help victims reflect on the ways in which their healing is linked to
the healing of the offender.  Direct questioning on this point may also be helpful.
In what ways do you think a meeting with the offender may be helpful to you?
In what ways do you think a meeting with you would be helpful to the offender?
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Opening the door to judgment carries two risks.  First there is the risk that victims will
remain focused on judging character, refusing to see the possibility of repentance, or to allow
the offender to become human.  The corresponding risk is that this will add to the inability or
unwillingness of the offender to carry through with the RJ process for fear of being harmed by
the victim.
d. The Restorative Justice Process
Once case preparation has been completed and the victim and the offender agree to a joint
meeting, there is a shift in the mediators’ task.  In a joint meeting mediators need to be
attentive to judgment/repentance/forgiveness patterns while assisting the parties in speaking to
each other.  This is much more difficult than the case preparation process, given the deepening
of the emotional content of the conversation as the parties seek to communicate with each
other.
Mediation is a dynamic process.  Despite any plans the mediator may have for where the
mediation should go, the parties will say what they want to say.  Moments of judgment,
moments of repentance, and moments of forgiveness drift in and out of the discussion, often
unheralded, usually unnamed, and frequently unrecognized.  One of the tasks of the mediator
is to recognize those moments and hold them up for participant response.  These mediator
responses do not necessarily require labels.  Just as participants offer forgiveness without
labeling their act as forgiveness, so the mediator does not need to say, “Folks, I just noticed
that the victim forgave the offender,” as the parties may reject the label even if they accept the
act.  Responses such as the following are more appropriate: 
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I just noticed that victim expressed concern in response to the offender’s last statement [a
statement of remorse or repentance].  What do each of you think that means?
I just noticed that the offender expressed a great deal of anxiety about what happens if
you meet on the street in the future.  Offender, can you talk more about that anxiety, and
victim, what are your thoughts on that question?
What I am suggesting is that as the mediator identifies moments of significant insight,
vulnerability, or expression of making new choices, the participants be invited to notice these
and comment on them.  These moments, identified and responded to, will slowly begin to lay
the foundation for transformed ways of relating into the future.
Accurately naming the criminal event is important to both victim and offender.  Offenders
may use a range of euphemisms that have the effect of minimizing the significance of the
crime.  To say “I raped her” rather than to say “I had my way with her,” is significant as the
latter phrase is a way of deflecting the full significance of the behaviour.  By naming the
behaviour with a word as freighted with moral and legal significance as the word “rape”, the
offender takes on a new level of moral culpability.  It is this ownership of the crime at which
judgment is aimed, and which the mediators will need to actively support throughout the
mediation.
 This naming is also important for victims, as the ability to name the crime as crime, using
the strongest appropriate language, enables victims to recognize themselves as victims, to see
that the crime was something done to them through no fault of their own, especially where the
crime is particularly traumatizing.  This is an important function of judgment.  Van Ness
recounts a story of a rape victim who continued to be distraught as the judge sentenced the
man who raped her.  The judge spoke to the victim after the proceedings were over, telling her
“You understand that what I have done here demonstrates conclusively that what happened
 Van Ness, Restoring Justice, 3.242
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was not your fault.”   Van Ness reports this as a significant moment in the victim’s healing. 242
It was in the act of judging the offender that the system was attempting to tell the victim that
she was truly someone who had been victimized.  Recognition of the location of responsibility
through the act of judgment plays an important part in supporting the vindication that the
victim requires for their healing.  While this story comes from the CJS, it points to the
important role of judgment for the victim, and highlights the loss to RJ if it is left by the
wayside.
Focusing the introductory parts of the RJ process on language of restitution has the
potential to limit the process to a discussion of restitution and thus avoid the reconciliatory
potential of RJ. This means that, while restitution needs to be part of the discussion early in
the process, it cannot be set up as the main purpose of the process.  The mediators have to let
the participants know that the process will give them opportunities to describe the event in its
fullness.  The corollary is that the process will give them the opportunity to hear about the
experience of the other in its fullness.  This interaction of the participants in the shared
experience of pain opens the door to new possibilities.  First each is humanized in the eyes of
the other.  In this humanization rests the possibility for hearing judgment as the judgment of
grace, the possibility for change in response to the judgment, and the possibility of
forgiveness. 
 Umbriet, Violent Offenders and their Victims, 102. See also David Gustafson, “Is Restorative 243
Justice Taking Too Few, or Too Many Risks?”, in Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard
Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 305.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS
At its core, in this thesis, I am arguing for a recovery of the initial impulses of the RJ
movement that saw itself as seeking reconciliation.  Reconciliation needs to be built on clear-
eyed recognition of the role of judgment and forgiveness.  I have identified some specific
practices that mediators can use in the process to open the door to full reconciliation.  More,
the structure of RJ needs to be scrutinized in light of judgment and forgiveness.  
Recall the critique of RJ suggested by Umbreit:
If crime is viewed as conflict between people and the importance of addressing the
emotional needs of both victims and offenders is so central to the model, why does VORP
focus so much on non-violent property offences in which the emotional trauma
experienced by victims is probably not as great as in crimes of violence?
If the model operates from a restorative rather than a retributive paradigm of justice,
why is VORP so closely linked to the concept of restitution, which many regard as merely
another form of retribution and punishment?  (The Reagan administration, for example,
supports restitution as part of its commitment to get tough with criminals.)
Even with the nearly exclusive focus on non-violent property crimes, if the VORP
model is committed to viewing crime as conflict between people and reconciliation as the
primary goal of the process, why is only one meeting lasting an average of one hour, with
rare exceptions, conducted between the victim and offender, rather than scheduling
follow-up meetings?  Is it realistic to think that ‘reconciliation’ will occur in such a brief
encounter?
To what extent is the very goal of the model, that of reconciliation, more an
ideological and symbolic value statement of its originators, rather than a grounded and
realistic goal that has a clear meaning to victims and offenders participating in VORP?243
Umbreit is correct in identifying the absence of so-called serious crime in the practice of
most RJ programmes.  In Canada there are only a few programmes that use mediation to
address crimes of serious violence.  If the full reconciliatory possibilities of RJ are to be met,
the programmatic focus on relatively minor non-violent property crimes needs to expand to
 Van Ness, “Pursuing a Restorative Vision of Justice.”244
 See, for example, Bowen, Boyack, and Marshall, “How Does Restorative Justice Ensure Good 245
Practice?”, 265-76; Boyes-Watson, “What Are the Implications of the Growing State Involvement in
Restorative Justice?”; Erbe, “What Is the Role of Professionals in Restorative Justice?”; Hakiaha,
“What Is the State’s Role in Indigenous Justice Processes?”
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include serious crime.
Reconciliation is not achieved in one hour.  A one hour mediation allows for little more
than the participants spending a bit of time talking about the crime itself, dealing with some of
the basic questions of the victim about the crime, and negotiating restitution.  Full exploration
of the meaning of the event, careful consideration of the needs of both participants, working
through judgment to the possibilities of repentance, exploring the possibilities for forgiveness
and achieving some expression of it, all take considerable time.  This has programmatic
implications, as increased time spent with participants means more money and mediators, or
fewer cases.
Zehr argued that RJ is an experimental plot that attempted to offer to the CJS an example
of what is possible.  No one knew at the start how it would develop.  There was an implicit
expectation that the CJS would pick up on the experiment and begin to give RJ some kind of
larger institutional life.  Van Ness went so far as to suggest a model of what RJ might look
like if fully implemented as part of the CJS.   Bianchi clearly argued that the CJS should be244
rebuilt using an approach modeled more concretely and directly on tsedeq.
Various critiques of RJ have been rooted in the recognition that as RJ becomes more
widespread, and is increasingly integrated into the mainstream system, something is lost.  245
That something is the core of what RJ was intended to be, an opportunity for the people caught
 Wonshe, “How Does the ‘Who, What, Where and How’ Affect the Practice of Restorative 246
Justice?”, in Critical Issues in Restorative Justice, ed. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 253.
 See also Dyck, “Practicing What We Preach.”247
 Wonshe, “Who, What, Where and How,” 255.248
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up in a painful incident to find some new ways of seeing each other and to begin the long
process of reconciliation.  Vulnerability to being co-opted and the attending loss suggest that
RJ may not be able to be a widely implemented and fully integrated, part of the CJS.
Wonshe, writing as an aboriginal person about her experience of RJ as implemented in the
CJS, notes:
The more I witnessed, the more I felt like Dorothy in the Land of Oz journeying to find
restorative justice.  Like her, I was surprised to discover the man behind the curtain
maintaining the grand projection.  I wanted to click my heels and go home, back to the
nurturing, loving and respectful community in which I had been living, where restorative
justice is modeled as a way of life.246
There are several insights here that I would highlight.  In the full sense that I am proposing, RJ
is rooted in a community of care and compassion.  Abstracted from a community and
implemented as part of a system, RJ cannot function in the same way as it does in a
community.  RJ is a way of life.  It is not primarily a practice, a process, or a system.  Rather,
it is a way of being in the world.   Wonshe recognizes that for this reason RJ can never be an247
alternative to the system.   It can however, function as a bridge between the community and248
the system.  The system will be the system.  RJ provides ways for the community to take
ownership of its conflicts, to enable the healing of the relationships of those harmed by crime,
whether victim or offender, to bring both offender and victim back into the circle of the
community.  It is here where the full potential of a RJ practice grounded in a theology of
 Bill Rankin,. “Circles of Support and Accountability: What Works,” Let’s Talk, Vol. 31, No. 3 249
[Website]. Correctional Services of Canada, 2007 [cited November 18, 2007], Available from
http://198.103.98.138/text/pblct/letstalk/2006/31-3/7_e.shtml.
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judgment and forgiveness can function.
This is not to say that RJ should abandon engagement with the CJS.  While RJ in its
mainstream manifestation is over 30 years old, it remains an experimental plot.  New ideas are
being generated, new models for doing RJ are being developed, and faith based organizations
continue to play a large part in the ongoing development of RJ.  One example will suffice. 
Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA), is now a national programme that works with
sex offenders after their release to assist in their reintegration into the community and to
provide support so that they do not re-offend.  The programme started in 1994 when Harry
Nigh, a pastor in Hamilton, formed a circle to support an offender that he knew.  One
volunteer describes his reasons for working in the programme in the following words: 
I used to be like everyone else.  I hated these guys.  Then I met one.  I realized pretty
quickly that he’s just like me.  He’s a human being just like I am.  Once I understood that,
I could not turn my back on him.  I hate what he’s done but if he’s willing to do his part,
I’m willing to be there to help him.  I don’t want there to be any more victims.249
Themes of judgment, repentance, and forgiveness thread through this description.  CoSA is an
example of programming that is clearly rooted in a profound understanding that tsedeq is a gift
that the church offers the world.  The fact that Correctional Services of Canada supports as
innovative and risky a programme as Circles of Support and Accountability suggests that RJ
experiments deeply rooted in the ground of tsedeq and shalom continue to be valued and can
continue to play a role in the way society responds to crime, including serious crime.  At the
same time, it is important that new programmes as they develop retain independence from the
 Howard Zehr, Transcending.250
 Howard Zehr, Doing Life: Reflections of Men and Women Serving Live Sentences: Portraits and 251
Interviews, (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 1996).
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CJS and that those born in the church continue to be rooted in the church.
It is this programmatic connection to the church, as well as ongoing lively debate about
the reasons why the church is active in such programmes, that will allow RJ to continue to be
nourished by its biblical taproot, and enable it to protect itself from the loss of vision that
worried Zehr twenty years ago.
As I completed this thesis I returned to reading two books by Howard Zehr,
Transcending,  which is a collection of photographs and interviews with people victimized250
by serious crime, and Doing Life,  a collection of photographs and interviews with people251
serving life sentences.  As I read and reflected on the stories and the photographs that captured
the strength of each person, I recognized again the unfairness of the labels “victim” and
“offender.”
I also saw themes running through the interviews: stories of survival against great odds,
people who had caused great harm gaining some empathy for those they harmed, people who
had been harmed deeply moving from desires for revenge to some understanding of the person
who had harmed them, people, in both books, who could be said to be serving life sentences,
recognizing their needs to change if they were going to survive, and who were, ever so slowly,
moving to recognize their common humanity.
It is this shift that I would want the proposals in this thesis to support.
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